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Implications of Species-as-Individuals: Kinds, Essentialism, Induction, De-Extinction
Mark Downing Lowe
University of Connecticut, 2014
The individuality thesis, or “species-as-individuals” (SAI), is the dominant view in philosophy of
biology. Biological species are not natural kinds, but individuals. This dissertation defends SAI
against recent proposals to reconceptualize species as natural kinds.

I argue that, despite

criticisms, the preponderance of considerations still weighs in favor of SAI. I then defend
another consensus view in philosophy of biology, that species have no essential intrinsic
qualitative properties (species anti-essentialism), against recent attempts to revive essentialism,
and show how SAI is better suited than the view that species are natural kinds to defeat
essentialism. I next develop an account of how it is that biologists can make reliable inductive
inferences about species – in particular, reliable generalizations – given that species are
individuals.

One motivation for reconceiving species as natural kinds is to provide a

philosophical grounding for these inductive practices, since the traditional view is that natural
kinds, with their essential properties, are uniquely suited for grounding inductive inference. My
account appeals to the causal processes which produce the degrees of uniformity and
homogeneity within species which permit biologists to make reliable generalizations; shows that
other sorts of natural kinds are also at work grounding such inferences; and argues that the
inferences in question demand only that species have stable, but not essential, properties.
Finally, I apply SAI to a controversial prospect in conservation, the resurrection of extinct
species by cloning (de-extinction). The received view is that once an individual is lost, it cannot
be recreated. I argue that the descent relation which makes offspring part of the same speciesindividual as their parent(s) holds between clones and their progenitors; thus clones of organisms

Mark Downing Lowe – University of Connecticut, 2014
from an extinct species are part of that species. This makes a resurrected species a temporally
discontinuous object; I give reasons to think there can be and are such objects. One argument in
favor of SAI is that evolutionary theory requires the spatiotemporal continuity of species, which
appears to be violated here. I maintain that evolutionary theory requires the historical continuity
of species, which is upheld on my account of de-extinction.
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Introduction

For centuries, philosophers had considered biological species to be paradigm natural
kinds. They had also assumed that, like all other natural kinds, every species had an essence,
some set of intrinsic properties which all and only members of that kind possessed, which were
essential to membership in the kind, and which explained why members of the kind were as they
are. As modern genetics developed, philosophers seem to have assumed that these properties
would turn out to be genetic: just as physicists and chemists had discovered that subatomic
particles, chemical elements, and various molecules were all characterized by a discrete and
unique microstructure, so biologists would discover that every species was characterized by a
unique set of genes, genetic properties, or genetic structures.
Species essentialism came under attack beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, largely at the
hands of the systematist Ernst Mayr, one of the founders of the “modern synthesis” that married
Mendelian genetics with the study of natural selection and evolutionary trends by field
naturalists.

Mayr argued that essentialistic, “typological thinking” about species had been

superseded in contemporary evolutionary biology by “population thinking,” which regarded
species as populations of unique organisms properly related to one another. Organisms were not
expressions of an archetype, and variation was not deviation from type, but the natural state.
Biologists were hard-pressed to find phenotypic or genotypic properties which all and only
members of particular species possessed, and upon which species identity depended. Moreover,
if species were temporally extended populations evolving by natural selection, it was hard to see
how there could be. Seen this way, species were open-ended entities which could, theoretically,
undergo indefinite change, gaining and losing properties without ceasing to exist. Essentialism
was at odds with empirical discoveries and biological practice.
1

In the late 1960s, Michael T. Ghiselin, a systematist trained by Mayr, began to argue that
viewing species as classes – i.e., natural kinds – was likewise at odds with empirical facts about
species (including the lack of any traditional species essence) and with biological practice.
Species were not classes, Ghiselin argued, but individuals. His work was shared with David L.
Hull, one of the first of those who we would today regard as philosophers of biology. Hull at the
time believed species were “cluster concepts,” and at first criticized Ghiselin’s work. But
subsequent conversations with Ghiselin convinced Hull that Ghiselin was right, and by the late
1970s, Hull became the most vigorous defender and elaborator of “species as individuals.” The
thesis was debated among biologically minded philosophers and philosophically inclined
biologists during the 1980s, with the debate reaching something of an apex in an edition of the
journal Biology and Philosophy dedicated to the topic in 1987.

Before the 1990s, the

individuality thesis had become the dominant view in philosophy of biology, and in much of
biology itself.
This dissertation examines some issues surrounding the individuality thesis. As I set
forth in more detail in Chapter 1, in recent years a number of philosophers have brought forth
more sophisticated arguments that species are indeed natural kinds. I try to show there that the
individuality thesis still deserves its dominant status. In Chapter 2, I deal with some recent
attempts to resurrect species essentialism, and I argue there that the individuality thesis is betterequipped to rebut these attempts than the rival view that species are natural kinds. Chapter 3
deals with an issue which has motivated a number of philosophers to construct theories of natural
kinds by which species could be natural kinds: the fact that species can ground many of the
inductive inferences and practices in which biologists engage regularly. Since longstanding
philosophical theory is that natural kinds, characterized by essential properties, must ground

2

reliable induction, an account is needed of how species can act as such a ground if they are
individuals with no essential intrinsic properties; I attempt in that chapter to provide such an
account. In Chapter 4, we arrive at a new challenge for the individuality thesis (and antiessentialism), the prospect, which is being explored by a number of researchers worldwide, of
resurrecting extinct species through genetic engineering.
Before we turn to these chapters, a few prefatory remarks are in order. First, in some of
what follows, I sometimes argue against particular positions – in particular species essentialism –
by pointing out ways in which they conflict with biological practice and theory. In this, I follow
a number of philosophers of biology, including Marc Ereshefsky and Elliott Sober. This may
worry some readers, who might be wondering whether I think there is any role for philosophy in
philosophy of biology. Those who argue that species have essential properties are contesting an
aspect of biological practice and theory.

If it is simply illegitimate to be in conflict with

biological practice and theory, then practice and theory are rendered immune from any criticism
whatsoever, and critics such as the essentialists we will meet don’t stand a chance, no matter how
sophisticated or cogent their arguments.
But this would be to misunderstand the nature of the enterprise. By and large, the
philosophers we will meet who disagree with the individuality thesis, or who propose that
species have essential intrinsic properties, see themselves as engaging in a thorougly naturalistic
project. That is, they are attempting to produce theories which they believe will be, to a great
extent, consistent with current biological theory and practice. Indeed, accounting for biological
theory and practice is often their motivation. When they do take themselves to be contesting
some asepct of biological theory and practice, they tend to see themselves as contesting some
single and dispensable aspect of that theory and practice, the rest of which they believe can be
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made to fit fairly unproblematically with their proposal. It can then become pertinent to show
that their proposal conflicts significantly with biological theory and practice in some other way
which they have not accounted for or anticipated.
Second, some readers may be bothered by the fact that, in what follows, I do not define
“species,” nor do I explicitly commit myself to any particular extant species concept, nor to
monism or pluralism about species concepts. I’ve done so for two main reasons. The first is that
attempting to solve the species problem – whether we take that to be coming up with and
defending a species concept, or arguing either for or against some sort of monism or pluralism –
is itself a project worthy of an entire dissertation (although I agree with the consensus that one
concept, the phenetic species concept, ought to be disregarded, due to internal problems with
pheneticism generally [see, especially, Ridley 1986], and, as I point out in Chapter 2, what I see
as the concept’s need to depend on other, relational species concepts to attempt to resolve some
of those problems). The second reason is that I have not wanted what I say in this dissertation to
be beholden to any particular species concept, that it should all stand or fall depending upon one
of the many species concepts that are on offer turning out to be the correct concept. The
positions I take herein remain true generally, I believe, regardless of which concept in three
broad classes of species concepts turns out to be correct: interbreeding concepts (such as the
Biological Species Concept, probably the most familiar concept, and which seems to be the one
philosophers of biology implicitly default to in writing about species), ecological concepts, and
phylogenetic or cladistic concepts. So, herein, where I believe that, under a particular sort of
species concept, a position which I propose would not work, or would turn out to be false, or
where I believe that adoption of a particular species concept would require refinement or
modification of one of my positions, I attempt to indicate this.

4

However, I do need to say at least minimally what I believe is essential to being a
species. What I presuppose about species in what follows is probably closest to Richards’
“division of conceptual labor solution” to the species problem (Richards 2010). Drawing upon
work by Mayden (Mayden 1997, 1999) and de Queiroz (de Queiroz 1999, 2005), Richards
proposes that we adopt a “hierarchical pluralism” whereby we have “theoretical species
concepts” and “operational species concepts.” The theoretical concepts will tell us generally
what species are – and, again drawing upon Mayden and de Queiroz, Richards suggests that
species are lineages of populations, or, more precisely, segments of those lineages, the segments
which are species being those which are bounded by, in de Queiroz’s terms, “certain critical
events” (de Queiroz 1999, 53; Richards 2010). On the other hand, other species concepts, such
as the Biological Species Concept, will be “operational concepts” – that is, they may be one of
several concepts which tell us how to identify or individuate taxa as species. They will be ways
“to connect the theoretical concept to nature, with all its diversity and variability” (Richards
2010, 136).
That species are population lineages satisfies two demands of evolutionary theory: that
species have a diachronic dimension as historical entities which change over time, and a
synchronic dimension as groups of organisms which “are connected or given some sort of
structure by biological processes” (Richards 2010, 132). The populations in question may be
small or large, ranging from demes to the entire synchronic dimension of the lineage – its current
time slice, encompassing all the organisms in the species at the present time. And the lineage
may be composed at a time of one or a number of populations (thus the theoretical concept may
be closer to that of what de Queiroz has termed a “metapopulation lineage” [de Queiroz 2005]).
What makes these populations components of the same lineage is that the lineages must be
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ancestor-descendent sequences; and since species are segments of these lineages which are
bounded by critical events, it will not be the case that a population of sparrows and a population
of rabbits existing at the same time will belong to the same species.
This is not meant as a full endorsement of Richards’ (or Mayden’s or de Queiroz’s)
position. It does, however, mesh nicely with what I would regard as a minimalist conception of
species – that species are essentially lineages (that is, ancestor-descendent sequences) at least of
organisms, if not populations of organisms.

I agree with Richards (and this is surely the

biological consensus) that species must have both diachronic and synchronic dimensions. But,
crucially for my purposes later, populations are composed of organisms, and not of other sorts of
entities. Even though species are individuals, with organisms as their parts, and organisms are
composed of cells, populations are not composed of cells, and neither are species.
One virtue of viewing species in this way is that it is consonant with the three broad types
of species concepts. Each of these may emphasize either species’ diachronic dimension or their
synchronic dimension. Phylogenetic concepts emphasize the diachronic dimension, with their
general criterion of monophyly, or that species are taxa containing all and only those organisms
descended froma common ancestor.

Interbreeding and ecological concepts emphasize the

synchronic dimension, given the weight they place on organism interactions, or on biological
processes (such as natural selection) which act upon organisms, at a time. Nevertheless, all see
species as historical, temporally extended entities, and all see them as entities upon which
biological processes act at the times at which the entity exists. Another virtue of viewing species
in this way is that it is friendly to the individuality thesis. Indeed, de Queiroz argues that his
“general lineage concept of species,” upon which Richards draws, implies the individuality
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thesis, since, “as a unified collection of organism lineages, a population lineage is a
quintessential composite whole” (de Queiroz 1999, 67).
Other terms and concepts which are commonplaces in the philosophy of biology
literature, but which may be unfamiliar to a general philosophical reader (e.g., “monophyly”), I
attempt to briefly define when they first appear in the body of the dissertation.

7

Chapter One
Biological Species: Still Individuals After All These Years
1. Introduction
Are biological species natural kinds, or are they individuals? In analytic philosophy,
species have long been regarded as paradigmatic instances of natural kinds.1 But, in philosophy
of biology, following a series of influential writings by Michael Ghiselin (1966, 1969, 1974) and
David Hull (1976, 1978), the dominant view for roughly the last 25 years has been that species
are individuals: spatiotemporally localized, historical entities to be identified with particular
chunks of the genealogical nexus.

On this view – which has come to be known as “the

individuality thesis,” or “species-as-individuals” (SAI) – the relation between organisms and
species is part-whole, not member-class (or kind).
Ghiselin, Hull, and their advocates have offered both positive and negative arguments for
their view. The positive arguments note that contemporary evolutionary theory treats species as
individuals, not natural kinds (Hull has argued that contemporary evolutionary theory requires
species to be individuals, not natural kinds); that there are important analogies between species
and organisms, themselves paradigm instances of individuals in both biology and philosophy,
which strongly indicate that species are individuals; and that a number of puzzling issues in
biology – such as the absence of laws of nature of particular species, and the resistance of species
names to traditional intensional definition – are resolved on the individuality thesis.

The

negative arguments point out important characteristics of biological species – such as biologists’

1

That most analytic philosophers assume, or have assumed, that species are natural kinds might seem so
uncontroversial that it needs no citation, but here are just a few: Baker 2000; Donnellan 1983; Elliott 1994; Kripke
1980; Mill 1950 [1895]; Putnam 1975; Quine 1969; Russell 1948; Salmon 2005; Wiggins 1980; Wilkerson 1993.
The view traces back at least to Book I of Aristotle’s Parts of Animals, where Aristotle writes of animals being
capable of being classified into groups or kinds which are natural. In this list, I am including philosophers who have
treated species, largely in their writings on other topics, as natural kinds, and am omitting the writings of
philosophers who have explicitly acknowledged or argued against the individuality thesis.
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regarding them as spatiotemporally restricted (i.e., that they have their actual origins
necessarily), and the fact that organisms belong to species in virtue of genealogical relations and
not due to possession of a set of essential intrinsic properties – which seem incompatible with
species being natural kinds.
Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the individuality thesis needs to be
reconsidered, and that species are indeed natural kinds. While a primary motivation for Ghiselin
and Hull was determining an ontological status for species which was consistent with
contemporary taxonomic practice, and with contemporary theories of how species are structured
and how they evolve, recent critics have been concerned primarily with the resurgence of
philosophical interest in natural kinds and the role which natural kinds are held to play in laws of
nature and in the inductive practices of the special sciences, including biology. Biological
species appear to be suitable targets of inductive inference, since it is possible to reliably project
the properties of observed organisms in many species to their unobserved conspecifics.
Critics maintain that for species to play the roles they do in scientific inference, they must
be natural kinds. They have had to meet two main challenges: one, species do not appear to be
eternal classes like the chemical elements, the other paradigmatic natural kind in philosophy, but
rather are fundamentally historical and contingent entities; and, two, species have no essential
intrinsic properties. According to contemporary biology, there is no set of properties which all
and only members of a particular species exhibit. The critics have responded generally, although
not exclusively, by reconsidering the nature of natural kinds, and viewing species as among a
historicized natural kind – a kind with a historical essence – or as a looser, property-cluster
natural kind, where no single property, or set of properties, is necessary or sufficient for
membership in the kind.

9

In my third chapter, I will take up the critics’ concerns about the individuality thesis and
the inductive practices of biology (and in my second chapter, I will defend the view, with which
most of the critics agree, that the biological consensus is correct, and that species have no
essential intrinsic properties, against recent attempts to revive such essentialism). In the present
chapter, I shall first review the positive and negative arguments for the individuality thesis. I
shall then turn to some of the recent criticism of SAI, and the attempts of the critics to recast
species as natural kinds. These will include proposals and criticisms by Boyd (1999a), Dupré
(1993), Elder (2008), Griffiths (1999), LaPorte (2004), Millikan (1999), and Wilson (1999).
What I intend to show is that, while not all of these criticisms fail, the proposals do, either on
their own terms, or because they fail to consider relevant disanalogies from the biological world,
or because they are in conflict with biological theory and practice. In particular, we will see that
Boyd’s “homeostatic property cluster” theory of natural kinds (and its historicized versions under
Griffiths), and similar theories of historical kinds from LaPorte and Millikan, threaten to erase
the important metaphysical distinction between kinds and individuals. There is also reason to
doubt that they can guarantee, as they wish to, the spatiotemporal restrictedness of biological
species.2 The conclusion I shall come to is that the preponderance of considerations still favors
regarding species as individuals.
2. Positive Arguments for the Individuality Thesis
As Sober has noted (2000), one of Ghiselin and Hull’s inspirations for the individuality
thesis is Mayr’s Biological Species Concept, under which species are interbreeding populations
of organisms which are reproductively isolated from all other such groups. Sexually reproducing
species are “breeding communities” (Ghiselin 1974, 537) or “breeding populations” (Sober
2

Griffiths, LaPorte, and Millikan all seek to make species spatiotemporally restricted. Boyd and Elder do not.
Wilson proposes adding genealogical properties to the homeostatic property clusters which characterize species.
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2000, 156), and these are individuals. As advocates of the individuality thesis see it, gene flow
within the group ensures that traits favored by natural selection will spread within the population.
Genes will also be selected for their ability to interact well with other genes in that population’s
gene pool. Lack of gene flow between populations allows populations to evolve independently
of one another, since traits will tend not to spread between populations. This makes breeding
communities fairly cohesive units. Sober points out that “causality, not similarity is the key to
their unity” (Sober 2000, 157), just as the parts of objects need not be similar to one another in
order to compose a whole, but instead must be causally integrated. Cells in an organism’s body
are parts of the same organism despite their great dissimilarity due to their “relations of mutual
biological dependence” (Sober 2000, 153). Advocates of the individuality thesis frequently also
point out that the thesis is not mereology (or not merely mereology); it is not an exercise in
mereological composition. Organisms are “incorporated” into species in the same way in which
an organism’s organs are incorporated into it (Ghiselin 1997, 40), where “incorporation” is a
more restrictive, causal notion. Even if for every mere collection of physical objects there is a
physical object which is their mereological fusion, such fusions are not biological taxa such as
species. This is because a fusion of “lions, trouts, dandelions, and fruit flies” lacks any degree of
“internal structure and organization” (Holsinger 1984, 296), something possessed at least by
breeding populations.
Advocates of SAI also point out that the conditions under which breeding populations
come into and go out of existence are the same as those of many organisms and other paradigm
individuals. A new breeding community comes into existence when it buds off from a parent,
just as a new hydra is born when it buds off its mother. They also can come into existence when
the parts of two distinct individuals combine:
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a hybrid species can be formed by the

interbreeding of fertile offspring which were the products of crosses between distinct species.
Breeding communities cease to exist when all their parts cease to exist, or when their internal
organization is disrupted.

And a breeding population continues to exist even if the

characteristics of its component parts change radically over time, just as an organism at the end
of its life has different traits than it did at the beginning, sometimes radically so: a butterfly is
the same organism as the caterpillar it develops from (Hull 1978; Sober 2000).
There are other analogies between, in particular, organisms and other paradigm
individuals and species Organisms do not belong to a species in virtue of sharing a common set
of properties, but in virtue of their genealogical relations. Two organisms which are not related
by descent within a single lineage do not belong to the same species no matter how similar they
are; and two organisms which are related by descent within a single lineage belong to the same
species no matter how dissimilar they are – just as two objects which are qualitatively
indistinguishable are not, in virtue of that, both parts of a larger object just because one of those
objects is part of that larger object; and as all the cells in an organism’s body are parts of the
same organism due to their descent from a single cell, no matter how dissimilar those cells are.
There are competitive interactions among organisms in a species, just as there can be competitive
interactions among the units of a firm; and yet a firm is an integrated, functioning whole which
can compete with other firms, just as a species is an integrated entity which can compete with
other species (Ghiselin 1974, 1997; Hull 1987).
The individuality thesis’ roots in the Biological Species Concept does not make it
beholden to that concept. Other concepts are amenable to the thesis as well, particularly those
which see a species as an evolutionary lineage “with its own unitary evolutionary role and
tendencies” (Simpson 1961, 153) or as an ancestor-descendent sequence of populations, as many
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of the phylogenetic species concepts do, since these concepts also regard species as integrated
units with beginning- and end-points in space and time. Yet, with the emphasis on sexually
reproducing species, one might wonder what advocates of the individuality thesis make of
asexual species, since in such species there is no gene flow to provide the same sort of causal,
homeostatic integration which characterizes sexually reproducing species, and which advocates
of the individuality thesis frequently cite in support of their view. Ghiselin (1987) and, to a
certain extent, Hull (1978), have been willing to follow Mayr (1987) and Dobzhansky (1937) and
declare that there are no asexual species. This does not make such lineages of organisms natural
kinds; the fact that asexual organisms do form lineages which evolve would, on one of the
negative arguments for the individuality thesis (species evolve and kinds do not), rule them out
as natural kinds. Rather, they would form “historical entities” which are not kinds but which do
not qualify as individuals (Sober 2000, 158).
(I wish to suggest, however, that there may be more hope for the individuality of asexual
species than some SAI advocates have claimed. Holsinger suggests that a necessary condition
for a collection of objects to be an individual, as opposed to a mere collection, is that “with
respect to a particular process,” the collection “behaves as a whole and is independent of similar
entities” [Holsinger 1984, 295].

There are many biological processes which might unite

organisms into entities which are more than mere collections, and gene flow by interbreeding is
just one of these processes.

Another might be natural selection acting upon common

developmental systems or other phenotypic traits which are held in common due to inheritance
from a common ancestor. Barring mutations or other errors of genetic copying, the descendents
of, say, a parthenogenetic female will be genetically identical to her, and so will respond to
selective pressures in much the same ways, e.g., changes in habitat, decline of a resource,
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appearance of a new predator, spread of a pathogen. This clone – the lineage including the
parent and its descendents – will behave as a whole with respect to selection, and will do so
independently of other groups of organisms.3 Over evolutionary time, however, it will begin to
behave less as a whole if – or as – the accumulation of mutations and other copying errors cause
later descendents to diverge genetically from their ancestor. Adopting this view might have the
likely consequence that each clone in what is currently considered an asexual species would
become a species in its own right; although Coyne and Orr have suggested that we consider these
genetically identical lineages which are nevertheless derived from a common ancestor to be
“microspecies” [Coyne and Orr 2004, 212].4)
Boyd and those who have adopted his HPC account of species as natural kinds claim that
the HPC view meets contemporary biology’s inductive inferential practices and “accommodation
demands” (i.e., satisfying the “fit” between the conceptual and classificatory resources of a
scientific discipline on the one hand, and the relevant causal structures of the world on the other,
that is required for the discipline’s inductive and explanatory aims to be achieved [Boyd 1999a,
148]). But individuality advocates have also noted ways in which the individuality thesis makes
sense of biological practice.

One of Ghiselin’s original arguments was that individuality

resolved outstanding tensions in taxonomy (Ghiselin 1974, 1997). Taxonomists tended to
3

A possible objection to this line of thought is that a collection of, say, water molecules will react in the same way if
subjected to some causal process, like heating. But water forms a natural kind, not an individual. Shouldn’t asexual
species, then, be natural kinds? Two things can be pointed out in response: first, it is not clear that the water
molecules respond as a whole, which a species would. Selection can act on organisms, but is a populational
phenomenon. Second, while selection can act on any stage of ontogeny, it operates cumulatively, over generations.
Its effects are felt over generations. The effect of heat on water molecules, or some other process acting upon kinds
like chemical elements, does happen over time, but not as a result of the differential survival and reproduction of
those molecules.
4
As I will discuss below in considering Millikan’s theory of species as historical kinds (and by the same token
Wilson’s and Griffith’s proposals to add a historical essence to Boyd’s HPC kinds), I think there are good reasons to
resist thinking of asexual species as historical kinds, if we think that all species – that is, all lineages of organisms –
are necessarily spatiotemporally restricted. So, if my suggestion regarding the individuality of asexual species
should fail, and there is not a sense in which asexual species are full-fledged individuals, then we nevertheless ought
to regard them as very individual-like historical entities – unless some reason can be given to think that lineages of
sexually reproducing organisms are spatiotemporally restricted while asexual lineages are not.
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regard species as classes, but many also believed species were real; and there remain notorious
debates as to whether classes are real. If species are individuals, however, then they are concrete
objects, and are as real as any concrete individual. So there is no need for classes to be real in
order for species to be real.
Taxonomy also faced confusion as to how or whether to define species names
intensionally. The problem is that there is great genetic and phenotypic diversity within species,
making it next to impossible to define species names in terms of necessary and sufficient
characteristics. At the time, taxonomists had proposed giving them “cluster” or “disjunctive”
definitions (Ghiselin 1974). But, as Hull had already pointed out, there are two drawbacks in
attempting to give a biological taxon a cluster or disjunctive definition. First, the definition will
be indefinitely long, since the sets of covarying properties within a taxon will be indefinite.
Second, and similarly, the definition cannot be completed until the taxon in question and the taxa
most closely related to it “in taxonomic space” have stopped evolving, for the definitions are
supposed to distinguish the taxa from one another definitively, and only until they have all
ceased to evolve “can it be decided which and how many properties are sufficient to distinguish
them once and for all” (Hull 1965, 326; emphasis in original). If species are individuals,
however, the need for problematic intensional definitions is avoided. Species names are proper
names and do not need intensional definitions.

More, the ontological status of species as

individuals explains why their names cannot be defined “in the traditional manner” of setting
forth necessary and sufficient conditions, or why their names resist cluster and disjunctive
definitions as well, since the proper names of individuals cannot be defined (Hull 1976, 180).
Ghiselin and Hull have also argued that the individuality thesis makes more sense of the
way in which species are named: ostensively, using the type specimen method (Ghiselin 1974,
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1995; Hull 1976). With the type specimen method, generally, a biologist who discovers what
she believes is a new species names the species and publishes a species description, which
includes the designation of a single organism to serve as the “type specimen” (holotype) for that
species.5 The species type then “bears” the species name (although the honored specimen
generally does not survive the procedure; it usually ends up in a museum or university collection
for later reference by other biologists). The species is then that population of organisms which is
related in the right way to the type specimen. What this means is that the type specimen need not
be “typical,” if there is any such thing. This highlights the fact that the property of belonging to
a particular species is just like the property of being part of an individual: it is a matter of
relations to other parts, rather than a matter of similarity to them (as in the member-class
relation). Much like the way in which Kripke argued individuals are given their proper names,
species are named in a “baptismal act” (Hull 1976, 180; Kripke 1980). That reference to species
is achieved ostensively, and, Ghiselin and Hull claim, species can be defined only ostensively,
just as is the case with individuals, indicates that species are individuals.6
The individuality thesis also comports well with cladistic schools of taxonomy, and with
their chief competitor, evolutionary taxonomy.

“Phylogenetic systematics,” or cladism,

developed by Willi Hennig (1966), insists that all taxa (above the species level) be monophyletic
(i.e., using that term as cladists do, they must consist of a common ancestor and all and only its
descendents), whereas evolutionary taxonomy, developed chiefly by Ernst Mayr (1969) and G.G.
Simpson (1961), countenances, in certain cases, paraphyletic taxa (i.e., those containing only but
not all the descendents of a common ancestor). Yet both emphasize taxonomizing according to
5

Parts of an organism, or fossilized remains of an organism, or a colony of organisms, may also serve as the
holotype. What sorts of entities are qualified to be name-bearing types is set forth in the International Code of
Zoological Nomenclature (for animals) and the International Code of Nomenclature (for plants). Name-bearing
types may also be designated retroactively for named species for which no type has yet been designated.
6
I believe LaPorte (2004) has raised a cogent criticism of this argument, which I address below.
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genealogy, and neither recognizes polyphyletic taxa – groups “united” only by exhibiting a trait
produced independently by convergent evolution (and note that some conceptions of species as
natural kinds, e.g., Boyd’s, allow polyphyletic taxa, if kinds are clusters of similar organisms).
Both schools view species as lineages – historical entities – bound together by causal biological
processes such as gene flow or natural selection.

As they are viewed by contemporary

taxonomy, species are branches of the phylogenetic tree – the “tree of life.” They are “chunks of
the genealogical nexus” (Hull 1976), and their identity consists in their position in that tree,
rather than consisting in satisfaction and maintenance of a set of intrinsic properties or
characteristics. There is also some evidence that Hennig himself regarded species (and higher
taxonomic categories) as individuals. All, he claimed, are “segments of the temporal stream of
successive ‘interbreeding populations,’” having “a beginning and an end in time” and a “constant
causal connection between the phases in which they are found at different times;” and so all
have, he said, “individuality and reality” (Hennig 1966, 81)(although he cautioned that this did
not mean that all taxonomic categories were individuals “in exactly the same sense as the
individual organisms that are the units of life” [Hennig 1966, 83]).7
Hull has also argued that, more than being more consistent with, or making better sense
of, scientific practice, the individuality thesis is required by contemporary evolutionary theory
(Hull 1976, 1978). Species must be individuals if they are to evolve by a process of natural
selection. Selection relies upon the differential “replication and reproduction” of organisms,
which are “spatiotemporally localized processes.” There is no “reproduction at a distance.”
Evolution by natural selection requires change in gene frequencies in populations of organisms,
7

This caveat is similar to one which Ghiselin reports he and Hull had to set forth in the early years of the
individuality thesis, in response to confusion from biologists over the use of the term “individual.” Biologists
regarded “individual” to be synonymous with “organism.” Ghiselin and Hull explained that they were not claiming
that species were an organism or “superorganism” (as colonies are sometimes portrayed), but simply concrete
particulars (Ghiselin 1997).
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and for such changes to accumulate, there must be “continuity through time” of the evolving
lineage (Hull 1978, 343). This means, Hull argues, that species must be spatiotemporally
continuous entities. Individuals are paradigm spatiotemporally continuous entities.8
Hull and others have also advanced what has become known as the “parity argument” for
the individuality thesis (Holsinger 1984; Hull 1978, 1988, 1989a; Sober 2000). The argument is
that, as we move up hierarchically, in terms of entities at lower levels being integrated or
organized into more inclusive – or, as Ghiselin would have it (Ghiselin 1997, 40), more
“incorporative” – entities, we should maintain the same ontological category. Genes are the
parts of and are organized into chromosomes, chromosomes are the parts of and are organized
into cells, and cells are the parts of and are organized into organisms. Organisms are then
organized or integrated into kin groups, colonies, populations, and species. Setting aside species
just for the moment, throughout the rest of this hierarchy, we have the part-whole relation –
individuals incorporated into larger individuals. Ontological parity would seem to require us to
regard organisms as parts of species, and since the rest of the more incorporative units are
individuals, we should regard species as individuals as well.
3. Negative Arguments for the Individuality Thesis
The first negative argument for SAI is that species evolve, but kinds do not. If species
evolve, then they cannot be natural kinds, which are abstract and immutable classes (Ghiselin
1987; Hull 1976). Another negative argument is that, as we saw above, organisms belong to a
species in virtue of their descent from other organisms, and in particular the common ancestor of
the species.

They do not belong to a species in virtue of their similarity, genetically or

8

In Chapter 4, I shall argue that, strictly speaking, species must be historically continuous; they must be historically
connected. The fact that an extinct species can be resurrected (the position I shall argue for in Chapter 4) shows that
they need not be temporally continuous, although in nature (i.e., without human intervention) they cannot be
historically continuous without being temporally continuous.
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phenotypically, to other organisms. They do not even belong to the same species in virtue of
their similarity to the type specimen, but due to their genealogical relations to it (Hull 1978). But
kinds are traditionally regarded as classes of similar entities, where membership in the kind is a
matter of similarity to other entities, traditionally a matter of possession of (satisfaction of) a set
of necessary and sufficient intrinsic properties. Traditionally, natural kinds have an immutable
essence, often some common inner constitution or structure which ensures that the members of
the kind are similar. But organisms in a species share no such essential inner structure.
Third, natural kinds are traditionally spatiotemporally unrestricted (Hull 1976); a sample
of gold is a member of its kind regardless of time, location, or manner of origin. Anything with
atomic number 79 would belong to the natural kind ‘gold’ regardless of where in the universe it
appeared. But biologists regard species as spatiotemporally restricted. A species that was
identical genetically to Gorilla gorilla but which originated in another part of the universe would
not be the same species, and the organisms in that species would not belong to Gorilla gorilla.
Species are also spatiotemporally localized. They come into existence at a particular time and
place, exist for a finite time, then cease to exist. As we saw Hull argue, there is no replication or
reproduction at a distance. At least in sexually reproducing species, propagules must be able to
come into contact, and this necessitates at least some spatial proximity among organisms. There
are no such spatial proximity requirements upon the natural kind ‘gold’ or its instances.
Finally, terms referring to natural kinds can and do feature in statements of laws of
nature, and while there may be laws regarding the species category, or laws about kinds of
species (e.g., ‘generalist,’ ‘sexually reproducing’), or about processes which involve species,
there are no laws of nature of particular species. Hull has advanced this as a consequence of the
individuality thesis – that if species are individuals, then there can be no scientific laws of
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particular species (Hull 1976, 1978), whereas others (Ghiselin 1997; Rosenberg 1987) regard the
individuality thesis as explaining the absence of laws of particular species.
Indeed, Rosenberg and Hull consider the lack of laws of particular species to be the
reason the entire individuality-kindhood debate is important.9 One of the goals of science is the
discovery and articulation of natural laws (as well as taxonomizing nature into natural kinds).
There is an important scientific distinction between classes, about which there can be laws of
nature – exceptionless generalizations which are spatiotemporally unrestricted, as are their
boundary conditions, making no reference to particular times and places – and individuals, about
which there cannot; the name of an individual cannot feature in a statement of a law of nature
(Hull 1976; Sober 1984b). As Rosenberg points out, there are no laws of Napoleon Bonaparte or
Mount Rushmore. Advocates of the view that species are natural kinds owe an explanation why
there are no laws about particular species, and why species, as kinds, cannot be “nomologically
incorporated in the theory of natural selection” (Rosenberg 1987) – by which, Rosenberg means
that evolutionary theory cannot, as special creationists often demand, “provide an account of the
actual course of evolution on this planet” as something derivable from the theory itself. Hull
makes a similar point:

that species are individuals explains why biologists cannot make

predictions about the development of particular species qua that particular species through time.
In order to make predictions about particular species, biologists must assign the species to a
relevant reference class, e.g., if Homo sapiens is assigned to the class of “generalist” species,
then it becomes possible to develop hypotheses about the development of Homo sapiens (Hull
1988, 430).

9

Ghiselin (1997, 16) claims that it was the lack of laws of particular species which convinced Hull, who originally
opposed Ghiselin’s individuality thesis, that species were individuals. Hull reports a different story; he says that
because he realized that conceptual systems must be treated as historical entities, his initial intuitions against treating
species as historical entities were overcome (Hull 1990, 259).
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Recently, Joseph LaPorte (2004) and Richard Boyd (1999a) have offered rebuttals to the
negative arguments of advocates of the individuality thesis. To a great extent, these rely upon
species being not what Millikan calls “eternal natural kinds” (Millikan 1999, 50) – natural kinds
such as chemical elements and fundamental particles where location in history plays no role in
the instances of the kind being similar to one another – but as “historical kinds,” ones in which
location in history does play such a role, those whose members must have “some causal
connection to an independently specified item,” such as “the beginning of a lineage” (LaPorte
2004, 11). I shall comment extensively below on this turn to historical kinds, in particular as to
whether as natural kinds they can be, as their advocates insist they are, spatiotemporally
restricted. My concern here is that (their advocates agree) such kinds owe their existence to the
occurrence of causal processes, and it is plausible that, for a process to be a genuine instance of
causation, it must, in principle, be repeatable (Elder 1998, 2008, 2011). What I shall address first
are Boyd’s and LaPorte’s responses to the negative argument from the lack of laws of particular
species.
The concepts of natural kinds and laws of nature are, of course, connected. Boyd’s
overall argument against the individuality thesis is that its view of natural kinds and laws of
nature is wedded to an overly logical empiricist desire to provide a “syntactic (or, at any rate, a
nonmetaphysical) distinction” between lawlike and nonlawlike generalizations, and to a “physics
envy” which led the logical empiricists to try to define kinds precisely, in the same way in which
they thought that (their idealized conception of) fundamental physics did (Boyd 1999a, 151).
The logical empiricists did not consider the actual “linguistic, conceptual, and inferential
practices in science,” and if they had, they would have seen that “the problem of projectability
and the associated accommodation demands” are no less real in the special sciences, and no less
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in need of explanation. A “proper theory of natural kinds” will seek to explain the actual
inductive successes of the sciences (including geology, biology, meteorology, and the social
sciences, and not simply an idealized version of fundamental physics) in terms of causally
sustained regularities, by which there are stable but imprecise clusterings of properties in nature.
These regularities do not need to be “eternal, exceptionless, or spatiotemporally universal” in
order to explain the reliable projectability judgments of the sciences. Due to the complexity of
the subjects which they study and the sheer number of “causally relevant variables” in them, the
laws of the special sciences will be inexact, and their kinds will not lend themselves to precise
definition. Moreover, in some of these sciences, the kinds which explain the science’s inductive
successes will have to be characterized in terms of relational and not simply intrinsic properties
(e.g., ‘alpha male’ must be defined in part in terms of one organism’s relation to other
organisms)(Boyd 1999a, 152-153).
Boyd claims that were it necessary that scientific laws of nature be “exceptionless,
eternal and ahistorical generalizations,” and that natural kinds be “defined by eternal,
unchanging, ahistorical, intrinsic, necessary and sufficient conditions,” that there could be no
laws and no natural kinds in any of the special sciences, including biology (Boyd 1999a, 151;
emphasis in original). What bears noting here is that prominent advocates of the individuality
thesis do believe there are at least some laws in biology (e.g., laws of inheritance, Fisher’s
fundamental theorem of natural selection, models of predator-prey interaction, “Mayr’s Law” of
allopatric speciation), and that biology has its own set of natural kinds (e.g., ‘peripheral isolate,’
‘predator,’ ‘generalist species’)(Ghiselin 1997; Hull 1987; Sober 1984b, 1996, 2000). Thus what
advocates of the individuality thesis must mean if they indeed regard laws as exceptionless,
eternal and ahistorical requires explanation.
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If they do indeed hold that laws of nature must be eternal and ahistorical, what they
appear to mean at least regarding laws of biology is that biological laws, like many other laws of
nature, hold only when certain boundary conditions are met. But these boundary conditions
themselves are not references to particular times, places, or entities. As Sober points out, if the
boundary conditions in Fisher’s model of the evolution of sex ratio are met anywhere in the
universe, then a sex ratio of 1:1 will evolve there and stay in place (Sober 2000, 16). To the
extent that advocates of the individuality thesis are committed to laws of nature being
exceptionless – given that there may be no laws which are, strictly speaking, exceptionless; no
laws the statements of which need not be accompanied with ceteris paribus clauses – what they
appear to have in mind is that when exceptions to such laws occur, not only is an explanation
required, but an explanation from within the relevant body of theory in terms of some interfering
or countervailing force, or in terms of one or more aspects of a boundary condition failing to be
in place.
Rosenberg, for example, claims that while a generalization such as “unspecialized species
tend to avoid extinction longer than specialized species” can be explained by evolutionary theory
when it fails to hold, a generalization such as “all swans are white” cannot (Rosenberg 1987,
196). This itself requires some clarification, since a skeptic might quickly respond that surely
there is some explanation, from evolutionary theory, as to why the non-white swans are not
white. But what Rosenberg means is that certain swans not being white is not, according to
evolutionary theory, “a disturbance from some mean property of members of a species which
provides its essence” (Rosenberg 1987, 195). To think otherwise is to assume the existence of
what Sober has called “the Natural State Model” (which he attributes to Aristotle), the view that
each species has a “natural state” and that variation within a species constitutes a departure, due
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to some disturbing influence or force, away from that state (Sober 1980). But, as both Sober and
Rosenberg point out, modern evolutionary theory has dispensed with the Natural State Model.
Variation is, as Rosenberg says, “the normal result of recombination within a lineage”
(Rosenberg 1987, 195). Thus, the failure of a generalization like “all swans are white” cannot be
explained by evolutionary theory. There is nothing in need of explanation. Yet were there a
failure of Fisher’s model of the evolution of sex ratio, or of the law of segregation, this would
stand in need of explanation from, and could be explained by, evolutionary theory in terms of
some interfering or countervailing force, or absence of some aspect of a boundary condition. If
this is correct, then even the inexact laws of biology are, in this sense, exceptionless, and there
are again no laws of particular species.10
LaPorte’s objection to the argument about the lack of laws of individuals requires, I
believe, slightly less treatment. LaPorte argues, in concurrence with Marc Lange (Lange 1995),
that if it is true that no law of nature can refer to an individual, then “anyone who understands the
nature of a law statement” could reject Aristotelian physics a priori, since there are in
Aristotelian physics laws about the path of the moon. “That,” LaPorte says, “seems wrong”
(LaPorte 2004, 14).
Yet surely the development of our understanding (in whatever state that may be) of the
nature of laws of nature – that they refer only to classes of objects and not to individual objects –
is one which has come in parallel with, and in response to, the development of modern science
(i.e., since the “scientific revolution” of the 16th and 17th centuries); and it is on the basis of the
success of modern physics, and the inadequacy of Aristotelian physics, that we have rejected
10

Against Rosenberg and Hull, I will grant, as will become important in the following chapters on species
essentialism and inductive inferences involving species, that there are lawlike generalizations about particular
species, e.g., “all tigers are striped.” This is because I accept that a generalization’s being able to support a
counterfactual is a sufficient condition of its lawlikeness (but not lawhood). But, following Griffiths (1999), I
simply take this to mean that the generalization allows one to make a better-than-chance prediction.
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Aristotelian physics. That is, there is an intimate connection between our current conception of
natural laws, including the fact that they cannot refer to individuals, and our current science, such
that if Aristotelian physics countenances or requires laws of nature of particular celestial bodies,
we can reject it on that basis. It was at least in part a discovery that laws of nature refer only to
classes or kinds, and not merely a conceptual invention or conventional decision; Aristotelian
physics simply gets significant details and facts about the structuring of the world wrong. And
while we ought to be open to the possibility that there may be new scientific theories, or that
what we think we know of the world may turn out to be wrong, this doesn’t entail
accommodating our current scientific concepts to possible yet thoroughgoing alternate ways of
doing science, including logically possible but as yet non-actual and unknown ways by which we
discover that there are laws of individuals.
LaPorte also cites a different example from Lange regarding the contention, upheld in
arguments for the individuality thesis, that laws of nature cannot refer to particular places and
times. Lange considers the state of affairs had Dirac turned out to be correct in his conjecture
that the gravitational-force constant is inversely proportional to the time since the Big Bang. In
that case, any statement of the gravitational-force law would have to include “an implicit
reference to some particular moment (for example ... to the time elapsed since the Big Bang)”
(Lange 1995, 433). Yet had Dirac’s conjecture turned out to be correct, it would be because we
turned out to be living in a universe quite different – perhaps fundamentally different – from our
own. It is not clear to me that what we regard as a law of nature must be sensitive to, or not rule
out, states of affairs not in distant possible worlds which our physical theories tell us are distant

25

from ours, but worlds where our best physical theories don’t apply.11 As Kitcher has pointed out
(Kitcher 2001), it might have turned out that Darwin’s “conjecture” that species transmute into
other species was false. All the evidence which turned up confirming Darwin’s hypothesis of
common ancestry might never have been adduced, and instead the only evidence which turned
up was (as creationists believe the state of affairs actually is) disconfirming. For some reason, it
is nomologically impossible for one species to evolve into a new species; every species must be,
and is in fact, specially created by God. It does not follow that our current concept of ‘species’
must accommodate such a possible state of affairs.
Regarding a different argument in favor of the individuality thesis, the definition of
species names, I believe LaPorte has (as I mentioned in a footnote above), identified a cogent
criticism: that the names of species can be defined intensionally (although far more thinly than
traditionally conceived).

The type specimen method might be used to ostensively fix the

reference of a species name, using a non-rigid description; e.g., the biologist who named the tiger
species might say, “Panthera tigris names the biological species related in the right way to this
organism.”12 But one could also define the species name by using a rigid description as the
definiens; e.g., Panthera tigris =df the lineage descending from ancestral population P and
terminating in speciation or extinction (P being the population which gave rise to tigers)
(LaPorte 2004, 54). Panthera tigris just is that lineage in all possible worlds in which that

Hull (2001) and Millikan (2010) make similar claims. As Hull puts it regarding species concepts, “Evolutionary
biologists have fashioned their species concepts to reflect the world as it is, not as it might be” (Hull 2001, 209).
The same point applies, I believe, to certain logically possible ways the world might have been.
12
The description, “the species related in the right way to this organism” is non-rigid because in some possible
world (possible, that is according to evolutionary theory!), the type specimen belongs to a different species than it
does in this world. No organism belongs essentially to its species. In some other world, a speciation event occurs in
the species to which the type belongs in this world, resulting in two new species; yet the same genealogical relations
carry forth in one of the resulting branches sufficient to ensure that the type still is born. In that world, a biologist
chooses it as the type specimen for that species. This is a possibility of which LaPorte is aware (LaPorte 2004,
184n14). And in this footnote, he lays out rigid criteria for a population to be P such that referring to P in the
definition does not render it circular.
11
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species exists. Since both the definiens and the definiendum pick out exactly the same entity in
all possible worlds, we avoid counterexamples involving the truth of statements about
individuals in counterfactual situations, such as those elucidated by Kripke (Kripke 1980), which
are generated when proper names are taken to be synonymous with non-rigid descriptions.
Notably, LaPorte’s example of a species name definition does capture the necessary and
sufficient conditions for an entity’s being just that species.
LaPorte intends this analysis to apply to the names of natural kinds, but it also applies to
species names even if species are individuals, and their names are proper names, even though it
would be problematic were it to apply to proper names in general. Suppose we defined the
proper name ‘David Hull’ intensionally using a rigid description which picked out Hull uniquely.
We would not have to worry whether the truth of a statement such as “David Hull was an
advocate of the individuality thesis” will in some other possible world depend upon whether
someone else satisfies the description which is synonymous with Hull’s name, since only one
individual can satisfy it in any possible world, namely, Hull himself. The problem is that, given
our conventions for naming human beings, and many other objects, which do not always require
distinct individuals to have distinct names, anyone else bearing the name ‘David Hull’ would
have to be identical to Hull. However, taxonomic conventions dictate that every species must
have a distinct name; so the names of biological species, and higher taxa, could be definable
intensionally using an appropriate rigid description as the definiens.
LaPorte’s responses to the remaining negative arguments for the individuality thesis (e.g.,
that species evolve yet kinds do not) depend upon whether it is plausible that there can be
historical natural kinds which are spatiotemporally restricted. So I shall turn my attention next to
attempts, including LaPorte’s, to develop accounts whereby species are just such historical kinds.
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These comments will also pertain to Millikan’s account of species as historical kinds, and will
affect some aspects of Griffiths’ theory of species as natural kinds, although Griffiths (like
Wilson) actually offers a modified version of Boyd’s HPC theory of natural kinds. I shall deal
with Boyd’s account separately. Because Wilson, who has also proposed that species are noneternal natural kinds, adopts Boyd’s HPC account largely unmodified, my discussion of Boyd’s
proposal will address both authors.
4. Historical Kinds
Millikan (1999, 2000), Griffiths (1999), and LaPorte (2004) all argue for the existence of
“historical kinds.”13 Physics and chemistry deal with “eternal kinds,” in which the properties of
the kinds studied by these sciences (and, Millikan argues, to a certain extent astronomy and
cosmogony) are bound together by “eternal laws of nature,” based upon some common inner
structure that the members of the kind all possess. Because the properties are bound together in
this way, the members have these properties necessarily, and, just in the way in which traditional
essentialism has supposed, the inner structure forms the essence of the kind. However, this
model is unfit for species, since there is no corresponding “inner structure” which all of the
organisms in a species possess. Species do not have a traditional essence. Instead, species are an
example of a “historical kind,” one in which the members resemble one another to the extent
they do “because of certain historical relations they bear to one another” (Millikan 1999, 54).
The essence of such a kind is this set of historical relations. For Griffiths and LaPorte explicitly,
this means causal connection to a particular historical origin (Griffiths 1999, 219; LaPorte 2004,
11); for Millikan, this is implicit, since she, too, accepts the biological consensus that species are
spatiotemporally restricted (Millikan 2010, 68). Thus, all three agree that, using LaPorte’s

13

Thomas Reydon (2006) also develops a historicized account of species as natural kinds which differs significantly
from that of Millikan, Griffiths, and LaPorte. I discuss it in Chapter 3.
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example, organisms which evolved on a planet around Alpha Centauri and looked just like
horses would not be horses, because they don’t share the same numerical origin with horses
(LaPorte 2004, 10).
On Millikan’s view, the “historical link” which causes the members to be like one
another consists in two facts: that “something akin to reproduction or copying has produced all
the various kind members from one another or from the same models” and that “the various kind
members have been produced in or in response to the very same ongoing historical environment”
(Millikan 1999, 55). With species, this first condition is met by the genes of organisms all being
drawn from a shared gene pool; the second is met by processes such as natural selection.
Griffiths shares this perspective: the “principle of heredity” acts as an “inertial force” which,
unless acted upon by processes like selection, ensures that groups related by common descent
have morphological and physiological traits in common (Griffiths 1999, 219). But, because the
“copying processes” which maintain the kind are not perfect, and because the external forces
coming from the environment which also shape the kind also are not perfectly maintained, there
will be variation among the members of the kind, the kind will have vague boundaries, and such
kinds will be unable to ground exceptionless generalizations; although they can be expected, due
to the degree of “homeostasis” which the historically extended causal mechanisms which do
produce similarity, to ground reliable generalizations (Millikan 1999, 56). Species are not the
only sort of historical kind. Griffiths and LaPorte both believe that higher taxa are historical
kinds. Millikan claims that models of automobiles (e.g., the 1969 Plymouth Valiant), particular
styles of architecture, retail chains such as McDonalds, and even buses on particular bus lines
count as historical kinds (Millikan 1999, 56; 2000, 22). LaPorte suggests that Levi’s 501 jeans
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are a historical kind (LaPorte 2004, 176n3)(Griffiths gives no other examples outside biology).
But species are, of course, for our purposes here, the important example.
It is easy to see how species as historical kinds are intended to meet the challenges posed
by the positive and, especially, negative arguments for the individuality thesis. LaPorte in
particular seems to regard the possibility of historical kinds as a response to the claim by
advocates of the individuality thesis that species cannot be kinds because species evolve and
kinds do not. LaPorte acknowledges that natural kinds are abstract. He regards them as abstract
objects, and notes that abstract objects cannot change. But to say “the species evolves” doesn’t,
he contends, mean that the abstract object changes; it means “successive members of a kind
gradually become different from their ancestors.” Likewise, to say “one species can evolve into
another” doesn’t mean that one abstract object can become a different abstract object, but that
“instances of one species-kind can give rise to instances of another species-kind” (LaPorte 2004,
9), in the same way that heavier elements like lead can be generated from lighter elements.
Yet this produces a new puzzle. Coming into and going out of existence are limiting
instances of change. So, if species are abstract objects, and abstract objects are incapable of
change, then species can neither come into nor go out of existence. This seems consistent with
what LaPorte says about the generation of heavier elements from lighter elements. LaPorte
denies that when the first instances of lead appeared in the universe, an abstract kind (i.e., an
abstract object) was generated. Yet biologists speak of species coming into existence and going
extinct (as do philosophers who hold that species are natural kinds; see, e.g., Elder 2008). This
means that, as we reinterpret talk of “species evolving,” we must reinterpret talk of species
“coming into existence” and “going extinct,” presumably in the same manner in which we
reinterpret talk of evolution. To say a species “comes into existence” is to say that the sorts of
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causal processes involved in speciation events produce the kind’s first instances, and to say it
“goes extinct” is to say that it fails to be instantiated (because the last instance has died). The
species itself is eternal, a slot in a “periodic table” of species (Sober 1984b) which is waiting for
certain sorts of biological processes to fill it.14
I don’t intend to dwell upon the problem of vagueness inherent in the question of just
which organisms constitute the first instances of a “new” species (‘new’ in scare quotes because
the species is, it seems, eternal), because the same problem of vagueness afflicts the question of
just which organisms constitute the first parts of a new species-individual. Rather, the puzzle is
one raised by Elder (2008): if species are natural kinds, in the way we’re considering now, it
would seem that, just as the same sorts of causal processes which can produce samples of gold
here on Earth can produce samples of gold elsewhere in the universe, the same sorts of causal
processes which on Earth produce organisms which instantiate a species here could instantiate
numerically the same species somewhere else in the universe with no historical connection to
Earth. Yet Griffiths, LaPorte, and Millikan all hold that species are spatiotemporally restricted.
I expect the advocates of species as historical kinds to respond that I have misconstrued
their proposal, and am confusing historical kinds with eternal kinds. Causal processes of the
same sorts which produced gold on Earth could produce gold elsewhere, but that is because those
sorts of causal processes need only be sufficient for producing the atomic microstructure which
is the essence of gold. But the essence of historical kinds, including species, is their origin in
some particular, singular event – numerically that event, wherever and whenever it happened to
occur. The causal processes which brought about or were involved in numerically that event can
no more bring about numerically the same event elsewhere than the causal processes which

14

Note that this means there are many more species than taxonomists could classify even if they found every species
on Earth. Every theoretically possible species exists, but many simply fail to be instantiated.
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produce some particular instance of the atomic microstructure which is the essence of gold could
produce, elsewhere, numerically the same instance of that microstructure.
My response is that this is true, but that this criterion is one by which we normally
individuate individuals, not kinds. The concern here is that the distinction Millikan tries to draw
between eternal and historical kinds collapses upon inspection. It is not the case that each
independent atom with microstructure corresponding to atomic number 79 is a kind unto itself,
just because that particular instance of the microstructure cannot be repeated; rather, it is an atom
of gold because of the sort of microstructure it has. To avoid conflating kinds and individuals,
why shouldn’t the advocates of species as historical kinds – which by hypothesis have their
origin in particular causal processes, in principle repeatable – say that it is not origin in just
numerically those circumstances and just numerically that instance of those sorts of causal
processes (whichever circumstances and processes those are which are appropriate for that kind)
which individuates a historical kind from all other kinds, but that it is origin in those sorts of
circumstances and tokens of those sorts of causal processes which individuate historical kinds
from one another, in parallel with how we individuate “eternal kinds”? Why must it be that the
members have been produced in response to numerically that ongoing historical environment,
rather than just that sort of ongoing historical environment (i.e., one which is numerically
distinct yet qualitatively indistinguishable; qualitatively yet not numerically identical)? They
are, after all, both kinds, and, traditionally, instances of the essences of kinds are repeatable. As
Elder points out (Elder 2008, 360), it is vanishingly unlikely that qualitatively identical
circumstances and historical environments would be reproduced elsewhere in the universe. But
if we are talking about genuine instances of causation, it seems it would have to possible in
principle. To insist that this cannot be the way in which historical kinds are individuated, that
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they – even though they are kinds – are necessarily restricted to particular regions of spacetime,
looks like stipulation, absent some argument. If species were some sort of conventional or
nominal kind, we could simply stipulate that their origin on just some particular planet at just
some point in time is essential to them. But the advocates of species as historical kinds regard
them as arising and existing mind-independently.
With the theory of meaning she develops in (Millikan 2010), Millikan does set forth an
argument for the spatiotemporal restrictedness of historical kinds. The argument is that, given
the meaning of natural kind terms, including the names of species, certain kinds (i.e., historical
kinds) will be spatiotemporally restricted. Millikan suggests that the meaning of a term is its
“stabilizing function.” The stabilizing function of any language form is “an effect it has had that
encouraged speakers to keep reproducing it and hearers to keep responding to it in a roughly
uniform way” (Millikan 2010, 53).

Empirical terms, like ‘water’ or ‘weasel’ have two

stabilizing functions: one, to “help carry information” about natural kinds – various “clottings”
or “clumps” of properties which, due to the operation of various causal mechanisms or processes,
turn up again and again – and about the instances of those kinds; and, two, to “direct attention or
action towards” the things which are the extensions of these kinds (Millikan 2010, 64).15
Millikan creates a thought experiment like Putnam’s Twin Earth, except that Millikan’s Twin
Earth is like Earth “in every detail,” including that its water is H2O. This Twin Earth has
duplicates of Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, and Chelsea Clinton, and of weasels. But the Twin
Earth weasels are not the same species as the weasels of Earth (in fact, ‘weasel’ names a genus,
so let us pick a species: Long-tailed weasels, or Mustela frenata, since some of Millikan’s

They are also to carry information about and direct attention toward natural “peaks,” which are “natural end
points” of kinds, such as the “natural peaks in discrimination distance for the human visual system;” peaks are the
anchors for many adjectives, adverbs, and words for “mixed substances” containing “various proportions of pure
elements and compounds,” such as milk and wine. Some kinds can serve as peaks (Millikan 2010, 63).
15

33

“Twin Earth fable” involves weasels indigenous to Connecticut, which Mustela frenata is).
When farmer Jones tries to call state agricultural consultant Barnes to get information about his
weasel problem, and gets connected instead to Twin Barnes, they talk extensively, but Jones
talks about weasels, whereas Barnes does not.
The argument for the spatiotemporal restrictedness of historical kinds is this: the term
‘weasel’ arose on Earth to convey information about and direct attitudes toward Earth weasels,
“an individual, self-perpetuating, earthly clump, constrained by properties of its actual,
contingently ongoing environment,” and not about the qualitatively identical organisms of Twin
Earth. The “results of measurement” using that term are constant here on Earth “for a reason”
(Millikan 2010, 69; emphasis in original)(i.e., a species like Mustela frenata is a historical kind –
the organisms in it are like one another due to copying processes and subjection to the same
environmental pressures). Millikan grants that we might augment her fable by “telling a story”
about why Earth and Twin Earth are the same, so let us do so: they are the same because the
very same sorts of causal processes produced both; their histories are qualitatively identical
(although numerically distinct).16 So although there is a reason why the “weasels” of the two
worlds are alike, Twin Earth weasels are not like one another “for the same reason” that Earth
weasels are like one another (Millikan 2010, 68). So, the “results of measurement” using the
term ‘weasel’ for the species of both worlds will not be constant for a reason, and attempting to
use the term in that way robs it of its meaning. The species of Twin Earth which is qualitatively
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This, I imagine, is the strongest reason the two worlds could be the same, without there being any causal
connection between the two; that is, events don’t happen on Twin Earth because of events on Earth. Millikan rules
this out in her thought experiment, so I will abide by it. The worlds simply develop in parallel, accidentally. I
choose this reason because it ensures that the two worlds are alike “in every detail,” and because it ensures that the
entire history of weasels on both worlds is qualitatively identical. There can be no escape by pointing to some detail
of the histories of the two putative kinds which is different.
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indistinguishable from Mustela frenata is not Mustela frenata; historical kinds are
spatiotemporally restricted.
Yet, consider an “eternal kind,” water. The stabilizing function of the term ‘water’ must
be to convey information about and direct attitudes toward water. But water where? The term,
and the concept, developed here on Earth in response to a stuff on Earth; yet if we insist on
Earthboundedness, then the qualitatively identical stuff on Mars is not water. Presumably, the
stabilizing function of the term is to convey information about this stuff wherever we may find it.
Why, then, is the stabilizing function of the term ‘weasel’ not that of conveying information
about that clotting of properties wherever we may find it? Millikan says that the stabilizing
function (and so the “current meaning”) of a word “rests on what has, as a contingent matter of
fact, been holding its usage in place, effecting agreement among users and for users with
themselves, despite the use of a variety of alternative recognition techniques” (Millikan 2010,
65). What has been holding the usage of ‘water’ in place is the microstructure H2O – not any
particular instance of this microstructure, but instances of it, this sort of microstructure, one
which we later find gets instantiated elsewhere in the universe. But then, wouldn’t we have to
say – in parallel, since we are dealing with natural kinds – that what has been holding the usage
of ‘weasel’ in place is these organisms’ descent from a historical milieu – not any particular
instance of this milieu, but this sort of milieu?
We cannot say that ‘water’ arose in response to a kind the essence of which is a
microstructure which can be, as it turns out, instantiated anywhere in the universe, whereas
‘weasel’ or ‘Mustela frenata’ arose in response to a kind the essence of which is
spatiotemporally restricted, for that begs the question. The argument from stabilizing function is
intended to show that historical kinds are spatiotemporally restricted. We cannot assume that the
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weasel kind is spatiotemporally restricted, whereas the water kind is not, and that is why the
stabilizing function of ‘weasel’ is (or can be) to convey information about some organisms only
on Earth, whereas the stabilizing function of ‘water’ is (or can be) to convey information about
some molecules anywhere in universe. Nor can we say that among the properties in the clot
which is the weasel kind is its link to a particular – that is, to just numerically that – ongoing
historical environment and origin, for that begs the question as well. Indeed, if by her premise
about weasels being an earthly clump, or her reference to their actual environment, Millikan
means weasels are a necessarily earthly clump, or that its evolution in its actual environment on
Earth is one of its essential properties, then it already begs the question. In order for the
argument from stabilizing function to show that historical kinds are spatiotemporally restricted,
we can assume that the weasels form a kind (since they are “like one another”), and that this is
due to historical relations the organisms bear to one another (by copying), or to some ongoing
shared environment (and so they are a historical kind), but we cannot assume that among these
relations is that to just numerically that environment, and not one qualitatively identical to it.
Millikan’s argument seems to me to suffer from equivocations on “accident” and “the
same reason.” The latter is a type-token equivocation. Let us assume that the same types of
causal processes produced Twin Earth as produced Earth, albeit distinct tokens of those types of
processes (i.e., coincidentally, everything which happened to make Earth as it is happened with
Twin Earth to make it like Earth in every detail). The Twin Earth weasels are not like each other
for the same reason Earth weasels are like one another, in the sense that different tokens of
certain types of causal processes, in principle repeatable, produced the Earth versus the Twin
Earth weasels. But in another sense, Twin Earth weasels are like each other for the same reason
the Earth weasels are like one another, namely, they come from qualitatively the same causal

36

processes and events. They are the products of qualitatively the same pattern of descent. As
Millikan points out, the resemblance of Twin Earth in every detail to Earth is accidental; by
hypothesis, there is no causal connection between the two (Millikan 2010, 67). It’s an accident
that both contain creatures which look like weasels; indeed, it’s an accident that Earth contains
the genus Mustela. Neither planet, it seems, had to contain those creatures. It’s also an accident
that there is water on both Earth and Mars, an accident that they resemble one another in that
way; neither had to contain water. But it’s no accident that the stuff there has the same
properties as the stuff here. They both have the same (type of) microstructure (although distinct
tokens of it). But the weasels on Earth and Twin Earth (or at least their origins) both are the
products of the same types of (i.e., qualitatively identical) generative processes. If they are
kinds, and not individuals (which we agree are spatiotemporally restricted), why isn’t it then no
accident that they are alike?
Perhaps it is an accident that the weasels of the two planets are like one another in their
respective present days on their respective planets. But, if the two worlds are like one another in
every detail, the weasels of the two worlds also would have been like one another at their
inceptions as well (that is, the Twin Earth weasels would have been like the Earth weasels), and
here it seems to be less an accident, since, by hypothesis, the very same causal processes acting
upon qualitatively identical circumstances (i.e., the characteristics of the common ancestors of
the Earth weasels and the Twin Earth weasels, or their respective founder populations) generated
both the Earth weasels and the Twin Earth weasels. It is an accident (it seems) that both planets
ended up manifesting those circumstances. But given that they did, it doesn’t seem to be an
accident that the initial phases of Mustela frenata and its Twin Earth counterpart ended up
qualitatively identical, any more than it would be an accident if the same causal processes which
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on Earth produce an H2O microstructure were to produce, operating on Twin Earth, an H2O
microstructure as well; i.e., a qualitatively identical microstructure. Indeed, it seems it would be
expected.
Up until now, I have been focusing on doubts that historical kinds can be
spatiotemporally restricted. Let me turn to the way in which I think they blur (or eliminate) the
distinction between kinds and individuals. Millikan’s proposal for species as historical kinds
starts from the observation that the organisms in a species are “like one another.” LaPorte’s has
a different starting point. LaPorte argues that for every property there is a corresponding kind,
“the essential mark of which is to possess that property” (LaPorte 2004, 15). Even if species are
individuals, with organisms as their parts, then for every species-individual S, there is the
property of “being a part of S,” and possessing that property is an essential mark of that kind.
So, there is a kind whose members all share that property, and that will be a species-kind.
Alternately, although LaPorte does not explicitly use this example, there is the property of “being
the lineage of organisms descended from ancestral population P,” for which there is a
corresponding kind. If species are lineages, then for each distinct species there will be a distinct
corresponding kind, and each species will be the unique instance of this kind (there will also, of
course, be the property of “being part of the lineage of organisms descended from ancestral
population P,” and so, again a corresponding kind whose members all share that property).
These kinds will be more or less natural to the extent that they are more or less theoretically
significant, meaning to the extent that being of that kind is explanatory (LaPorte 2004, 19). And
these kinds will be historical in that all the members have a “causal connection to an
independently specified item,” e.g., the beginning of that individual or lineage (LaPorte 2004,
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11). Species are historical natural kinds either because being a member of that kind, or being of
that kind, is explanatory.
Yet consider that there is also the property of “being the cell lineage descended from E,”
where E is the embryo from which all the cells which currently compose me are descended. So,
there is a corresponding kind, and I am the unique instantiation of it. Or, there is a kind the
essential mark of which is being part of the individual which is me (which has its origin in a
particular embryo), and every member of that kind (i.e., every part of me) has that property.
That I am of this kind, or that something which is part of me is of that kind, seems to be fairly
explanatory, as both kinds involve reference to my genetic and developmental heritage, and that
is at least partially explanatory of why most of my hair is now gray, why my nose is shaped as it
is, and why I might have particular susceptibilities to various diseases or disorders, including
cancer, or heart disease, or Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s. So, I am a natural kind, and a historical
one (and, if I am correct in my analysis of LaPorte’s contention that species are abstract objects
which never change, then my kind is also eternal, a slot in a “periodic table of organisms” which
was waiting for the right sorts of causal processes to fill it).
LaPorte’s actual position is that something like this is exactly right. Even if I am an
individual with parts, I am also a kind with members. Regarding species, “[g]iven both a kind
and an individual, it seems plausible to suppose that fans of part-talk will prefer in general to
reconstruct species-talk as talk about the parts of an individual, and fans of membership-talk will
prefer to reconstruct species-talk as talk about kinds.” So, we have “no need to reject the idea
that the organisms of a species constitute an individual.” We can talk about them either way, and
neither way will “affect the acceptability of ordinary scientific claims” (LaPorte 2004, 17). As it
goes for species-individuals, it seems it must go for any sort of individual. But then, as Richards
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asks in his own discussion of LaPorte, and the general “species problem,” “why is there even a
debate about the metaphysical status of species?” (Richards 2010, 170).
Richards answers his own question by suggesting, as we have seen Hull has, that one
position might be “more coherent with evolutionary theory” than the other; and while he believes
there is “no conclusive answer yet” as to which position better coheres with evolutionary theory,
he “suspects” it will be the individuality thesis (and, indeed, he tends to argue in its favor). One
of the considerations he brings forward in favor of individuality is that individuals have an
internal cohesion, which species seem to possess and natural kinds do not (As we will see,
Ereshefsky, in his discussion of Boyd’s HPC theory of natural kinds, points out that an important
metaphysical distinction between kinds and individuals is that the parts of an individual must be
causally connected in some way, whereas the members of a kind need not be [Ereshefsky 2010]).
Another consideration that we have already seen in this chapter is that while there are laws
involving natural kinds, there are no laws of individuals. Natural kinds are the sorts of things
about which there at least can be laws of nature, whereas individuals are not. Biologists regard
species as spatiotemporally restricted, yet paradigm natural kinds such as the chemical elements
are not, and, as I have attempted to show, it is not clear that historical kinds can be. It seems that
our conclusion ought to be that, even if there are historical kinds, including historical biological
kinds, that species are not among them. If we wish to preserve the distinction between kinds and
individuals, and uphold the view that species are spatiotemporally restricted, we need to reject
approaches like Millikan’s and LaPorte’s, and conclude that species are individuals.
5. HPC Kinds, and Boyd’s Attack on the Individuality Thesis from Induction
Richard Boyd, in a series of papers (1988, 1989, 1991, 1999a, 1999b), has argued for the
existence of “homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kinds,” and applies this idea at length to
40

biological species and higher taxa in (Boyd 1999a). HPC kinds are marked by stable, but not
fixed, non-accidental clusters of properties, where stability is maintained either because the
presence of one or some of the properties promotes the presence of others; or because of the
operation of causal mechanisms which tend to produce the properties in the cluster as a cluster,
and which tend to continue to do so against the influence of perturbing factors (hence
homeostasis). The cluster is disjunctive; members of such kinds will tend to have a number of
properties in common, but they need not have all properties in common. So, HPC kinds lack a
traditional essence. Boyd maintains that HPC kinds do have essences, although it is somewhat
unclear what he believes them to be; they seem to be either the causal homeostatic mechanisms
themselves, or the relation which those mechanisms bear to the characteristic properties in the
homeostatic cluster (Boyd 1999, 156; Griffiths takes them to be the the relation which instances
of the kind bear to the mechanisms [Griffiths 1999, 218].). The homeostatic mechanisms will
produce clusterings of properties only imperfectly, so HPC kinds will not be characterized by
crisp, precise sets of properties; their boundaries will be ineliminably vague. In this, HPC kinds
are much like Millikan’s conception of historical kinds, where such kinds lack crisp boundaries
because the copying processes among the members, and the external kind-shaping processes in
the ongoing historical environment, will be imperfect. When it comes to biological species, the
causal homeostatic mechanisms will be processes and factors such as interbreeding within the
kind and reproductive isolation from non-members, natural selection, “coadapted gene
complexes,” and developmental constraints (Boyd 1999a, 165).
Since it is not the case that possession of any single property in the cluster is necessary
and sufficient for membership, nor is possession of any particular set of properties in the cluster
necessary and sufficient for membership, Boyd believes such kinds are particularly apt for
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application to species.

Because HPC kinds are natural kinds exhibiting stable property

clusterings, they are apt for the making and supporting of lawlike generalizations and inductive
inferences, such as those made by biologists regarding particular species.

But just as the

boundaries of HPC kinds will be vague, the lawlike generalizations regarding such kinds will not
be exceptionless (as lawlike generalizations about particular species are not). Since none of the
properties in the cluster is essential to that kind, HPC kinds can gain or lose properties over time,
and so species as HPC kinds are, Boyd believes, consistent with evolution, unlike traditional
“eternal” kinds.
With respect to biological practice, Boyd’s account of species as HPC kinds suffers from
several drawbacks, as Ereshefsky (2010) has independently noted. The leading contemporary
schools of taxonomy – cladistics and evolutionary taxonomy – classify taxa according to history,
not similarity. Organisms belong to species in virtue of their relations to other organisms, not in
virtue of their similarity to them. More inclusive taxa – clades – are delimited in terms of their
phylogenetic relationships, not their similarity to one another. All of life on Earth forms a single
phylogenetic tree; contemporary taxonomy attempts to determine how that tree is segmented into
branches. Aside from philosophical concerns regarding bare notions of similarity which are
unguided by some background theory or assumptions (Sober 2000), due to such phenomena as
convergent evolution, similarity (e.g., the “overall similarity” advocated by the phenetic school
of taxonomy) is a problematic guide to phylogenetic relationship.
But Boyd is quite clear that, as with traditional natural kinds, membership in an HPC
kind is a matter of possessing particular intrinsic properties, not historical relationship (Boyd
1999b). HPC kinds, Boyd thinks, cannot have historical essences. In response to a suggestion
by Millikan (Millikan 1999) that HPC kinds be defined by historical relations rather than
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intrinsic properties, since many of Boyd’s examples of HPC kinds have historical dimensions,
Boyd has agreed that species are “necessarily limited to a particular historical situation” – by
which he just means that “commonalities in evolutionary tendencies” must arise within a shared
historical framework (Boyd 1999b, 80). But he rejects any attempt to define HPC kinds in
general, and species in particular, by historical relations. He rejects it in general because he
believes it is the “shared features” of natural kinds which are “centrally important” to the
inductive practices and the meeting of accommodation demands in various sciences, including
biology – and not, in biology, historical relations among taxa (Boyd 1999b, 82). He rejects it for
species in particular also because, he says, just as it is true that populations in a species would
not tend to be subject to the same evolutionary forces were they in different historical
circumstances, so they would not so tend if they did not share many phenotypic characters.
The problem with this response is that historical relations among taxa do play a role in
the inductive practices of biologists in certain contexts. As one example, it can be useful in
predicting the likely effects of a vaccine upon a particular virus to know the virus’ phylogeny.
Boyd’s position also entails – as Boyd acknowledges – that were a species to evolve on some
distant planet manifesting the same cluster (or as same as can be gotten given the vague nature of
the cluster) of phenotypic properties, sustained by the same sorts of homeostatic mechanisms, as
in Panthera tigris, it would, on the HPC account, be the same species, regardless of ancestry.
Successive populations of this species would, after all, be in a shared historical framework, just
not one shared with (Earth-bound) Panthera tigris. This is, of course, the same implication
which advocates of more Millikanian historical kinds seek to deny their account leads us to, and
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which I put pressure upon above. Indeed, Boyd is also skeptical that there can be any natural
kinds which are spatiotemporally restricted (Boyd 1999b, 83).17
Other problematic aspects of Boyd’s HPC account, and its application to the question of
the metaphysical status of species, will emerge if we consider the ways in which Boyd argues
against the individuality thesis from the need for species to be the sort of entity which can
ground inductive inferences. As we saw at the start of this chapter, and will explore in depth in
Chapter 3, this concern is at the heart of recent proposals to reconceptualize species as natural
kinds. As we will see Elder also does (Elder 2008), Boyd claims that even advocates of the
individuality thesis must treat species as natural kinds for the purposes of inference and
explanation (Boyd 1999a, 168). Boyd gives two interrelated arguments based upon inductive
practice in order to attack the individuality thesis in favor of his view that species are
homeostatic property cluster (HPC) natural kinds. The first we have already seen: shared
phenotypic properties, not historical connectedness, make the important contributions to what
Boyd calls “accommodation” in biology, and hence are what unite the members into a species.18
Second, the sort of evolutionary unity species possess, and which advocates of the individuality
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Griffiths (1999) has proposed grafting a historical essence onto the HPC account for species; Wilson (1999)
proposes adding genealogical properties to the HPC. Griffiths and Wilson regard historical relations as a
homeostatic causal mechanism maintaining properties in the cluster. While I shall argue in Chapter 3 that
inheritance is one of the processes promoting species cohesion and uniformity, and while historical relation is
necessary for inheritance, it is not clear that mere historical relation to a common ancestor is a causal mechanism.
Even if it is, I believe Griffiths’ and Wilson’s proposal will create all the same problems which I diagnose in
Chapter 2 in my discussion of Elder’s attempt (Elder 2008) to make belonging to a species a matter of a conjunction
of ancestry and satisfaction of a rough phenotypic profile.
18

Boyd neglects to mention shared genotypic properties making important contributions to accommodation in
biology. My guess is that he does so because the “shared phenotypic characters of the sort sustained by mechanisms
of property homeostasis” (Boyd 1999a, 167) are, intuitively, most like the “surface level” properties or scientifically
interesting properties of natural kinds like water. This might give us uniformity in the classificatory practices of
science (even though, again, classification of species by phenotypic characters conflicts with the predominant
schools of classification). But, presumably, genotypic properties would also be maintained by homeostatic causal
mechanisms, so this oversight is curious. Nevertheless, I don’t believe that this omission by itself is fatal to his HPC
account, and in what follows I shall assume that both phenotypic and genotypic properties can make what Boyd
would consider the important contributions to accommodation.
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thesis emphasize – unity due to common descent and reproductive integration – and which Boyd
claims is both “anticipated” by inferences in evolutionary biology and “required” by the
accommodation demands of biology, just is the homeostatic unity “appropriate to” HPC kinds.
I don’t dispute that species exhibit property homeostasis. I shall rely upon this fact – or
suggest that it can be relied upon – in Chapter 3 in order to give an account of the grounding of
inductive inferences involving species. What’s really doing the work, then, in Boyd’s arguments
is the success biologists have in making inductive inferences about species – their success in
meeting the accommodation demands of biology. So the unity he talks about in the second
argument must either be, or be able to be cashed out in terms of, unity in phenotypic properties,
since these are the properties which Boyd’s HPC account emphasizes, and which he believes
make the important contribution to accommodation in biology. This makes the first argument
more important, and so I will address most of what I say to it.
Boyd notes that in the cases of some “natural individuals,” such as forests and tropical
storms, what is “overwhelmingly important” to accommodation is not commonality of
properties, but “the nature and dynamics of the continuity between their temporal stages” (Boyd
1999a, 166). Now, Boyd admits that the sorts of continuity between stages of these sorts of
individuals which are explanatorily relevant will enforce some similarity among the stages;
nevertheless, it’s the “continuity of historical development” which is central to explanation, not
the shared properties. Thus, if species were individuals, we ought to expect that the “historical
continuities between their temporal realizations” – that is, the historical relationships that the
organisms in the species bear to one another, or between successive populations – would be the
important contributor to accommodation. Yet it seems that, for a great deal of evolutionary
explanations, what’s important to explanation are the commonalities in the properties shared by
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organisms belonging to the species. So, Boyd concludes, when it comes to species, what “unites
their members” is not historical relationships among the organisms, but shared properties, and
therefore species are natural kinds, not individuals.
As I shall discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, Boyd is arguing inductively (or perhaps
abductively) for the ontological status of species from the ways scientists use them to gain
knowledge. Boyd is correct when he notes that “the standard sorts of evolutionary explanations”
do presuppose that the organisms in a species share a wide range of phenotypic (and genotypic)
characters. To explain how some process (e.g., natural selection) affects a species, biologists
need to refer to the properties of the organisms being affected. To predict that a process like
selection for a particular property will affect a population in a particular way presupposes that
there is some commonality among the organisms, i.e., that the properties involved are fairly
widely shared. So, for the purposes of prediction and explanation, these properties are “what
unites the members.”
Metaphysically, however, from a biological perspective, what unites the members into
the single entity which is the species to which they belong are their relationships to one another,
not (as Boyd would have it) their satisfaction of even a disjunctive cluster of phenotypic
properties (or genotypic properties, or a combination of the two). Moreover, for taxonomy at
least, historical relations make the right contribution to accommodation demands, not shared
properties. While not directly addressing Boyd, Hull has himself denounced this “myth of
overall similarity” as “a metaphysical compulsion with an epistemological source,” and writes:
“Perhaps from an epistemological perspective, species are classes of similar organisms and the
Portuguese man-of-war is a single organism.
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If so, then so much the worse for the

epistemological perspective. Species may not seem like genealogical units, but if they are to
evolve by natural selection, this is precisely how they must be construed” (Hull 1987, 176).
Let us take a parallel case. Suppose one could reliably predict that Americans would
react negatively to a proposal that no U.S. citizen or resident could buy more than a single
handgun, or to a proposal that all e-mail communications be subjected to FBI monitoring to look
for signs of terrorist involvement. Such reliability would surely depend upon it being true that
devotion to a particular interpretation of the Second Amendment, loathing of state interference in
private matters, and devotion to freedom of expression, are property commonalities among
Americans. But those properties, while perhaps characteristic of Americans, are not what unites
these people into a single nation. What makes it the case that these people are Americans are
facts such as their being born to an American citizen, or being born in the United States, or
having become a naturalized citizen. Surely there could be other nations whose people believe in
gun rights, free speech, and limited intrusion; and if those properties came to characterize only
49 percent of Americans or fewer, the United States would not at that moment cease to exist.
I can imagine a Boydian response to this objection: I’m being legalistic. What unites the
diverse peoples of the United States into a nation (and not simply a political entity) is their
shared allegiance to a set of ideals; that is, their shared possession of a set of properties.
Moreover, the HPC view can accommodate a situation like the one I describe, where less than
half of Americans come to have those properties. On the HPC account, something can be a
member of an HPC kind even if it fails to satisfy some single set of properties, as long as it
satisfies some set of properties in the cluster; and the properties which determine whether
something is a member of the kind may change over time (Boyd 1999a, 144). True enough at
least: we frequently speak of certain beliefs or attitudes being what unites the residents of the
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United States as Americans. And someone might be an American at heart (by sympathizing with
all the things Americans sympathize with, and so on) and yet not be a citizen of the United
States. But that person’s still not an American, just as Swampman, upon being flashed into
existence, for all of his human-like qualities, isn’t part of Homo sapiens.
Such a response would also expose the way in which the HPC account blurs (or erases)
the distinction between kinds and individuals. Boyd initially argues that species are HPC
phenomena, then elicits additional considerations to make the move to their being HPC kinds.
The proof that they are HPC kinds, and not simply HPC phenomena that are really individuals, is
that the important fact about them, for the purposes of accommodation in biology, is the sharing
of properties, not historical relations among their organisms (Boyd 1999a, 165-167). Only if the
latter were the important contributor to accommodation could we conclude they were HPC-like
individuals. But the response we’re considering now to my “Americans” objection also regards
the American nation as an HPC phenomenon, where the shared properties of the people in the
nation, not their historical relations to one another, are the important contributor to
accommodation (in, perhaps, sociology or political science). Hence, we ought to conclude that
America, qua nation, is not an individual, but a natural kind (and maybe so is the United States
qua political entity, for the properties characterizing it are somewhat protean; are either
maintained by something like homeostatic causal mechanisms, or, in the other way in which
Boyd sees properties as being part of a cluster, the presence of some favors the presence of
others [Boyd 1999a, 143]; and might serve accommodation in fields such as political science, or
law).
We can see this blurring by considering Boyd’s own examples of “natural individuals”:
forests and tropical storms. If scientists wanted to explain the development over time of a
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particular forest, they would need to invoke both continuity of the stages of the forest, and the
properties of those stages. The fact that the stages are causally connected, and that an earlier
stage had the properties it had, explains why a later stage has the properties it has. The same is
true with species. So, it’s not clear that, for the purposes of accommodation in ecology, or
meteorology, the historical relationships among the stages of forests or tropical storms are more
important than the properties of the entities making up those stages, and so not clear that
particular forests and storms are actually natural individuals rather than natural kinds.
Boyd is aware of this sort of objection to his view, yet considers it something of a virtue;
the HPC account demonstrates why the distinction between natural kinds and individuals “is, in
an important way, merely pragmatic” (Boyd 1999a, 163). Kinds and individuals play similar
roles in induction and explanation, so the distinction between them is not ontological. For these
reasons, Boyd concludes that conceptual systems like Islam and Christianity are natural kinds,
and perhaps also the rock of Gibraltar, Oliver Cromwell, and particular instances of (i.e.,
particular historical developments of) feudalism. And such a conclusion seems built into the
nature of the HPC account. Homeostatic causal mechanisms sustain the cluster of properties
found in Oliver Cromwell, and those properties surely contribute to accommodation in some
domain of human inquiry – indeed, Boyd believes that individuals such as Cromwell and the
rock of Gibraltar do contribute to accommodation demands in sciences (Boyd 1999a, 163). But
then we again lose the distinction between kinds and individuals, one which is important at least
for our understanding of laws of nature. One way we could try to maintain the distinction is to
note that, traditionally, we individuate individuals (but not kinds) not simply by their being
homeostatic clusters, and not even homeostatic clusters of particular properties, but by their
origin.

Yet this is, as advocates of the individuality thesis point out, how taxonomists
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individuate species – as particular branches of the phylogenetic tree, with particular origins. So,
if we are to keep HPC theory from conflating kinds and individuals, we again should conclude
that species are individuals.19
For all these various reasons, I believe neither the account of species as HPC kinds, nor
Boyd’s attack on the individuality thesis from induction, succeeds.
6. Elder’s Attack on the Individuality Thesis from Induction
While Boyd’s arguments regarding species, kinds, and the individuality thesis are better
known, Elder (2008) launches perhaps the most sustained attack on the individuality thesis,
based largely upon biologists’ ability to engage in good inductive inferences about them. Elder
proposes that species are, just as many philosophers had assumed they were, natural kinds, “of a
perfectly traditional sort” (Elder 2008, 359). By this, Elder means they are “pluralities” of
entities characterized by properties which “nonaccidentally cluster together, in instance after
instance,” because such properties are “bound together by mind-independent causal necessity, if
not by metaphysical necessity” (Elder 2008, 341). In all cases, the properties are capable of
being “crisply defined,” and the properties are essential. So, part of Elder’s proposal that species
are natural kinds consists in arguments that they must, and do, possess essential intrinsic
properties, in the form of a “rough phenotypic profile” consisting of “the possession of one
majority or another out of a common roster of crisply defined properties” (Elder 2008, 345). I
19

In his evaluation of HPC kinds, Ereshefsky offers the criticism I mentioned earlier: the parts of an individual
must be causally connected; they must have some sorts of causal relations to one another (Ereshefsky 2010). We
also get conflation of the distinction between kinds and individuals if we attempt to solve what Ereshefsky diagnoses
as a conceptual problem with HPC kinds: explanatory circularity. The essence of an HPC kind is its causal
homeostatic mechanisms; but HPC theory admits that these can change. How, then, do we know which mechanisms
are constitutive of the kind? The answer from HPC theory seems to be that we identify the cluster of similarities
which these mechanisms produce. But the properties in an HPC kind can change as well. How do we identify the
properties which are constitutive of the kind? According to HPC theory, we do this by identifying the essential
causal mechanisms. We might attempt to break out of the circle by determining which organisms and mechanisms
are connected historically to a particular common ancestor. But this would not only encourage classification by
history, not similarity, but conflate kinds and individuals, largely for the reason I just brought forth: an HPC
demarcated by connection to a particular origin in space and time looks like an individual.
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address these claims in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I shall address what is the first prong of Elder’s
three-pronged attack on the individuality thesis from induction: given that successful inductive
inferences cannot be drawn from the parts of many objects to other parts (since many objects are
quite, even extremely, heterogeneous in their parts), how is reliable induction involving species
possible?
Here, I shall address the other two. If species are individuals, they are scattered objects.
So, in the second prong, Elder challenges the advocate of the individuality thesis to explain how
scientists use induction to gain knowledge of the properties of the scattered object itself. It’s not
unreasonable to think they must be able to do so, given that it’s possible to gain inductive
knowledge of the object-level properties of many objects. The actual challenge takes the form of
Elder casting doubt on species qua individuals having any properties “of scientific interest”
(Elder 2008, 353-4).

The third prong is related to the second:

the only “scientifically

interesting” properties of a species emerge when this individual is treated as a plurality of
organisms; and since these appear only when considering “objectively privileged
segmentations,” scientists must treat species operationally as natural kinds (as we just saw, Boyd
lodges a similar objection).
Elder divides the properties instantiated in entities – whether kinds and their instances or
individuals and their parts – into “border-sensitive” and “border-insensitive” properties. The
former are properties whose presence is affected by how far out the borders of the thing extend;
the latter are properties whose presence is not so affected.

The scientifically interesting

properties of samples of gold and water are border-insensitive; samples of these kinds have the
same index of refraction, or melting or freezing point, regardless of how much one has of the
stuff. This makes them ideal for running inductions.

51

But none of the border-insensitive properties of species, qua individuals – such as their
specific gravity or combustion point – are, Elder claims, of any scientific interest (Elder 2008,
353). Neither are any of their border-sensitive properties, such as maximal spatial extent, center
of gravity, or aggregate mass. The only scientifically interesting properties of a species are just
those which are sensitive to the borders of individual organisms. Any object-level (and so
species-level) properties that might seem to be of scientific interest – such as spatial extent –
would simply be a matter of the species’ structural properties (i.e., properties expressed by a long
conjunction of predicates, namely: “has one part at L1 bearing properties p1, p2, …, pn; and has
one part at L2 bearing properties … etc.” where L represents some location). Indeed, any
properties of the object itself which were of scientific interest would either be such structural
properties, or would logically depend upon them. The only reason we would care to learn about
a structural location-property, or any other structural property, would be, Elder claims, to explain
the phenotypic or genotypic properties of the organism-parts, or to help predict what,
phenotypically, the species would be like in the future (this is also meant to be an argument for
the essentialness for each species of some rough set of phenotypic properties).
Elder’s argument is directed at species-level properties which would be, as Gould (2002)
puts it, “a linear combination of lower-level parts” – additive or aggregative – and seems to
assume that any species-level properties would be additive or aggregative. All such properties
would be reducible to the properties of organisms, or to structural properties. Yet this ignores
the possibility that species might have “emergent” species-level properties – properties not
reducible to, nor derivable in any additive way from, nor predictable from, the properties of
individual organisms, and which interact with the environment in non-reducible, non-derivable
ways. A number of biologists have proposed candidates for emergent species-level properties,
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particularly since Eldredge and Gould’s initial publication on punctuated equilibria.

Such

properties are generally proposed as being important in macroevolutionary processes or
explanations, and many have been tied to the view, championed in particular by Gould (and
Stanley [Stanley 1979]), that macroevolution is characterized by “species selection,” the
differential survival and reproduction, with heritability of species-level properties, of species
themselves.20
Perhaps most famously (or most notoriously), Jablonski has argued (Jablonski et al. 1985;
Jablonski 1987) that magnitude of geographic range is an emergent, heritable species-level
property, one which influences species duration and is crucial in enabling species to survive
mass extinction events. More recently, de Queiroz and Ashton argue that tendency to develop a
Bergmann’s rule cline is a heritable, emergent species-level property. This is the tendency for
organisms in a species to exhibit variation in size, over the species’ range, in accordance with
“Bergmann’s rule” that organisms in a species which live in colder climates tend to be larger
than those in the species that live in warmer climates, since large size in a colder climate aids
endothermic regulation (de Queiroz and Ashton 2004). Still more recently, Goldberg, et al.,
argue that the inability of species in the nightshade family to self-fertilize permits these species
to speciate at a higher rate than species in which nightshade can self-fertilize. They believe this
trend is explained by species-selection, not predictable by studying selection acting upon
individuals within species (Goldberg, et al. 2010).
All claims for the existence of emergent species-level properties, and of the operation of
species selection, are admittedly controversial. I have cited only three. Yet the paleontological

Recall the “parity argument” for the individuality thesis. At least two candidates for the – or a – unit of selection
are unequivocally individuals: genes and organisms. This should weigh heavily toward the conclusion that any
unit of selection must be an individual. So, if groups or demes are units of selection, they are individuals; and if
species are units of selection, they are individuals.
20

53

literature of at least the past 30 years is rife with them; they are clearly of scientific interest. Of
course, if there are no such properties, then they cannot be of scientific interest. But in the
present context, Elder must supply an argument, either his own or someone else’s, that there are
no such properties.
Alternately, it would be open to Elder to attempt to engender skepticism about the reality
of individual cases of putative emergent properties. He could, for example, follow the strategy
of Coyne and Orr. They remain agnostic on the existence of emergent properties in general, but
claim in the case of geographic range that geographic range can be viewed either as a specieslevel property, or as a product of the properties of individual organisms, reflecting ability to
migrate, or adaptation to wider ranges of food and environment (Coyne and Orr 2004, 443) –
although this does not look exactly like what Elder is calling a structural property. And even on
the alternate view Coyne and Orr suggest, geographic range – arguably a border-sensitive species
property, and clearly a scientifically interesting property – would not merely be the aggregate
property of having one organism-part with a particular ability to migrate, having another
organism-part with a particular ability to migrate, and so on. They see the property as some sort
of product. Nor does it seem to be a property which is sensitive to the borders of individual
organisms, as Elder claimed that all of the scientific interesting properties of a species are.
On the other hand, other, non-emergent properties, like variability – a border-insensitive
property – might seem to be more susceptible to such an analysis. A species’ variability might
be a “structural phenotype-property” or “structural genotype-property” – a matter of the species
having one organism-part with one genotype, and another with another genotype, etc. Gould
concedes (Gould 2002, 658) that the variability of a species “represents” an aggregate character
– the average of the variations of the constituent organisms – but nevertheless insists that it
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makes sense to speak of the variability of a species: one can explain that species A survived and
multiplied, whereas species B died, because A had greater variability than B. Variability is a
property of the species, not its organisms. Individual organisms don’t exhibit variability.
Now, Elder could simply insist that, really, no such property exists, and that variability is
nothing but a structural property in the manner already outlined. Any explanations of species
survival or extinction in terms of species properties are really just convenient shorthand or
manners of speaking; the real explanations are in terms of the properties of constituent
organisms. But forget momentarily whether there are any emergent species-level properties
which would resist such an analysis.

Such a “nothing but” strategy seems dangerous,

particularly for Elder, who elsewhere wants to resist the efforts of conventionalists or
eliminativists about medium-sized objects to deny the reality of such objects and to reduce them
to the atomic or subatomic simples which are their constituent parts, with the claim that they are
“nothing but” aggregates of those parts (Elder 1996, 2003, 2011).
Recall that Elder embarks on the “structural property” strategy – a strategy of reducing
putative species-level properties to the properties of the constituent organisms – in order to
disqualify species as individuals, and provide reason to think that they are in fact natural kinds.
But consider:

some scientifically interesting object-level properties can be redescribed as

structural properties, or are logically dependent upon them. The total mass of the Empire State
Building is of scientific interest; the architects and engineers who built it needed to consider this,
as do all builders of skyscrapers, in coming up with their designs so that the building would not
collapse under its own weight. But the Empire State Building’s total mass is just a matter of its
having one part with a particular mass, and another part with another mass, and so on.
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The above example might be dismissed as merely one exception to Elder’s structural
property argument. But consider some of the scientifically interesting properties of human
beings. A particular man might have a certain chance of developing diabetes, or having a heart
attack before a certain age. But we could reduce this organism-level property, or fact, to the
properties of or facts about various of his parts: facts about his various organs, or bodily
systems, or genes, or the cells making up his body. If we are to suspect that entities are not
individuals, but rather are natural kinds, to the extent that their scientifically interesting objectlevel properties can be reduced to aggregates of lower-level properties, then it seems we ought to
suspect that many entities which we were previously certain were individuals are in fact not.
This is not, of course, an argument that Elder’s strategy in dealing with alleged species-level
properties would require him to adopt conventionalism or eliminativism about such individuals;
no one is disputing the reality of the entities under consideration. It would instead be a matter of
the ontological category – individual or kind – under which they fall.
One of Elder’s arguments for the reality of medium-sized objects, in contrast to his
conventionalist and eliminativist opponents, is that medium-sized objects either have causal
powers which they do not have qua aggregates of simples, or exhibit behaviors which cannot be
predicted from the laws which govern the subatomic realm (Elder 1996, 2007, 2011). So he
might reply here by adapting this argument: that, even though we are not wondering whether
species are real, but rather really are individuals, I should show that species have causal powers
or exhibit behaviors qua species which they do not have as mere aggregates of organisms, or
which cannot be predicted from the properties of their organism-parts. But such causal powers
and behaviors are just the sorts of things which advocates of emergent species-level properties
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claim that species in fact have, such as propensity to speciate, or survive extinction, or develop a
Bergmann’s rule cline.
Finally, let us examine the third prong of Elder’s challenge: that, in order to learn
anything of interest about a species, scientists must consult objectively privileged segmentations
of such an individual, wherein “roughly the same phenotypic (or possibly genotypic) traits can
be counted on to crop up” (Elder 2008, 354). This is meant to bolster the view that scientists
must treat species operationally as natural kinds. But as an argument in favor of the kindhood
thesis, it seems puzzling, particularly given Elder’s earlier emphasis on the fact that natural kinds
license inductive inferences in many cases precisely because the properties involved in such
inductions are border-insensitive. One need not consult objectively privileged segmentations of
gold or water in order to run inductive inferences over these kinds. And Elder recognizes the
difference: if they are natural kinds, species must be considered not a “much” like gold, but a
“many” (Elder 2008, 352).
What’s puzzling, however, is that objectively privileged segmentations are precisely what
we find when we examine individuals; that is exactly what they tend to be composed of. Tables,
chairs, automobiles, houses – all are made up of objectively privileged segmentations, as are
organisms (in the form of organs, bones, cells, stems, leaves, etc.). Elder has argued in several
instances (Elder 1995, 1996, 2004) that many types of artifacts, like screwdrivers and very
particular styles of furniture (e.g., the Eames 1957 desk chair), are themselves natural kinds, with
the individual artifacts (i.e., this screwdriver, that chair) as their instances. These sorts of kinds
would be “manys,” their instances would be objects with parts, and anyone, scientist or not, who
wanted to learn about these objects would need to consult their objectively privileged
segmentations. It is quite natural to think that ‘species’ denotes a natural kind, one with essential
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properties (which is what the debates over species concepts are debates about). If ‘species’ does
denote a natural kind, and if species are individuals, that kind is a “many,” each species is an
instance of that kind, and an individual, with organisms as their objectively privileged
segmentation-parts. So it would seem that, on Elder’s own view, the need to consult objectively
privileged segmentations actually gives us further reason to think that species are individuals.
Elder has attempted (personal communication) to clarify how objectively privileged
segmentation is supposed to fit into his argument. The mystery he thinks needs to be dispelled is
why biologists, to learn about, say, Canis familiaris, must consult whole dogs, and only whole
dogs, not merely the hindquarters of a dog, or 1½ dogs, if species are individuals. The question
is, I believe, why must scientists consult just these parts of the species – the organism parts – and
not other parts? The question trades on the transitivity of parthood. If I am part of Homo
sapiens, and my elbow is part of me, then my elbow is part of Homo sapiens. Why then must
biologists consult whole organisms in running inductive inferences over species? Why not
simply elbows, or hands, or feet? The answer is twofold. First, biologists surely do sometimes
run inductions only over the parts of the parts of a species, consulting only the parts of
organisms, and not entire organisms – over hands, say. Of course, if they want to project entire
clusters of properties, then they must consult whole organisms, which is the unit in which such
clusters reside. That leads to the second response: the causal forces which (as I shall argue in
Chapter 3) permit inductive inferences over species go only through whole organisms – through
just those objectively privileged segmentations – not merely through the organisms’ constituent
parts. They produce only entire organisms – only entire rabbits, not detached rabbit-parts. Thus
the need to consult just those objectively privileged segmentations. If terrestrial biology were
quite different – if quite different causal forces were in operation, causal forces which produced
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detached organism-parts – one might not need to focus on just those segmentations of the
species-individual which are whole organisms. One might be able to consult 1½ dogs, rather
than only whole dogs.21
As Elder observes (Elder 2008, 354), many objects are quite heterogeneous in their parts.
This is what frustrates running inductions over their parts. For species to be entities which
support induction, the parts must be homogeneous. Elder argues that once the advocate of the
individuality thesis admits that the parts are homogeneous, she is admitting that, operationally,
species must be treated as natural kinds, where the only scientifically interesting properties show
up in whole organisms (and here I think the idea is that this is just like the scientifically
interesting properties of other natural kinds always showing up together in dollops of that kind).
The response here is, I think, to point out that while the advocate of the individuality thesis must
admit that species, or at least many of them, exhibit some homogeneity (otherwise we lose our
reason to think that running inductions over their parts stands any chance of success), she is not
committed to their being homogeneous, tout court.

As Wilson (1999) notes, species are

inherently heterogeneous, in some cases quite so. This fact helped generate the puzzle about
inductive inferences involving species – the one which philosophers such as Boyd, Griffiths,
Millikan, and Wilson are attempting to address – to begin with. Using Elder’s example, what
this means is that, in the case of some species, in particular polytypic or highly polymorphic
species, or those with marked geographic varieties, inferring that because these (fairly
homogeneous) sampled parts are φ, the unobserved parts will all be φ, really is like inferring that
all of Chicago is railroad tracks on the basis of railroad tracks making up the city’s outskirts.

I thank the attendees of the October 17, 2012, “grue bag” meeting of the University of Connecticut’s Philosophy
Graduate Student Association, and in particular Kathy Fazekas, Michael Hughes, and Andrew Parisi, for helping to
clarify this.
21
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Elder has suggested (personal communication) that we might preserve the kindhood
thesis by saying that, in such cases, inductions are actually run over a species’ morphs, or
subspecies, or varieties. I don’t deny that, with polymorphic species, inductive inferences can
and will be run over the morphs, and that inferences over the morphs might be the best ones
biologists can make in such cases; it will depend upon the species. But an attempt to save the
kindhood thesis this way would transform the morphs, subspecies, or varieties into the natural
kinds, with the species as clusters of such kinds, not kinds themselves. This is not Elder’s view,
although it is the view of Brian Ellis (2001) (who takes it from Wilkerson [1993]). But the
heterogeneity problem will plague this move, as well; there will be variation within morphs,
subspecies, and varieties, certainly at the genotypic level, even if less so at the phenotypic level.
This also seems like an awkward move for an advocate of the kindhood thesis, which
maintains that species are natural kinds. Such a move means that while non-polytypic or nonpolymorphic species, or those without marked varieties – species for which the entire species is
the unit of induction – are natural kinds, polytypic or polymorphic species, or those with marked
varieties, are not natural kinds, but instead clusters (indeed, clusters which, at least in sexually
reproducing species, are integrated by causal relations) of natural kinds. As we saw in the
footnote above regarding HPC theory’s circularity problem, an integrated cluster – particularly
one which is anchored genealogically to its origin – looks very much like a whole with parts, an
individual. On this suggestion, some species would be natural kinds, and others would or might
be individuals; and some, presumably, would change their ontological status over the course of
evolution as they developed or lost multiple types, morphs, or varieties. Perhaps such a view is
coherent; I have not devoted any thought to whether it is. But it is not the kindhood thesis.
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Yet even if biologists can treat species operationally as (something like) natural kinds for
certain purposes, this does not establish that this is their ontological status. Even field biologists
recognize that species have a historical dimension, that they are lineages, and population
genetics, cladistic taxonomy, and paleontology are much more likely to regard species as
individuals. Some advocates of the phenetic species concept – that species are groups of
organisms classified together by some measure of overall similarity – have tried to argue for
their concept with the claim that only their concept is operational (Sokal and Crovello 1970).
But as critics have pointed out, a strictly applied phenetic concept puts males and females of the
same species in different species, or different life stages of organisms into different species
(Ereshefsky 2001, Sober 2000).

Pheneticists themselves recognize that they must make

allowances and exceptions to their methods of determining overall similarity to properly include
males and females, castes, and the markedly different life stages of some organisms, into the
same species (Sokal and Crovello 1970). They recognize that males, females, castes, and life
stages, even though they are quite dissimilar, do not constitute separate species. Yet how can
they make such a distinction, except by relying upon some other species concept, e.g., the
biological species concept? So even if the phenetic concept is operational (e.g., it permits
biologists to diagnose to which species a particular organism belongs) in ways other concepts are
not, it turns out other concepts are in fact primary, and that, metaphysically, species are not
groups of overall similar organisms.22 Thus, operational or diagnostic utility, while suggestive,

22

Ridley lodges this criticism independently, for different reasons. Among other critics (e.g., Sober 2000), he faults
pheneticism (i.e., numerical taxonomy) for lacking the internal resources to disambiguate cases where one phenetic
measure recommends dividing organisms up into species one way, whereas another measure recommends a different
pattern. Such a decision must be made arbitrarily, rather than according to some objective criterion which is part of
pheneticism itself. He concludes, “Identifying species phenetically is done only for practical convenience; the
underlying theoretical concept of species embraces something other than a phenetic cluster” (Ridley 1996, 402; see
also Ridley 1986).
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is in itself insufficient to establish metaphysical status. Species are still individuals, not natural
kinds.
7. Promiscuous Realism
As part of his argument for “promiscuous realism,” Dupré (1993) has claimed that, while
species are individuals from the perspective of, and for the purposes of, evolutionary biology, the
purposes of other branches of biology, such as ecology, require that species be taxonomized not
by genealogy but by shared characters, and so for ecology they are natural kinds.

Under

“promiscuous realism,” the world may be carved up into kinds in indefinitely many legitimate
ways, all of which will be real provided the criteria used are objective and non-arbitrary. In the
case of kinds, this will consist in their ability to support inductive inferences, counterfactuals,
and generalizations.
Dupré accepts that, as Hull himself has argued, evolutionary theory requires species to be
individuals. Species are “what the theory of evolution is centrally about” (Dupré 1993, 42).
Gould’s theories regarding the importance to evolution of mass extinctions, Mayr’s regarding the
importance to speciation of peripheral isolates, and the facts that species “evolve, diverge,
become extinct, and so on” seem to dictate, Dupré says, that evolutionary theory must treat
species as objects; and if we are to draw our metaphysics and “our understanding” of the
theoretical term, “species,” from evolutionary theory, then “we should conclude that species are
objects, which is to say, individuals.” This argument is, according to Dupré, “basically correct”
(although like LaPorte, he finds other arguments unsatisfactory)(Dupré 1993, 42).
But ecology, Dupré continues, has other requirements. Its categories – including ‘prey,’
‘predator,’ ‘parasite,’ and ‘saprophyte’ – are “fairly abstract,” but how they are applied to
particular situations will depend upon some classification, and will “draw upon general
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taxonomy so that, for instance, in a particular system lynxes are the predators and hares are the
prey.” Ecological models – such as those of predator-prey interaction, or of competition – are
supposed to explain, among other things, “fluctuations of the numbers of these species.” But this
requires, Dupré claims, viewing the organisms in these species as members of kinds (Dupré
1993, 42). If we should draw our conclusions about the metaphysics of species from the
theoretical context in which they are embedded, then (especially because ecological models are
essential to understanding evolution) their embeddedness in ecological theory as kinds should
lead us to conclude that they are (at least in ecology) natural kinds.
Let us grant that terms like ‘predator,’ ‘prey,’ ‘parasite,’ and ‘saprophyte’ name natural
kinds, as at least Hull (2001) and Sober (1984b), both advocates of the individuality thesis, are
willing to do. These kinds enter into ecological models. If Sober is correct that the models
which biologists produce of processes such as natural selection count as laws, or capture laws
(Sober 2010), and if it is true that the entities which feature in laws of nature are natural kinds,
then terms like ‘predator’ name natural kinds. What it seems to me Dupré has shown is not that
species are natural kinds from the perspective of ecology, but rather that the parts of these
species can (non-essentially) instantiate or be members of ecological kinds (e.g., ‘predator’). We
might also think that, say, some lynx species itself instantiates the kind, ‘predator’ in a certain
ecological situation; although that would require some care, if species are temporally extended
entities. It seems misleading to say that the species instantiates the ‘predator’ kind, because the
entire species is not there in that situation; many of its parts no longer exist, and many more are
yet to be born. It might be better to say that a time-slice of the species instantiates the predator
kind in some situation. It is also somewhat strange that Dupré refers to “lynxes” and “hares” as
“species,” given that, first, there are a number of species of both lynxes and hares; second, Dupré
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goes to some length to note that ordinary language kind terms like ‘lynx’ and ‘hare’ do not
correspond to biologically recognized taxa (Dupré 1993, 27-29); and third, that it seems unlikely
that a single model of a “concrete” instance of predator-prey interaction would attempt to include
all the organisms in every species of lynx and hare. Be that as it may, even if we were to think
that in some ecological model it is some lynx species which is instantiating the kind ‘predator,’
the instances of natural kinds are not themselves kinds, but individuals.
Dupré’s argument here appears to be that numerically the same species which “general
taxonomy” would recognize (i.e., that would be taxonomized according to genealogy) is both an
individual and a natural kind, depending upon theoretical context. But it may also be that,
consistent with promiscuous realism, we ought not merely consider as species those groupings
which taxonomists would recognize as discrete species of, in this case, lynxes and hares, but also
those groupings which would fall under the kind terms ‘predator’ and ‘prey’ in the modeling of
some particular predator-prey situation. In such a case, were, say, organisms belonging to a
single species of lynx in a district to be preying upon organisms belonging to more than one
species of hare, then we ought to consider all of the hares as belonging to a single species.
‘Species’ becomes, then, not just a taxon in evolutionary theory, but in ecological theory as well,
and species may be cross-cutting.
This is reminiscent of Kitcher’s proposal for species pluralism, “pluralistic realism,”
according to which species are “sets of organisms related to one another by complicated,
biologically interesting relations,” where being related to one another is not simply a matter of
genealogy but of bearing in common any properties which are theoretically interesting to
biologists (Kitcher 1984, 309).

Thus not merely organisms related by descent would be

members of a species, but organisms possessing some morphological or genetic feature;
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organisms might therefore belong to many species, depending upon the interests of scientists. If
this is Dupré’s proposal, then I have the much the same reaction to it as Sober (1984b) does to
Kitcher’s: this does not seem to be a species concept, at least not one which is much like any of
the extant species concepts currently fighting for dominance in the biology (and philosophy of
biology) literature, where species are all genealogical units. It is not clear why all of the classes,
groups, or kinds in such a cross-cutting classification ought to be called a species. Would we be
using the term “species” equivocally, or univocally? That is, would we simply be calling such
ecological units “species,” or would we be claiming that they had something in common with the
species recognized by evolutionary theory? Moreover, if one premise in Dupré’s argument is
that we ought to regard the groups of organisms which might fall under a category in an
ecological model as species, due to the importance ecological models play in evolutionary
theory, then this seems to be all the more an argument for regarding species as individuals, since
this argument, too, places primacy on evolutionary theory.
Dupré questions Hull’s assertion, which Hull claims he shares with Mayr (1987) and
Ghiselin (1987), that “the actors in the evolutionary play must be genealogical. Only their roles
are defined in terms of ecology” (Hull 1987, 179). Hull’s argument for regarding the actors as
genealogical is, as we have seen, that, given the truth of what Darwin called his “strong principle
of inheritance,” for species to evolve by natural selection, they must be spatiotemporally
continuous lineages (Hull 1978, 1987). Yet why, Dupré asks, can we not “equally well say” that
the “actors in the ecological play” must be ecological, while “only their pedigrees are defined
genealogically” (Dupré 1993, 43). The answer, I believe, is that pedigrees are defining. So, the
actors will still be defined genealogically, which is to say, according to the demands of
evolutionary theory. And on that basis, as Dupré acknowledges, they are individuals.
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8. General Criticisms of the Individuality Thesis
Species occupy an interesting and puzzling place in ontology. As a class, they exhibit
certain properties which are characteristic of individuals. On the other hand, they exhibit certain
properties which are characteristic of natural kinds. We have examined some of these various
characteristics in this chapter; I will examine one in particular – the capacity species have for
grounding inductive inferences – in Chapter 3. What I have attempted to show so far is that
objections to, in particular, the negative arguments employed by advocates of the individuality
thesis do not hold up under scrutiny, and that proposals to reconceptualize species as some nontraditional sort of natural kind are problematic, either running afoul of biological theory and
practice, or conflating the distinction between kinds and individuals. All things considered, I
believe the preponderance of the considerations stills weighs in favor of the conclusion that
species are individuals, not natural kinds. In this final section, I briefly take up a few common
criticisms or objections to the individuality thesis which we have not yet examined, but which
are of philosophical interest.
Parthood. We encountered this objection in §6. On the individuality thesis, the relation
of organism to species is part-whole. Parthood is transitive. If my elbow is part of me, and I am
part of Homo sapiens, then my elbow is part of Homo sapiens. This strikes many philosophers
as unacceptably counterintuitive. Ghiselin (1997) has addressed this concern. He points out that
if Jones’ liver is part of Jones, and Jones is part of the 76th regiment, then Jones’ liver is part of
the 76th regiment. The reason we might find this jarring is that we are not paying attention to the
fact that we are shifting our contexts. In talking about Jones and his liver, we are working within
an anatomical context. When we talk about Jones and the 76th regiment, we are working within a
military context.

In “ordinary discourse,” we are only concerned, working with particular
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contexts, with the parts and wholes which are important within that context. And “for all
practical purposes,” the hierarchy stops definitively, within each context, at the uppermost level
for that context (Ghiselin 1997, 41). In the Jones example, anatomically, that level is the
organism; militarily, it is the regiment. Speaking purely mereologically (yet another context), it
is true that Jones’ liver is part of the regiment. We are discomfited by the clashing of the two
hierarchical classification systems, which are brought into collision by an example we are not
used to dealing with. But what the example asserts is nevertheless true.
Consider an analogy: a small screw might be part of the leg of a chair, and help to keep
the leg steady, or connected to other chair parts, so that the chair remains an integrated whole.
By transitivity, the screw is part of the chair. Now, our arms have elbows because we are
descended from creatures which had four legs, each with a central joint. Somehow, presumably,
the joints of the front two limbs in one of our ancestors came to be oriented with their openings
toward the anterior, while the joints of the rear two came to be oriented with their openings
toward the posterior. This must have conferred some sort of advantage on our remote ancestors,
for survival and propagation of their genes into the next generation. Our elbows are functionally
integrated into us, and we are functionally integrated into our species. It doesn’t matter whether
I personally have successfully procreated (I haven’t); elbows themselves are evolved for their
contribution to survival and reproduction, the latter of which contributes to the functional
integration of our species (note that this is not to say that elbows evolved for the good of the
species). Seen from this biological perspective, my elbow is every bit a part of Homo sapiens as
the small screw is a part of the chair.
A similar objection might be to consider whether organisms belonging to one species can
become parts of an organism belonging to another species; an example might be the E. coli
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bacteria which reside in our intestines and help us digest food. If the E. coli bacteria are part of
me, and I am part of Homo sapiens, then those bacteria are part of Homo sapiens.23 The reason
this might seem intuitively unacceptable to some philosophers is that, along with the view that
species are natural kinds, the view that organisms belong essentially to their species is common
in analytic philosophy; common, but no less mistaken. I address this in Chapter 2. On the other
hand, descent is a necessary condition of belonging to a species. Yet we have no trouble
thinking that an artificial hip is part of the person who receives it, even though it is not
descended from the embryo from which the rest of the person’s parts are descended. Still, it
might have a lesser status of parthood, or a more honorary parthood status, since it is functionally
integrated into the person, but is not descended from the same source as the other parts. The
same could be said of the E. coli in our intestines.
Boundaries. One disanalogy which opponents of the individuality thesis have attempted
to lodge is that paradigm individuals like organisms have fairly precise borders or boundaries,
whereas it is not clear what the border or boundaries are of a species qua individual. But, as Hull
has pointed out, this objection can succeed only by privileging our perspective as medium-sized
vertebrates (Hull 1981, 1989b). From the atomic perspective, objects which appear to us to be
spatially contiguous are actually spatially discontinuous. The beginnings and end points in time
of species can be vague, but so are the beginning and end points in time of organisms. It can
sometimes be indeterminate whether some particular organism is part of a particular species.
Yet it can also be indeterminate whether an atom, or an electron of that atom, is part of a
particular medium-sized object. It is not entirely clear what the borders or boundaries are of a
galaxy, or a swarm of gnats, or a parked car when its windows are rolled down, yet all are
uncontroversially wholes with parts. If we should invalidate the individuality thesis on the
23

Andrew Parisi first raised with me the possibility of a situation such as this.
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grounds that species’ borders can be indeterminate, then it seems we ought to deny that there are
any individuals at all (and, of course, some philosophers do deny that there are any individuals
beyond subatomic particles or whatever fundamental entities of physics turn out to be
mereological “simples” [Merricks 2003; Unger 1979; Wheeler 1979]).
Cohesion/Disruption. Opponents of the individuality thesis have noted that the internal
cohesion which advocates of the thesis say characterizes species, and thus lends support to the
view that they are individuals, is much less than that of other paradigm individuals like
organisms (Kitcher 1989). Species can often survive the destruction of a sizeable number of
their organism-parts, but organisms themselves are far more sensitive, and cannot survive such
diminutions.

But, as Sober has pointed out (Sober 2000), whether individuals exhibit

cohesiveness, or can withstand obliteration of some of their parts, is a matter of degree, not kind.
Excise an arbitrary 20 percent of a tiger, and the tiger may likely die; but excise an arbitrary 20
percent of an ivy plant, and the plant will live (Sober 2000, 154). Skeptics of the individuality
thesis might well reply that that depends upon which 20 percent one excises. If the 20 percent
were to include the roots and stem of the ivy plant, then the plant will not survive. But this
would amount to a radical disruption of the internal organization of the plant, and, as Hull has
pointed out (Hull 1978), the comparable sort of disruption of the internal organization of a
species (by, say, bifurcating it 50-50 by imposition of an impassable geological feature) can
result in the destruction of that species (and possibly the subsequent creation of two new species,
over evolutionary time).
Competition. Ruse has argued that we ought not regard species as individuals because
the parts of a paradigm individual like an organism are not in competition with one another,
whereas competition between organisms is a hallmark of biological species; “individual
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organisms of a species are all working for their own benefits, against those of others.” He
recognizes that cooperation occurs between relatives or “fellow population members,” but points
out that “selection pits organisms against each other” (Ruse 1987, 233). But again, this seems to
be a matter of degree, not kind. Even though the genes within an organism must make up a
coadapted whole, or the organism of which they are part will die and they will not be propagated
into the next generation, genes, which are parts of an organism are, or at least can be conceived
of as being, in competition with one another: “mutators” can manipulate the rate of copying
errors in other genes, to those genes’ detriment (Dawkins 1976, 44).
Dawkins’ famous example to illustrate coadapted gene complexes is the oarsmen
occupying the same boat in the Cambridge and Oxford boat race (Dawkins 1976, 38). The
rowers must work together or the entire boat will lose the race. Nevertheless, it is not the case
that the parts of wholes are never in competition with one another. Players on a basketball team
may be in competition with one another, although they must also suppress such competition to an
extent if they want to win as a team.

Various units of a corporation or firm may be in

competition with one another, even though the people in those units cooperate – in this, they
would be like the kin groups within species which Ruse mentions, which largely cooperate but
find themselves in competition with other such groups.

Of course, should the units of a

corporation compete too fiercely, the corporation will not achieve its goals, and all will suffer.
Yet by the same token, as Ruse acknowledges, intraspecific competition is not always as “red in
tooth and claw” as might crudely be imagined. Without some degree of cooperation between
organisms in a species, all will suffer. Again, this is not to say that cooperative behavior evolves
“for the good of the species.” But that “any species cooperation, any species integration, is
secondary on the particular organism’s self-interests” (Ruse 1987, 233) seems beside the point,
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especially since this could be true of many units which arguably count as individuals, including
human units.
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Chapter Two
Why Species Essentialism Should Remain a Dead Issue
1. Introduction
Belief that every biological species has an intrinsic essence – some single, underlying
essential intrinsic property, as opposed to surface properties; or a set of underlying essential
intrinsic properties, particularly genetic properties – is apparently commonplace among lay
people; or at least among children, and among adults who have learned little or no evolutionary
biology (Keil 1989; Shtulman and Schulz 2008; Taylor et al. 2009). Among philosophers,
species essentialism goes back at least as far as Aristotle, but its contemporary prevalence among
analytic philosophers is probably due to the resurgence of interest in natural kinds and their
essential properties that arose from the influential writings on reference, meaning, kinds, and
essentialism of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam.
Kripke, for example, argued that “tiger” is a rigid designator in that it picks out the same
entity (in this case, Kripke took it to be the same natural kind) in every possible world where it
picks out anything at all – and assumed that this transworld sameness turned crucially on
sameness with respect to a particular “inner structure” (Kripke 1980, 120). Putnam claimed that
to be a lemon is not to have the “superficial characteristics” of a lemon, such as color or taste,
but to have the essential “genetic code” of a lemon (Putnam 1975, 240).24 Both characterized
scientific practice as the search for the hidden real essences of natural kinds, which both took
biological species to be. Their assertions regarding species appear to be attempts to assimilate

Putnam explicitly rejects “being cross-fertile with lemons” as being constitutive of lemonhood, including it among the
“superficial characteristics” of lemons. This is ironic, considering that it is just such a relational property – ability to interbreed
with other organisms in a population and reproductive isolation from other populations – which contemporary biologists and
philosophers of biology would regard as determining membership in a species.
24
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species to the same microstructural essentialism they adopt for chemical kinds – that to be water
just is to have microstructure H2O.
Sober declared more than 30 years ago that intrinsic species essentialism was a “dead
issue” (Sober 1980, 353), and most biologists and philosophers of biology regard it as such.25
They have pointed out

that variation within any species is ubiquitous.

This fact is

acknowledged even by philosophers who have attempted in recent years to revive intrinsic
essentialism (Devitt 2008; Elder 1995, 2004, 2008), but anti-essentialists mean something more.
Variation is not a matter of there being accidental properties which either do or do not “attach” to
a core of essential properties exhibited by all organisms in a species. No organism in a species is
typical. Generally, there are no characteristics which all and only members of a species possess,
morphologically, physiologically, genotypically, developmentally, or otherwise.

Not all

organisms in a species possess all the same traits, not even genetically, and if any traits are
universal within a species, this is an accident of evolution and subject to change. Characters,
structures, systems, processes, phenotypes and genotypes, are shared across species, which one
would expect given that all species on Earth are related by descent. Species can gain and lose
characteristics, even quite striking ones, without – at least as far as biologists are concerned –
ceasing to be the same species. Thus belief that every (or even any) species has an essence, at
least in terms of intrinsic properties, is unwarranted. Moreover, on the species concepts popular
with most biologists, species are individuated by relational not intrinsic properties, and criteria of
species membership are relational (e.g., genealogical relations, or reproductive isolation from
other populations).

25

For a small sampling of anti-essentialist arguments, see Buller 2005; Ereshefsky 2001, 2010; Griffiths 1999; Hull 1965, 1976,
1978, 1989a; Mayr 1959, 1963, 1982; Millikan 2000; Okasha 2002; Richards 2010; Sober 1980, 1984; Wilson 1999. Some of
these authors (Mayr in particular) have argued that essentialism is deeply incompatible with evolutionary theory. Sober
disagrees; he argues that even pre-Darwinian essentialists were willing to admit the existence of vague essences. Sober regards
essentialism as an explanatory strategy which evolutionary theory, and especially population genetics, rendered unnecessary.
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To philosophers outside philosophy of biology, and probably to lay people, the claim that
there are no intrinsic, qualitative properties which are essential to any species may seem
incredible. After all, one can, with better than chance success, predict that the next tiger one
encounters will be striped and a carnivore. Species also exhibit remarkable stability at least in
terms of their morphology over their lifetimes, and in general phenotype and genotype over
shorter instances of time (as well as in properties which perhaps do not fall so intuitively into
either of those two categories, such as chromosome number or structure, or developmental
mechanisms). This (apparent) lack of phenotypic change led some of Darwin’s early critics to
attempt to cast doubt on the “transmutation” of species by pointing to work done by the French
naturalist Georges Cuvier on the mummified remains of cats and ibises found in Egypt. 26 The
animals had not changed in thousands of years, leading Cuvier to conclude that species did not
evolve; they did not transmute one into another (Hull 1973). There are phenotypic and genotypic
commonalities within species.

The DNA of organisms in particular species possess

characteristic markers which enable biologists to reliably infer from which species a sample of
DNA originated. But opponents of intrinsic essentialism need not deny these phenomena. They
merely deny that the properties involved in such inductions, or even those which are present in
many or even most of the organisms in a species throughout the species’ lifetime, are essential.
An examination of essentialist claims requires that we obtain more clarity about what it is
that essentialists are claiming when they claim that certain intrinsic properties of species are
essential. There are many ways of stating the claim, and the differences among them are subtle.
Traditionally, the claim has been about intrinsic properties, namely the intrinsic
properties of organisms; and essentialism gives the conditions for belonging to a particular

26

Among these critics was the English anatomist Richard Owen, who secretly held transmutationist views. Owen famously cited
Cuvier’s work in his scathing, anonymous review of The Origin of Species in the Edinburgh Review of April 1860.
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species. Essentialism holds that there is some property, or set of properties, possession of which
by an organism is or are necessary and sufficient for that organism to belong to that species. The
claim is that every organism which possesses these intrinsic properties is a member of the
species, and no organism which lacks the properties is a member; all and only members of that
species possess all those properties. Sometimes the claim emphasizes the explanatory role that
the alleged species essence is supposed to play. Not only are the essential intrinsic properties
those in virtue of which a particular organism is a member of its species, but the essential
properties explain why organisms in that species are as they are – in particular, why they have
certain phenotypic features. Stating essentialism in terms of membership, or explanatory role,
most commonly links the claim to the view that species are natural kinds. In fact, Hull argues
that the individuality thesis disproved species essentialism, and claims this as one of the thesis’
virtues over the view that species are natural kinds (Hull 1978). But as Okasha points out,
essentialism can be adapted to the individuality thesis: the essentialist simply claims that there
are some intrinsic properties in virtue of which any given organism is part of its species (Okasha
2002).
Alternately, the claim can be about the species itself: that every species is characterized
by a set of intrinsic properties, none of which the species may lose without ceasing to exist
(although the properties in question are not taken to be species-level properties, but the intrinsic
properties of the organisms which are its members or its parts). This would imply a converse
claim, that if a species were to acquire a property, it would have to be an accidental property, or
the species would cease to exist. If a property is an essential property of a kind (or individual), it
cannot be the case that the kind (or individual) currently fails to have it but will have it in the
future. Essentialist claims in terms of the species itself can also be expressed in terms of possible
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worlds: for any species S, there is no possible world in which S exists but fails to exhibit the
properties p1, …, pn. All of these features of essentialism will be important in the discussion that
follows.
On its face, at least, essentialism seems deeply incompatible with the biological facts, and
with evolutionary theory, which teaches us not only to expect variation and change, but that the
very stuff and processes of life guarantees it. Recently, however, some philosophers have
attempted to revive it. Here, I shall deal with the independent attempts of Michael Devitt (2008)
and Crawford Elder (2008). While both ultimately fail, the arguments their authors employ are
sophisticated, and they pay the proper respect to the anti-essentialist literature. After discussing
these attempts to revive intrinsic species essentialism, I turn to the question of origin. I suggest
that a species’ relational property of arising from just its actual numerical ancestor is its only
plausible essential property. But, following Marc Ereshefsky, I deny that this single property
amounts to a species essence (Ereshefsky 2010).
The reader may wonder whether anything is to be gained from reinforcing the consensus
which philosophers of biology have reached regarding species essentialism, particularly in a
dissertation on the individuality thesis. The link to the overall purpose of this dissertation is
twofold. First, the following discussion will show that Hull is in a sense right: anti-essentialism
about species requires that species be individuals, not natural kinds (at least not natural kinds of a
traditional sort). For only if species are individuals can some of Elder’s otherwise uncomfortable
questions about essentialism be dispensed with. Second, I need to dispense with essentialism for
purposes of Chapter 4 (on species de-extinction). The initial organisms cloned from genetic
material from an extinct species must develop in the wombs of organisms belonging to other
species – which might, due to epigenetic factors, produce properties in them unlike the
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characteristic properties of the species prior to its extinction. If species have essential properties,
but for various reasons the clones lacked one or more of them, then they would not belong to the
extinct species.
2. Devitt’s Intrinsic Biological Essentialism
Devitt’s defense of intrinsic species essentialism is the prominent one in the literature.
Attempting to remain neutral on the question whether species are natural kinds or individuals,
Devitt argues that all Linnaean taxa have essences which must be largely genetic, although the
Linnaean taxa which he is concerned with, and to which he confines his arguments, are species.
Devitt’s view, which he calls Intrinsic Biological Essentialism, has already been criticized from a
number of quarters (see, for example, Barker 2010, Ereshefsky 2010, and Richards 2010). My
comments will cover similar ground, but, I hope, by bringing different considerations to light, or
by illuminating some of the same considerations in different ways.
As Barker notes, Devitt employs both a negative and a positive argument for Intrinsic
Biological Essentialism (IBE). The negative argument begins with the fact that the species
concepts most popular with contemporary biologists all use relational properties both to define
what a species is and what membership in a species consists in.

Devitt agrees that such

properties solve the former problem, defining the species category – which he, following Mayr,
calls the “category problem” (Devitt 2008, 357; Mayr 1982). But they are, Devitt contends,
“metaphysically hopeless” when it comes to solving the latter problem – providing membership
conditions, which Devitt calls the “taxon problem” or the “conspecificity problem” (Devitt 2008,
362; 357). Solving the latter problem requires intrinsic, and probably largely genetic, properties
of organisms. The positive argument is that only intrinsic, largely genetic properties can explain
why the warranted structural generalizations (e.g., “all tigers have stripes”) which biologists
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make are true, and how it is that inductive inferences regarding members of species regularly
having particular traits are reliable; and that because such genetic properties causally underlie the
(phenotypic) properties featuring in such generalizations, such genetic properties are essential. I
shall examine the negative argument first, then turn to the positive.
2a. Devitt’s Negative Argument
Devitt complains that anti-essentialists have conflated two distinct problems involving
species which, following Mayr (1982), he calls the “taxon problem” and the “category problem”
(Devitt 2008, 363). A taxon is a group of organisms; the taxon problem has to do with figuring
out which groups constitute actual populations, and which organisms are members of which
populations. Categories, on the other hand, are ranks in the Linnaean hierarchy. Once we know
that we have a population, and know which organisms are members of it, we would wonder what
rank of the hierarchy it occupies. Is it a species? Or does it occupy some other rank? The
category problem concerns how we define the ranks in the hierarchy, such that we know to what
sort of rank to assign a group.

Anti-essentialists hold that relational properties, and only

relational properties, are involved in solutions to both problems; indeed, the same relational
property might solve both problems. Figuring out which organisms are members of which
populations is a matter of figuring out interbreeding relations, or genealogical relations. And we
might define “species,” as the Biological Species Concept does, as an interbreeding population
of organisms, or group of such populations, which is reproductively isolated from other such
groups.
Such strategies, Devitt argues, conflate the problems. He suggests that once they are
cleanly separated, and kept distinct, it will become apparent that relational properties are
inadequate to solve the taxon problem (Devitt 2008, 358). Take the standard anti-essentialist
78

claim, accepted by most biologists, that what makes an organism part of its species (i.e., what
makes O an F) is that it can interbreed with others in the species, or is born of organisms in the
species (Hull 1978).

That leaves unanswered, Devitt claims, in virtue of what are those

organisms F?27 Or, take the claim that what makes an organism part of its species is that it is
related in the right way to the type specimen of the species (recall from Chapter 1, this is a
member of the species arbitrarily chosen to “bear” the species name). That does not explain
why, for example, tigers are striped, or why lions can mate with lions but not tigers, or why polar
bears have poor eyesight. Such relations might be “epistemically useful” for telling which
species the organism belongs to, but they are “metaphysically hopeless” as that which is
constitutive of species membership, since they cannot answer the unanswered question above,
nor explain the above explananda (Devitt 2008, 362). To be metaphysically respectable, a
property constitutive of membership must do both.
Devitt claims that, once the two problems are properly separated, we will see that
relational properties, and the species concepts which engage them, will solve the category
problem, while IBE will solve the taxon problem. Indeed, Devitt recognizes that unless IBE and
species concepts can be restricted in this way, IBE will conflict with the predominant species
concepts. It must turn out, that is, that species concepts tell us only what it is for a group of
organisms to be a species, and do not give the membership conditions for species. And Devitt
takes pains to assure philosophers of biology skeptical of his view that IBE complements, and
does not conflict with, such species concepts – as well as comporting with, rather than seriously

27

I will not address this regress question at this point in this chapter, reserving it for later. Ereshefsky (2010) has
proposed a solution to it, which dovetails with a solution I propose later in this chapter to a somewhat similar
question posed by Elder (2008). Ereshefsky’s proposed solution occurs in Note 41 below in the context of my
proposed solution to Elder’s question.
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conflicting with, aspects of evolutionary theory such as the paramount importance of variation,
and the origin of new species.
But it is not clear, first, that one can sever the taxon problem from the category problem
as cleanly as Devitt suggests, and that relational properties and IBE will keep to their respective
domains. That IBE and the predominant species concepts will not simply play nice with one
another begins to become apparent if we look at how Mayr himself, from whom Devitt takes his
cues on this issue, actually framed the two problems, and what larger issue Mayr was addressing.
Devitt correctly poses the category problem: it is the question, “how do we define
‘species’?” What makes a population (or an aggregate of populations) a species, rather than a
group of some other taxonomic rank? But he poses the taxon problem as, “In virtue of what is an
organism an F?” (Devitt 2008, 357) This subtly misstates the problem, which for Mayr was,
“Are the individuals from a given district members of the same population?” (Mayr 1982, 253)
It is the question, are these organisms members of the same group as those organisms? Or, is
this organism a member of the same group as those organisms? Mayr himself was clear that
these two questions are related, since part of the taxon problem involves “the delimitation of taxa
against each other,” and in particular whether to include “a single variable aggregate of
populations” into a single species. As Mayr posed the taxon problem, it appears explicitly
relational. As Devitt poses it, the problem sounds as if it asks about an intrinsic feature.
Mayr famously devised and advocated the Biological Species Concept, and the
interbreeding and reproductive isolation criteria clearly come into play in deciding whether taxon
T, or aggregate A, is a species. Yet the interbreeding criterion (at least) is also clearly in play in
deciding whether organism O is a member of species S – that is, it’s an element in solving the
taxon problem, of giving the membership conditions for a species – since species are just one
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more taxon. As Mayr originally posed the problem, relational properties such as interbreeding
can solve the taxon problem, since the presence or absence of such a property determines
whether the individuals from a given district are members of the same population, or whether
this organism is of the same group as those. As Mayr posed the taxon and category problems,
the BSC can be seen as providing the elements for a natural solution to both. It is only through
Devitt’s recasting of the issue that the BSC looks suspicious.
In fairness to Devitt, it is somewhat unclear whether he takes himself simply to be
repeating Mayr’s original taxon problem, or whether he takes himself to be posing a problem of
his own devising, and is merely appropriating Mayr’s words (e.g., “taxon problem”). If the
former, he is misstating the problem. If the latter, he is doing so in a way which makes it seem
all but inevitable that only intrinsic properties can solve the problem – and also in a way which
comes close to violating his professed agnosticism as to whether species are kinds or individuals,
if it does not actually violate it. In several instances, in discussing the problem of membership
conditions – the taxon problem – Devitt talks about species in ways which make them appear to
be natural kinds, and invokes analogies to groups which many philosophers would instinctively
regard as kinds of some sort, e.g., tools, pets, toys, hammers, and saws (Devitt 2008, 360). Since
intrinsic properties make up the membership conditions for these kinds, it becomes very easy to
slide to the conclusion that intrinsic properties must also make up the membership conditions for
species. Devitt does alert his readers that he will “mostly talk of species as if they were kinds”
(Devitt 2008, 348). But even with the alert, such “as if” talk has, I think, a subtle, prejudicial
influence, although not necessarily an intentional one.
Second, Devitt simply assumes that any property which solves the taxon problem must
also explain the characteristic intrinsic properties of the taxon – as he puts it, why it is that Fs are
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P. If Okasha (2002) is correct, in this, he is following in the footsteps of Kripke and Putnam, the
fathers of contemporary essentialism. Both Kripke and Putnam, according to Okasha, assume
that the essence of a kind must be a property – such as a microstructure – which both gives the
membership conditions for the kind, and explains why members of the kind have their (essential)
properties. As Okasha points out, there seems to be no a priori reason to think this is so (Okasha
2002, 203). And in fact, such a doctrine is false, at least insofar as certain taxa are concerned.
We can see this by considering different “taxon” and “category” problems. In virtue of
what is the House of Windsor a royal house? This is a category problem, and probably requires
a solution at least in part in terms of intrinsic properties, namely of the House of Windsor as an
institution (not as a human family). But now, in virtue of what is Prince William a member of
the House of Windsor? This is a taxon problem, and the answer is that he is a descendent of
Queen Victoria and Prince Albert in the male line and is a subject of the Commonwealth. These
are both relational properties. Suppose that William were, as were some of Victoria’s male
descendents, a hemophiliac. This, of course, would not itself be explained by the mere fact that
he is a descendent of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert in the male line and is a subject of the
Commonwealth (although, as Ereshefsky would probably point out, and as I discuss below, his
ancestry would be part of a full explanation, since hemophilia is an inherited condition).

It

would require some explanation in terms of William’s intrinsic, genetic properties. But the
important point is that no one would reasonably expect that the relational property which gives
the membership condition for the House of Windsor ought to explain the intrinsic properties of
its members. Absent an argument that the same property must set membership conditions and
explain the intrinsic properties of members, Devitt is placing unreasonable demands upon any
solution to the taxon problem that solely involves relational properties.
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Devitt admits that some category problems – namely, the species category – can be
solved using relational properties. It’s clear some taxon problems can be solved using relational
properties.28 There seems to be no reason why, at least in some cases or in some domains, the
solution to each problem will not involve the same relational property. This possibility becomes
more evident if we re-examine the reason Mayr insisted there were two distinct, but related,
problems, reasoning which Devitt neglects. Mayr was attempting to correct the view that every
taxon is a species (and, as we see below, resolving the problem of morphologically identical but
reproductively isolated “cryptic” or “sibling” species)(Mayr 1982, 254). Mary is insisting that
the term “species” be reserved for a particular type of taxon. All species are taxa, but not all taxa
are species. Interbreeding might solve the taxon problem, although it would be insufficient to
establish that a taxon was a species; that takes reproductive isolation from other taxa.
If a relational property (or properties) can solve the taxon problem, then, contrary to
Devitt’s optimism, IBE will conflict with species concepts, since they will provide different
answers to the taxon question. It should also become clear that IBE will pose problems on its
own terms, when we consider what IBE would have to say about a particular case of evolution,
which will amount to a reductio of IBE.
Per IBE, essential genetic properties are those which produce properties which feature in
generalizations about species. Suppose that a species, F, evolves such that it begins to lose one
of those genetic properties, yet with every generation we still have an interbreeding population of
organisms that is reproductively isolated from other populations (one might wonder from the
start how F can begin to lose a property which is essential to it; the answer is that Devitt holds
28

A defender of Devitt might object that my House of Windsor case is not truly a taxon problem, since it involves a
royal house, not a group of organisms which a taxonomist or systematist would investigate. If this were an
objection, I don’t believe it makes any difference. Nor could a defender object that the House of Windsor is (as I
will claim below) an individual, while the “relevant” sort of taxa are classes or natural kinds, without violating
Devitt’s professed agnosticism about the ontological status of species.
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that essences can be vague [Devitt 2008, 371; 373]). Let us say that, at some point, half this
evolving population retains genetic property g, while the other half has lost it. Assume that these
two halves are not reproductively isolated from one another; to assume otherwise would be to
make the most likely dubious claim that all essential species properties somehow all necessarily
also play a role in isolating mechanisms – that, say, the genetic property responsible for
stripedness in tigers necessarily contributes to intebreeding, such that its absence produces or
amounts to a prezygotic or postzygotic isolating mechanism.
Now, per the BSC, to which we refer to address the category problem, we have a single
species, and since, per IBE, all Linnaean taxa have essences, that species must have an essence.
Further, Devitt holds that IBE requires the possibility of anagenetic speciation – that one species
may transform into another species within a single lineage (whereas the dominant theories of
speciation are all cladogenetic, meaning they involve the splitting of a lineage into two or more
lineages)(Devitt 2008, 369). He also holds that the gradual evolution of one species into another,
on IBE, involves “moving from organisms that determinately have G1 [the genetic essence of the
first species] to organisms that determinately have G2 [the genetic essence of the second species]
via a whole lot of organisms that do not determinately have either” (Devitt 2008, 373). Given
this, it’s clear that, for Devitt, change of essence entails change of species; and, if there is no
change in the essence, there is no change of species (and conversely: that we have the same
species entails we have the same essence; and if we have a different species, we must have a
different essence). Call this the Change Principle.29 Which organisms are now members of F?
In particular, of which species are the g-less organisms members?

It might seem that this violates Devitt’s view that species concepts tell us only whether a taxon is a species, while
IBE tells us whether an organism is a member of a particular species. It need not. On Devitt’s view, a change in
essence entails that we no longer have the same species. Whether the resulting taxon would itself be a species
would be a matter to be decided by referring to a species concept.
29
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It appears that the g-less organisms are members of no species, unless the F-essence,
minus g, is now its own species essence (i.e., we have another, and new, species essence, Fminus-g). While this seems to be what the Change Principle implies, Devitt could deny this; he
could claim that it is merely the essence of some taxonomic group of some other rank, or that it
is not an essence at all. He could claim, on his own terms, that the essence of F hasn’t changed;
it’s just that those organisms without g are no longer members of F. Since he holds that during
the evolution of one species into another, it is indeterminate whether we still have the same
species (Devitt 2008, 373), and this looks like such a case, it would also be open for him to claim
that it is indeterminate whether the species with half g-less organisms is F. Granting that, and
since by the BSC we do still have a species, let us call this new group of organisms (all those in
question) Fʹ, where possibly (that is, for all we know at this stage) F = Fʹ.
Yet if we circumscribed Fʹ according to the BSC, it would include all the organisms in
question. That is, suppose we decided that the g-possessing organisms constituted one taxon (as
per IBE). Of what rank is that taxon? Not a species. Fʹ cannot be just the g-possessing
organisms, since that population is not reproductively isolated from all other populations; they
still interbreed with the g-less organisms.

This is paradoxical.

The g-less organisms are

included in Fʹ, but they fail to be members of Fʹ (Perhaps they are honorary members.). And
what about the g-less set of genetic properties? Is it now an essence in its own right? If it is, it
cannot be a species essence, since (per the BSC) the g-less taxon is not a species (the organisms
interbreed, but that population is not reproductively isolated from other populations). But then,
by the same reasoning, neither can the original essence any longer be a species essence. The
original essence is the essence of the taxon-with-g; but that taxon is not a species. Yet, per the
Change Principle, same essence entails same species. So, since the essence of F is unchanged,
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we must still have F, and F must be a species (and, per the BSC, it is). But now the essence of F
is no longer a species essence. And consider that, if we still have F, and if (as the BSC tells us)
we have but one species, then that species (which we have provisionally been calling Fʹ) must be
F, and F = Fʹ.
So far, I have been talking about membership. Things get worse on the individuality
thesis. We know taxon Fʹ rises to the level of a species. So every organism included in Fʹ must
be a discrete proper part (in Elder’s terms, an “objectively privileged segmentation” [Elder 2008,
354]) of that species. It cannot be otherwise. If Fʹ is a species, it’s an individual. If it’s an
individual, either it’s a whole lacking such proper parts – an undifferentiated, homogeneous
object – or it has such proper parts.

But species are not undifferentiated blobs; they are

composed of organisms. So Fʹ has such proper parts. Now, the g-less organisms must be
included in Fʹ, so they are parts of Fʹ. Since F = Fʹ, they are parts of F. But per IBE, they cannot
be parts of F, since they lack g.
Moreover, since F = Fʹ, the essence of F is identical to the essence of Fʹ. So nothing can
be part of Fʹ which lacks the essence of Fʹ, which includes g. But the g-less organisms are part
of Fʹ! Either we have a contradiction, or organisms can be part of Fʹ without g. If the former,
IBE must be false. If the latter, then g is not an essential property of Fʹ, nor, since F = Fʹ, is it an
essential property of F. Since g is an arbitrarily selected component of the essence (an arbitrarily
selected essential property), it must be the case that no component of the essence is an essential
property of F – in which case, there is no essence of F, and again, IBE is false.
Devitt is officially neutral between the individuality thesis and the kindhood thesis, but
the kindhood thesis will be no kinder to IBE. On the kindhood thesis, since Fʹ is a species, it is a
natural kind. But nothing can be a member of the kind which lacks the requisite properties. So
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the g-less organisms cannot be members of the kind Fʹ. But the kind Fʹ just is the species, which
is the entirety of Fʹ, which, were we to circumscribe it according to the BSC, includes the g-less
organisms.
Devitt might have a reply here. In response to concerns about the substantial amount of
variation which can occur within a species, Devitt proposes (as we saw above) that a species
essence need not be “neat and tidy” (Devitt 2008, 371). He might attempt to employ this
position here, and claim that – going back to our original species and original essence – the
essence of F need not be neat and tidy. It would, therefore, be indeterminate whether g is an
essential component of the essence of F. Thus it is merely indeterminate whether the g-less
organisms are members of kind F. Of course, this also makes it indeterminate whether any of
the organisms in question are members of F.

Or, since they all presumably possess the

remaining components of the essence of F, perhaps these properties determinately make up the
essence of F, and all the organisms in question are members of F. But then the possession of g
cannot be essential to membership in F (even though, by our original hypothesis, it underlies a
property which features in a lawlike generalization about F). Since g is an arbitrary component
of the essence, the same must be true of all the components; and, again, there is no essence, and
IBE is false. Alternately, since g is an arbitrary component, it must be indeterminate whether
any component is essential to the essence (to see this, simply run the original thought experiment
using some other alleged essential property). It is unclear of what benefit an essence this vague
is going to be, either to determining membership (or parthood) in a species, or in explaining why,
e.g., tigers have stripes, or polar bears have poor eyesight.
There is also this: for a period shortly (in evolutionary time) after two new species are
born of a stem species in a cladogenetic speciation event, they will be phenotypically and
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genotypically very similar. Both will have to have vague genetic essences, even if, further down
the road in evolutionary time, those essences become more determinate. There might, however,
at such an early moment, be no sense in which their vague essences can be said to be distinct.
Yet if the two species are reproductively isolated, as they would have to be on the BSC if they
are separate species, they are distinct species. If IBE is true, there will almost certainly be
distinct species sharing the same vague essence. But if they have the same essence, even a vague
one, they must, per IBE, be the same species. Again, IBE conflicts with a species concept.
Admittedly, this lengthy discussion has involved only the BSC. But I believe that the
same result would obtain if we used either a Phylogenetic Species Concept (PSC) (which Devitt
refers to as the Phylogenetic-Cladistic Concept, or P-CC), or an Ecological Species Concept
(ESC) (which Devitt calls the Ecological Niche Concept, or ENC). This is because both also
define species in relational terms. For the PSC, a species is an ancestor-descendent lineage of
organisms, bounded at one end by the speciation event which gave rise to it, and at the other
either by another speciation event, or extinction; for the ESC, a species is a group of
interbreeding organisms which share the same ecological niche. Thus we could run the same
thought experiment, but ask whether F was an ancestor-descendent lineage (and since the PSC
tends to use reproductive isolation as a component in speciation, using the PSC might be no
different from using the BSC), or whether everything in taxon F shared an ecological niche.
But what we have seen is that IBE does conflict with species concepts, even if we try to
keep the taxon and category problems separate.30 Indeed, it looks like, if we refuse to allow the
same properties to solve both problems, IBE undermines itself.
30

Devitt could remove this

As Devitt himself remarks, IBE already conflicts with the PSC, since the PSC regards lineage-splitting as a
necessary component of speciation, and disallows anagenetic speciation (Devitt 2008, 369). Devitt does not regard
this as a drawback, since the PSC implies, on cladistic terms, that if one could start with a population of protists and
over billions of years have them evolve into Homo sapiens in a single lineage without splitting, all of the organisms
in this lineage would be members of the same species, a position he regards as implausible.
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problem by claiming that IBE speaks to both problems. But this would engender different
problems, such as why it should be that the essence of a species suddenly fails to be a species
essence, when there was no change in the essence itself. Of course, if he acknowledged that the
relational properties in species concepts could solve the taxon problem, he would lose his
motivation for his negative argument.
2b. Devitt’s Positive Argument
Let us turn from Devitt’s negative argument to his positive argument. The positive
argument, again, relies upon the lawlikeness of the “structural generalizations” which biologists
are able to make regarding species. Devitt recognizes that variation is ubiquitous in species; thus
generalizations about species will have exceptions. He attempts to deal with this by arguing that
statistical generalizations can themselves be lawlike. The generalization, “90% of Fs are P” is
lawlike, because it sustains the subjunctive conditional that if something were F, it very likely
would be P (Devitt 2008, 377).

It is because such generalizations are lawlike that the genetic

property G which explains why all (or nearly all) Fs are P must be an essential property.
Anything which would be F would have P, and would do so in virtue of having G. Thus,
anything which would be F would have G, so having G is an essential property. This makes
Devitt’s positive argument an extension of standard essentialism concerning chemical elements.
In this arena of essentialism, the microstructure of an element or molecule is the element’s
essential property, because it is causally responsible for the properties which feature in lawful
generalizations about that element or molecule, including how that element or molecule interacts
with other elements or molecules (Elder 1994a; Ellis 2001).

In formulating his positive

argument in this way, Devitt at least has an advantage over other latter-day essentialists, in that
he has a principled method of identifying a species’ (alleged) essential properties. As we will
89

see, identifying which of a species’ properties are essential is a vexed problem for the
essentialist, since the essentialist generally agrees that some, but not all, of a species’ properties
are essential to it. For Devitt, a species’ essential properties are just the genetic properties which
are causally responsible for the (phenotypic) properties which feature in structural
generalizations.
Yet suppose, to use one of Devitt’s examples of species, that a species of African rhino
loses the gene or genes which produce their characteristic two horns, and this change goes to
fixation in the species. There are two extant species of African rhino, black rhinos (Diceros
bicornis) and white rhinos (Ceratotherium simum), and both have two horns, a nasal horn and a
frontal horn. Indeed, it is hypothesized that the ancestor of all rhinos was hornless, that two
horns was the ancestral condition of the common ancestor of all the extant species of rhino, and
that the frontal horn was lost in the Rhinoceros genus, which today contains two species, the
Indian and Javan rhinos (Rhinoceros unicornis and Rhinoceros sondaicus)(Coddington 1988;
Groves 1983; Prothero et al. 1986).31 It makes little difference to this thought experiment
whether the gene loss causes the African rhino species to have only one horn, or no horns. I do
need, however, to distinguish such a case from one in which a mutation causes the two-hornproducing genetic property (assuming there is but one property responsible for the horns) to be
merely completely or partially suppressed, such that the species still possesses the gene(s), but
switched off. That might still count as one in which the species continues to possess the same
genetic property – although it also might not, since Devitt has not said whether he means by
“genetic property” the mere nucleotide sequence involved in the production of the phenotypic
property featuring in the structural generalization, or the associated regions of the genome, or
31

Here is a case where our ordinary language terms do not correspond neatly with the names of recognized
biological taxa. All four species named above are considered “rhinos.” But only two are in the genus Rhinoceros.
Dupré (1993) notes a number of similar cases, e.g. “lily.” I shall return to this issue in Chapter 3.
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epigenetic factors, which regulate expression of the gene(s). A switched-off gene might not be
the same genetic property. In any event, both in our imaginary case, and in the real case, it is
theoretically possible that loss of the gene(s) occurs without any speciation event occurring – that
is, any such event which biologists would currently recognize as speciation (such as a peripheral
isolate budding off, say, Diceros bicornis, and becoming reproductively isolated from Diceros
bicornis). Everything F would now lack G, which is impossible if G is an essential property of
Fs. Yet evolutionary theory permits it. Devitt, of course, could reply that in fact a speciation
event had occurred due to the loss of G; and, given his comments regarding the (at least
conceptual) possibility of anagenetic speciation, he might very well do so (see the above
footnote). But this would put him out of step with the science, something he seeks in general to
avoid.
Consider another counterexample, this time to the principle Devitt implicitly relies upon
in making his positive argument. This can be stated as, “If G (genetic or otherwise) is an
intrinsic property of F which explains why all (or nearly all) F are P (i.e., where the
generalization, ‘All F are P’ has counterfactual force), then G is an essential property of F.”
Currently, about 65 percent of humans do not exhibit lactase persistence; they can digest lactose
as infants, but they quickly lose this ability as they move toward adulthood, becoming lactose
intolerant as adults (Ingram et al. 2009).

Lactase persistence is highest among northern

Europeans and their American and Australian descendants, as well as among certain pastoral
Africans believed to be descended from north or east Africans, exceeding 70 percent (Holden
and Mace 1997). Lactose intolerance and lactase persistence are both genetically determined,
being controlled by the lactase gene.
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The allele strongly associated with lactase persistence appears to be the result of a single
nucleotide polymorphism upstream from this gene, affecting its regulation. The allele originated
in the last 7,400 to 12,000 years – at the same time that dairying was becoming widespread in
Europe and the Mediterranean (Ingram et al. 2009). In fact, Holden and Mace hypothesize
(Mace 2010; Holden and Mace 1997) that lactase persistence is an adaptation to dairying and its
corresponding high levels of drinking of milk from domestic livestock. Most humans today have
the ancestral lactase gene, which explains why most humans today are lactose intolerant as
adults. Yet possession of this gene cannot be an essential property of Homo sapiens, since those
with the lactase persistence allele belong just as much to Homo sapiens as do those with the
ancestral gene. Properties can be explanatory without being essential. Crucially, if this analysis
is correct, then even properties which are explanatory of properties featuring in lawlike
generalizations need not be essential properties.
A defender of Devitt’s view might here object, of course, that merely 65 percent of
humans are lactose intolerant, whereas in the schematic generalization Devitt invokes above, the
percentage is a whopping 90; 65 percent is neither all, nor (perhaps) nearly all. 32 But Devitt’s
positive argument does not depend upon percentages. It depends upon the generalization having
counterfactual force – the ability to predict reliably that the next organism from species F that
one encounters will have property P. Devitt’s position is also the uncontroversial one that
having such counterfactual force is a sufficient condition for a generalization’s being lawlike.
As Griffiths has observed (Griffiths 1999), in his discussion of species and inductive inference,
what seems to be required for a generalization to have counterfactual force is simply that one be

Intuitions may vary here as to whether 65 percent constitutes “nearly all.” Some may find their intuitions driving
them to conclude it does – it is, after all, nearly two-thirds, a very large percentage – while others may find their
intuitions inclining them to denying that it does. I will not quibble about that here, nor do I need to, as the following
discussion will show.
32
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able to use it to infer that the next observed F will be P, with a greater-than-chance probability of
being right. If one were to draw a human being at random from among all human beings, one
would have a 65 percent chance of being right if one predicted that the human drawn would be
lactose intolerant – clearly much better than chance. So the generalization, “65 percent of human
beings are lactose intolerant” has counterfactual force, and on Devitt’s account it must be
lawlike. Therefore, the ancestral lactase gene must be an essential property of Homo sapiens.
But this absurdly implies that 70 percent of northern Europeans do not belong to Homo
sapiens.33
Of course, we have already seen that Devitt recognizes that even substantial variation can
exist among the organisms in a species; this is why he has suggested that species essences may
be vague. So, a defender of Devitt’s view might insist that, in fact, the Homo sapiens essence
does indeed include the ancestral lactase gene. It just turns out that species essences are quite
vague, to the point that more than one third of the organisms in a species can be without it. This
is an extremely tolerant attitude to have toward vagueness in essences, given that, first,
essentialism traditionally has been conceived as a matter of all and only Fs having P; and,
second, Devitt himself seeks properties either which all and only organisms in a species possess,
or which an extremely high percentage (e.g., 90 percent) of them possess. Indeed, since the
lactase persistence allele originated only some 12,000 years ago, earlier than that time, (adult)
lactose intolerance would have been a near-universal human trait, and therefore possession of the
ancestral lactase gene must have been, at least then, an essential property of Homo sapiens.

Or, consider a slightly different case. The generalization, “More than 70 percent of northern Europeans are
lactase persistent” is counterfactual-sustaining. Their lactase persistence is explained by their possession of the
lactase persistence allele; therefore, possession of that allele must be an essential property of northern Europeans.
But the 30 percent of northern Europeans who lack this allele and are lactose intolerant are just as much northern
European as their lactose-tolerant kin (much as their kin might wish to disown them on that basis should they
consume dairy products at family gatherings). So possession of the allele cannot be an essential property.
33
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Either species essences can be quite vague, or we must conclude that a new species of human has
been evolving in northern Europe, north and east Africa, and other parts of the world (such as
Asia) where populations have evolved or are evolving lactase persistence.34
3. Elder’s Intrinsic Species Essentialism
Elder’s view is that there is some way, in terms of a rough phenotypic profile, that a
species is “bound” to be like (I will discuss this locution in detail below). Like Devitt, Elder
(independently) postulates the existence of intrinsic essential properties on the grounds that the
membership criteria favored by biologists and philosophers of biology are inadequate. The two
criteria under discussion are interbreeding (and reproductive isolation from populations of other
organisms) and descent from a common ancestor (being part of a lineage).
3a. First Argument: Inadequacy of the BSC
Elder’s first argument is that satisfaction of a rough phenotypic profile is required to deal
with some well-known problems with the BSC. As Elder points out, the BSC – probably the
default species concept for most biologists today – notoriously excludes asexually reproducing
organisms.

It also has trouble accounting for species which can hybridize, and for

geographically separated taxa which nevertheless are regarded as being in the same species.
Elder notes that some of these problems can be met by adding “epicycles” to the BSC; his
complaint is that the “epicycles” end up “too numerous and randomly assembled” (Elder 2008,
348).
But it is not clear that Elder’s preferred epicycle – satisfaction of a rough phenotypic
profile – in essence a wedding of the BSC with the phenetic species concept – will do any

34

And worse: were lactase persistence to spread to most humans, we would have to conclude that Homo sapiens
had gone extinct, and that a new species had taken its place.
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good.35 The proposal is that membership in a species would involve not merely “possession of a
common descent-involving property” such as interbreeding and reproductive isolation, but also
involve satisfaction of the profile (Elder 2008, 348). The proposal is, therefore, to create a
conjunction of the two. Yet all of the problems with the BSC which Elder discusses will remain.
If an organism satisfies the rough phenotypic profile, yet can hybridize with members of other
species, it still fails to be a member of the species (at least on a more literal, epicycle-less reading
of the BSC). Nor will satisfaction of a profile solve the asexuality problem, unless we abandon
the interbreeding criterion (and thus the BSC) and opt for the phenotypic profile alone. 36 In that
case, we return to the sorts of problems which led Mayr to propose the BSC in the first place,
such as mistaking “sibling species” (which are morphologically indistinguishable) for “biological
races” of a single species; and mistaking as separate species the geographic or individual
variations within a single, polytypic species (Mayr 1942, 1982).
Elder could amend his proposal by making it a disjunction: requiring that an organism is
a member of a species if it satisfies the interbreeding criterion or satisfies the rough phenotypic
profile. This may be more in keeping with the intent of the original suggestion, since it would
relieve the interbreeding criterion of carrying the entire burden of determining species
membership. But now, take the case of allopatric taxa within what is regarded as a single
species, where it is unclear whether interbreeding occurs between the taxa.

Because the

interbreeding criterion fails (or at least seems to), we switch to the satisfaction criterion, and

35

I leave to one side the question as to whether, during these days of attempts to discover and discern species
differences in terms of their molecular biology rather than phenotype, satisfaction of a phenotypic profile is in
keeping with the scientific spirit. It will make no difference if it isn’t. The same arguments will apply at the
molecular level.
36
Provided, that is, that we are monists about species concepts. Adopting species pluralism might solve the
asexuality problem. But as long as the membership criterion is a conjunction, the problems I am discussing here
will remain.
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make the determination that way. If the taxa are morphologically differentiated, they count as
two species; if not, they count as one.
Yet this looks like it is mostly just placekeeping, since the real work in such an analysis is
being done by the BSC. Suppose biologists continue to investigate whether these taxa are
isolated. If they find they aren’t, then the rough phenotypic profile will likely be discarded, and
the taxa declared to be a single species. If they find they are isolated, then the judgment that the
taxa are two distinct species will remain, but on the basis of the interbreeding criterion. In either
case, judgments as to whether the taxa really are distinct species are being made on the
interbreeding criterion. Absent some reason why satisfaction of a rough phenotypic profile
should always predominate over reproductive isolation, it is unlikely that biologists would insist,
based upon satisfaction of the rough phenotypic profile, that the two taxa are two species if the
taxa interbreed as much as do any two populations within a single species. These considerations
make it far more plausible that it is reproductive isolation which is definitional of a species,
while a phenotypic profile is merely diagnostic.
Moreover, a second problem arises if Elder switches to a disjunction of the criteria. It is
the same challenge which Ereshefsky (2010) poses for Boyd’s “homeostatic property cluster”
kind account of species (of which Elder has his own criticisms): imagine a hybrid species arising
from two parental species. It goes extinct. Later, more hybrids arise from the two species. Do
we have one, historically discontinuous species, or two?
Assume that both hybrid taxa have the same rough phenotypic profile. It is not clear
what to say about reproductive isolation in such a case. The two taxa are isolated, but this is
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because one now exists and the other no longer does.37 If we conclude this is a case that defies
the BSC, we resort to satisfaction of a profile, and the two taxa are one species. If we attempt to
determine whether the two taxa are isolated, it makes no difference, because whether it is true or
false that they are isolated, satisfaction of the profile holds, and again they are one species. 38
But (as Ereshefsky points out in his discussion of Boyd) the two major schools of
taxonomy, cladistics and evolutionary taxonomy, recognize only monophyletic or paraphyletic
taxa. Recall that monophyletic taxa contain all and only the descendants of a common ancestor,
whereas paraphyletic taxa contain only (but not all) the descendants of a common ancestor
(cladists recognize only monophyletic taxa, while evolutionary taxonomists recognize both).
Ereshefsky writes that this means that true taxa must be spatiotemporally continuous lineages.
So the major taxonomic schools would classify the hybrid taxa above as two distinct species.
None of the organisms in the second hybrid species are descended from the same (immediate)
common ancestor as those in the first. This would put my modified version of Elder’s proposal
out of step with scientific practice. Elder might well reply that he is challenging scientific
practice, so this is not much of an objection. But then the burden is on him to show in what way
either his marriage of pheneticism with the BSC, or a species concept made up of a disjunction
of the two, is superior to current scientific practice.
Perhaps a better way to pose the problem for Elder’s essentialism at this point is to
invoke a different formulation, also from Ereshefsky, of what taxa must be. The example of the
allegedly re-evolving hybrid species is drawn from Kitcher, in his defense of the view that
37

In Chapter 4, I explain the serious drawback involved in regarding separation in time as reproductive isolation;
namely, it means the species of which you and I are a part is a distinct species from the human speices which existed
in the early 19th century.
38
If it false, then we conclude they could interbreed, raising skeptical worries similar to those Elder has regarding
what sense it makes to say of two populations that don’t interbreed that they could: what sense does it make to say
that if they co-existed, they could interbreed, since they never will? If it is true, then we seem to be engaging in a
non-standard view about isolation. So it is for the best that we need not worry about the isolation/interbreeding
criterion!
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species can be historically disconnected sets (Kitcher 1984).

Suppose the lizard species

Cnemidophorus tesselatus, a unisexual species which was produced through hybridization
between two other lizard species, were wiped out, and then later more such unisexual organisms
were produced through hybridization between the same two species. Kitcher claims that “the
correct description to give” of these events would be that Cnemidophorus tesselatus was rederived. Hull (among others) would regard it as a conceptual truth that once a species is extinct,
it is gone forever; if correct, then the new hybrid species must be regarded as a distinct species –
perhaps as sibling species. But this, Kitcher claims, is “to multiply species beyond necessity”
(Kitcher 1984, 315), since it seems to serve no biological purpose. Drawing upon arguments
made primarily by Hull (Hull 1976, 1978, 1987), Ereshefsky points out that evolutionary theory
supplies the necessity Kitcher believes is lacking:

species must be historically continuous

lineages (Ereshefsky 1992, 688; my emphasis).39 The reason is that if species are to evolve by
natural selection, there must be transmission of (at least genetic) information between
generations through inheritance, and were there to be historically disconnected taxa, this could
not occur. So evolutionary theory cannot countenance historically disconnected taxa, which is
what our hypothesized hybrid species would be if the organisms in both its first and later
instantiation satisfied the same rough phenotypic profile.
3b. Second Argument: Inadequacy of the Descent Criterion
The remaining argument seems to be generated by a confused answer to a genuine
question, or to simply involve a confusion. Suppose the anti-(intrinsic property) essentialist

39

As we will see in the upcoming chapter on species de-extinction, this is an important distinction. I shall argue
there that temporally discontinuous segments of one and the same object may still be historically continuous. This
permits species de-extinction even if species are individuals. This would make a case of de-extinction different
from the hybrid case just discussed. In a case of de-extinction by cloning of organisms, there would be historical
continuity between the two segments. In the hybrid example just discussed, there isn’t.
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claims that organism O belongs to species S not because it possesses any set of intrinsic
properties, but because O is part of a lineage descended from a common ancestor. As Elder
points out, all organisms are ultimately descended from a single, last common ancestor; this
would appear to make all organisms members of a single species.40 Elder suggests we remedy
this by holding that what unites organisms into a single species is that they are descended from
ancestor organisms from which organisms in no other species are descended (Elder 2008, 349).
The question then is, why those ancestors, and not others. The only acceptable answer, Elder
claims, is in terms of those ancestor organisms’ intrinsic phenotypic (or genotypic) properties.
Moreover, biologists must refer to these intrinsic properties to explain why the descendants have
the properties they do; descent alone is insufficient. For these two reasons, such properties are
essential.
The confusions are twofold, one for each of the alleged reasons. First, the original
suggestion to avoid lumping all organisms into a single species will not work. Suppose species
S1 splits into two species, S2 and S3. These latter two are distinct species, yet it is not true that S2
is descended from ancestor organisms from which the members of no other species are
descended, since S2 is descended from ancestor organisms in S1, and so is S3.
This diagnosis may be too literal an interpretation of Elder, although I believe it is a
natural one, even the most natural one. Elder has said (in personal communication) that what he
means is that, in some later generation (perhaps even the second), the species will contain
members who are descended from organisms from which members of no other species are
40

This conclusion might be unwarranted. Is the lineage which begins with the universal common ancestor and ends
with every human being alive today the same lineage as the one which also starts with the universal common
ancestor and follows a much different history of branching and terminates in every poison ivy plant alive today? If
not, then the worry is not that all organisms belong to just a single species, but rather that all species extant today are
in some sense like identical twins rather than distant cousins; or that every extant species has existed since the
existence of the universal common ancestor, as in the protist-to-Homo sapiens species which Devitt found
implausible. I believe my response in this section to Elder’s concern – regarding the branching of lineages – would
address these worries.
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descended. He has also proposed that the suggestion be that what unites the organisms in a
species is that they are descended from at least some organisms from which the members of no
other species are descended.
At a glance this might look right. But these amended suggestions would work only in
limited cases, or would founder on the transitivity of the descent relation. Restricting ourselves
to S2, organisms in S2 might be descended from at least some ancestors from which members of
no other species are descended; that is, there might be organisms in S1 all of whose descendants
either end up in S2 or themselves have offspring all of whose descendants end up in S2 and none
of whose offspring end up in S3. But in another case, this might not happen; in which case, we
lose our demarcation criterion. Moreover, sticking to the original formulation but looking only
to later generations, unless we disallow the first generation of S2 as members of the species, it
will not be true that what all the members have in common (rather than what just some have in
common) is descent from ancestors from which no other organisms are descended.
Finally, neither suggestion will work unless when we say “x is descended from y,” we
confine y to the generation just before x; i.e., we deny the transitivity of “descended from” and
“ancestor of.” Call the later generation which Elder has in mind G2, and its parental generation
G1, and let both be in S2 from above. G2 is descended from G1, and (so far!) organisms in no
other species are descended from G1. But G2 is also descended from organisms in S1. And the
proposals will not work when we look toward the future. Should S2 give rise to other species,
those species will contain organisms who are descended from G1. And even if S2 was descended
from at least some organisms in S1 none of whose descendants ended up in S3, if S2 gives rise to
other species (say, S4 and S5), it will no longer be true that organisms in S2 are descended from at
least some organisms from which the members of no other species are descended, since the
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organisms in S1 whose (more immediate) descendants ended up exclusively in S2 will also be the
ancestors of organisms in S4 and S5. So neither suggestion will work unless we deny the
transitivity of descent, or confine the criterion to species which go extinct without speciating. If
the former, it is not true that, e.g., chimpanzees and humans are descended from a common
ancestor; if the latter, we cannot demarcate species which speciate. Both are fatal problems.
In any case, at least one alternative solution is available. It is implied by the Phylogenetic
Species Concept (PSC), which Elder mentions in his discussion. Since, on that concept, species
are distinct lineages bounded on one end by the speciation event which gave rise to them, and
either extinction or another speciation event (which on the cladistic view counts also as the
extinction of the ancestor species) on the other, such events are like nodes which demarcate the
lineages. By reference to these nodes (rather than to the ancestral organisms), we avoid the
problem of all organisms belonging to one, big species.41 If this solution succeeds, it neatly cuts
off much of the rest of Elder’s discussion of this issue, since it was his original proffered answer
which generated it.
Elder might complain that I have not truly resolved his concerns about common ancestry
as a membership criterion. Instead, I have transformed his question from, “Why just numerically
those organisms?” to, “Why just numerically that event?” Surely one of the elements in that
event was a group of organisms. Was it simply that it was numerically that event, or was it
something about that event, namely the organisms in it, and their intrinsic properties? Why

41

Ereshefsky (2010) has independently proposed referring to speciation events to answer a similar challenge posed
by Devitt (2008). As we saw, Devitt claims it is inadequate to say that O is a member of species S because it can
interbreed with other S’s, because this lead to a regress: what makes those organisms S’s? Ereshefsky argues that it
is their possession of isolating mechanisms that allow them to interbreed with some organisms and not others. They
have those mechanisms because of their genealogical relations to other organisms connected in a single lineage.
They might have had other mechanisms (meaning the mechanisms, while intrinsic, are not essential), but possession
of whatever mechanisms they have depends upon genealogical relations, making relational properties fundamental.
What makes these relations the relations of a particular species is that the lineage involved is “anchored to a
particular speciation event” (Ereshefsky 2010, 682).
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descent from organisms in that event, and not some other? The answer, I believe, is simply that
it was in that event which the species in question began. And this is important because it just is
in those sorts of events, whether they are allopatric (involving geographic separation of some
kind) or sympatric (occurring within the range of the species), that species begin. The evolution
of one or more new species from an existing species is a completely contingent happening, not at
all guaranteed to recur again were we to, as Gould suggested, rewind the tape of life and let it
play out again (Gould 1989).

Species S happened to evolve from its stem species under

particular circumstances at a particular time and place in Earth history. So the answer to the
question, “Why just numerically that event?” is that it just was in that event in the actual world
that the unique entity Species S was born.
And this new question seems to confuse what it takes to produce a species, with what it
takes for an organism to be part of a species. It also covertly assumes that species are natural
kinds, rather than individuals (which, indeed, is Elder’s position in his 2008 paper). The original
question, recall, was about the criteria for belonging to a species. Consider analogous cases of
genealogy, between what are uncontroversially individuals, and what we are assuming to be
individuals, namely, species. Suppose we think of individual organisms as temporally extended
things with earlier and later stages. What does it take to be a later stage of the organism which is
me?42 It is to bear the right spatiotemporal relationship to earlier stages and, ultimately, to the
conception event (which involves gametes) which is my beginning. We could also recast the
question as, what does it take for the cells which currently compose my body to compose
numerically the same organism as the cells which composed the organism which I am confident
was me when I was ten years old? It is again a matter of descent. It is for them all to be

42

Or, if there is a concern here about my begging questions of personal identity, the organism in which I am
currently instantiated, or which currently instantiates me.
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descended from the cell which was the fusion of the gametes the fusion of which in the actual
world leads to me today. To the questions, “Why those gametes?” or “Why the gametes in that
event,” the answer is, that just is how I began. I am an actual human being in the actual world
and that is my actual beginning. For another analogy, let us return to the House of Windsor.
Recall that to be a member is to be a descendent of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert in the male
line and to be a subject of the Commonwealth. Suppose someone were to ask, “Why those
ancestors, and not others?” The answer would be that it was so decreed by George V, grandson
of Victoria and Albert, when he created the house (and family name) by royal proclamation in
1917.
Suppose the question then became, “But why descent from the ancestors in that houseestablishing event, and not others? Why that event, and not some other?” The answer would be,
that is simply in the nature of royal houses.

Royal houses have their beginnings in a

proclamation. To be in the house is to be able to trace one’s lineage back to the beginning of the
house. Everyone descended in the male line from that common ancestor is in the House of
Windsor, which will exist until some future British monarch establishes a new house by
proclamation.

It is not in virtue of any intrinsic properties of the Windsors that they are

Windsors, nor is it in virtue of any intrinsic properties of Victoria and Albert. Likewise, the
Windsors are and were related to royals in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere; all of these may be
able to trace their ancestry back to a common progenitor. What keeps them from all being
members of one, big house? That the houses are demarcated by the proclamations which
establish them.
Now, it makes no difference that royal houses are established by convention, and species
by nature. The principle is the same. For an organism to be part of a species is for it to stand in
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the proper line of descent, from a common ancestor, a lineage which begins with a speciation
event (which admittedly involves organisms), and ends with either extinction, or (on a cladistic
analysis) another speciation event. It involves no intrinsic properties of the organisms.
Elder surely would complain at this point that, when it comes to species, there appears to
be no natural analog to Edward’s 1917 proclamation. The processes of nature accomplish their
feats by grabbing hold of the properties of objects. Genuine instances of causation are those
which involve the occurrence of properties and processes which are, at least in principle,
repeatable (Elder 1998, 2008). This is why he would insist that demarcation or identification of
species must involve particular organisms, and, especially, the intrinsic properties of those
organisms. It is in virtue of those organisms – or, more accurately, the properties of those
organisms – that we get all the later organisms, and hence the species. “Being numerically that
event” is not a repeatable property, so it is not a property which nature’s causal processes can
grab onto. So how can it make a difference to which species a species is?
Here is where the covert assumption comes in. Such questions still assume that species
are natural kinds, not individuals (or at least natural kinds of a more traditional sort). They
assume organisms are the instances of a natural kind, which itself could have been originally
instantiated at any point in time and space, provided that the processes involved produced things
with just the right set of intrinsic properties. Rather, organisms are the parts of an individual,
which is spatiotemporally restricted. Just as the House of Windsor could not be the house it is
had it come from some other origin event, and an individual human being not have been that
very human being had it originated in some other conception event, we would not have had that
species had it not come from that origin. Since species are individuals, the speciation event
which produces them is the analog to the royal proclamation.
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Interestingly, if defeating

arguments for intrinsic essentialism requires overcoming this particular objection, and if
overcoming this objection requires that species be individuals and not natural kinds, then it turns
out that defeating arguments for essentialism requires that species be individuals. Thus Hull was
right that there is a connection between the individuality thesis and anti-essentialism (Hull 1978).
But whereas Hull claimed that the individuality thesis was a sufficient condition for the falsity of
essentialism, it actually is a necessary condition.
All of this has been by way of what I have called the first confusion. The resolution of
the second confusion, related to the second proffered reason above, derives from my discussion
above of Devitt’s reliance upon lawlike generalizations:

simply because intrinsic species

properties are required elements in any explanation of the development of later properties, and
thus are an essential part of the explanation, does not entail that they are essential properties of
the species.
Setting aside the failure of the arguments for intrinsic essentialism, there is a fundamental
problem with Elder’s assertion that there is some way, in terms of intrinsic properties, that
organisms in a species are “bound” to be like. This problem is also twofold. For Elder, there is
the specific problem of what it means for anything (and in particular a kind) to be bound to be
like something. There is also a general problem of the specification of the properties which any
species is alleged to be bound to possess – that is, specifying the alleged essential intrinsic
properties. This general problem afflicts any intrinsic essentialist.
3c. The Specific Problem: “Bound to be Like”
On Elder’s view, for a kind, or for members of a kind, (or, I imagine, for an individual) to
be “bound” to be a particular way is a matter of metaphysical necessity. For members of a kind
K to be bound to be a particular way is for Ks to be that way in all possible worlds, and for Ks to
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be unable to cease being that way without ceasing to exist (Elder 2004, 2011). Such “careerdefining” memberships, and so possession of particular essential properties, is not a matter of
convention, but something which is enforced by laws of nature (which on Elder’s view are
themselves metaphysically necessary), or some sort of causal necessity (Elder 2011). Even if
species are individuals, not natural kinds, this would commit Elder to the following tenets: that
no organism can depart from its species without ceasing to exist; that no species can lose nor
gain an essential property without going extinct, either through the loss of all organisms in the
species or by giving rise to a new species with a new and different set of properties through a
speciation event; and that the prohibition on the loss or gain of properties is enforced either by a
law or laws of nature, or some causal necessity, which makes change metaphysically impossible.
All of these are fatally problematic. I shall focus first on the last two of these, then turn to the
first.
The view that major, adaptive (and rapid) evolutionary change (at least morphological
change) is associated with speciation is part of Eldredge and Gould’s theory of “punctuated
equilibria.” Eldredge and Gould hypothesize that major evolutionary change occurs rapidly
when a peripheral isolate becomes geographically separated from the parental species and
encounters selective pressures not experienced by the parental species (Eldredge and Gould
1972). Once the isolate adjusts to its new conditions, little evolutionary change occurs. Rather
than adaptations evolving slowly within a large population over the species lifetime, adaptations
evolve quickly (relative to the entire species lifetime) during this early period of speciation;
afterward, stasis – the absence of net evolutionary change – sets in.
The problem for Elder’s view is that not only would it need to be true that most major
evolutionary change occurs at speciation events, but that all major evolutionary change occurs at
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such events.

An essentialist would surely claim that a species’ adaptations are among its

essential properties. So the essentialist would be committed to the view that a species cannot
gain or lose adaptations without ceasing to exist, that is, without going through a speciation
event.

But such changes are known to have occurred without speciation.

Two textbook

examples are the evolution of industrial melanism in Biston betularia (the peppered moth), and
the evolution of DDT resistance in mosquitoes – or, in our own species, the evolution of sickle
cell heterozygosity as an adaptation against malaria (and if Holden and Mace are correct, the
evolution of lactase persistence as an adaptation to dairying).
Another textbook case is adaptive radiation and Müllerian mimicry in two species of
South American butterfly, Heliconius melpomene and Heliconius erato (Turner 1988). This
study is worth discussing in more detail, since Turner presents it explicitly as a test of the thesis
of punctuated equilibria that “punctuational change” – that is, large, rapid change – requires
speciation. H. melpomene and H. erato are remarkable in that in each of a dozen geographic
locations (but one) where a race of one species occurs, bearing a distinctive wing coloration
pattern (a morph), a race of the other occurs which mimics the wing pattern of the other.
Mimicry is an adaptive change, and the explosion of mimicked color patterns from presumably a
single ancestral race makes this a case of adaptive radiation. In this case, both species are
poisonous to birds, so a stable, widespread morph acts as a warning to predators. 43 The other
species will be under selective pressure to evolve a similar morph, since it will provide the most

43

This distinguishes Müllerian mimicry from Batesian mimicry. In the latter, a non-poisonous species evolves a
pattern which mimics that of a poisonous species. The fitness of the mimicked morph is negatively frequencydependent. Predators learn not to eat the original, poisonous morph; this creates a selective pressure for the nonpoisonous species to evolve a mimic. But the greater the number of such non-poisonous mimics (and so the higher
the frequency of the morph), the less fit the morph becomes, since predators will then learn that sometimes they can
eat the morph without harm. In Müllerian mimicry, both species are poisonous, so the fitness of the mimicked
morph is positively frequency-dependent. Predators learn not to eat a prevalent morph of one species. Deviations
from that warning morph are disadvantageous. Thus selection will drive the one species to mimic the other. Since
both species are poisonous, the greater the frequency of the warning morph, the greater its fitness.
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protection. If the initial mimicry is not perfect, selection will force the two species to converge
on a single pattern (Turner 1988).
Turner examined the genetics of six extant races of H. melpomene and eight of H. erato,
and reconstructed their likely evolution each from their own common ancestral morphs. He
concluded that each of the 14 extant races, and six (three per species) reconstructed races
intermediate between the common ancestors and the extant races, had been produced by a small
number of changes in major genes (in some cases as many as four, in others as few as one) over
a period of at most a few thousand years. This is a blink of an eye in geological terms and
therefore fits Eldredge and Gould’s punctuational pattern of rapid, major change. But what is
significant for our purposes here is that these changes occurred without speciation. Turner warns
against overgeneralizing from these two species; it may be that in some cases major evolutionary
change is linked to speciation. But Turner’s main point is mine: major evolutionary change
without speciation is possible.
An essentialist might at this point argue that because no single extant morph occurs in
every (or nearly every) member of the two species, no extant morph qualifies as an essential
property. Such an objection fails. Turner hypothesizes (as seems reasonable) that in each
species, all the races (all the morphs) are descended from a single, ancestral race which exhibited
a single morph – and, in fact, the same morph in both species (the reconstructed races exhibited
patterns similar to those of other species which still exist, and Turner suggests that H.
melpomene and H. erato might have mimicked these species in the past). Since there was but
one ancestral pattern in both H. melpomene and H. erato, and it was itself adaptive, it seems to
be a strong candidate for a property which an essentialist would have declared essential had she
been on the scene thousands of years ago.

We can complete the response to the current
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essentialist objection with a thought experiment. Let some cataclysm wipe out every extant race
but two, one in H. melpomene and one in H. erato, and let these be races that mimic each other.
Only one morph would be left, it would now be universal, it would be adaptive and therefore
essential, the original and presumably essential morph is long gone, but still no speciation event
would have occurred. Even without the thought experiment, we have a case of the loss of a
property (the ancestral wing pattern) which an essentialist would surely have regarded as
essential, with neither extinction nor speciation.
The third point above is equivalent to the question, why is there stasis? Why do species
appear to be so stable in at least their morphology over the millions of years that they often exist?
There appears to be a consensus (at least among paleontologists) that stasis is a genuine
phenomenon in need of explanation. But there is no consensus on what causes it. Proffered
explanations include long periods of stabilizing selection (Charlesworth et al. 1982; Estes and
Arnold 2007), genetic or developmental constraints (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Hansen and
Houle 2004; Blows and Hoffman 2005), and the failure of locally evolved adaptations to spread
widely enough to persist to enter the fossil record (Eldredge et al. 2005; Futuyma 2010). But
none of these explanations appear to offer what Elder, in particular, needs. To see this, we must
first briefly examine the phenomenon of stasis itself.
The theory of punctuated equilibria quickly entered the larger culture, as did its claim that
most species experience “stasis.” But in the vernacular, “stasis” became the absence of any
evolutionary change at all (Sterelny 2007). This is not its technical meaning. Rather than
denoting no change, stasis denotes little or no net evolutionary change over long geological time
scales (Hunt 2007). In stasis, traits may diverge from the ancestral state, even greatly, but the
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changes tend to revert, and gravitate about the original state; as Sterelny puts it, they “wobble”
around a phenotypic mean.
In a recent and oft-cited quantitative meta-analysis of more than 250 sequences of
evolving traits, Hunt found that only about 5 percent of fossil sequences exhibited directional
evolution. This means that in only 5 percent of sequences did a trait consistently, continuously
evolve in a single direction (toward, say, ever-increasing body size) over a long geological
period of time.

The remaining sequences were roughly evenly split between sequences

exhibiting stasis and unbiased random walk – about 46 percent stasis, and 49 percent random
walk. In random walk, traits diverge, but without consistent, long-term direction – although over
long periods of time, if differences do begin to accumulate in a particular direction, they tend to
continue ever more pronounced in that direction. Shell width, for example, may fluctuate from
narrower to wider and back, but ultimately move toward greater narrowness, with minor
fluctuations along the way, or at the end state (Hunt 2007). Hunt found that, across a broad cross
section of vertebrates and invertebrates – including foraminifera, conodonts, mollusks,
mammals, teleost fish, and trilobites – shape traits are more susceptible to stasis than are size
traits, and that, conversely, size traits are more susceptible to random walk than to stasis.
If it’s possible to generalize from Hunt’s meta-analysis, not only do many species not
experience stasis, but even those that do experience it do so differently in different sorts of traits.
For Elder’s position to profit from the phenomenon of stasis, it would have to be true that stasis
is the rule – probably an exceptionless rule or nearly exceptionless rule. This is because, on
Elder’s view, if there is some way which a given natural kind is bound to be, then there will be
some way (one for each kind) which every natural kind of the same relevant higher-order kind is
bound to be. There is a way which gold is bound to be, and a way which lead is bound to be, and
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likewise for all chemical elements. It would not be true that some chemical elements can change
in their essential properties (while remaining the same kind), whereas others cannot. Elder’s
position implies that, for every species, there is a way, in terms of some phenotypic profile,
which that species is bound to be like. This doesn’t appear to be the case, even if stasis is
common. Looking just at size, while size appears to be more variable than shape, size is
plausibly among those properties which an essentialist would want to include in a rough profile
of a species’ essential phenotypic traits (again, particularly, I imagine, if some roughly
determinate size were an adaptation).
Moreover, let us assume that the processes which are hypothesized to be at work in cases
of stasis could amount to laws or causal necessities (the sorts of processes or forces which Elder
needs for it to be the case that there is a way species are bound to be like). It may be that they
are. Sober, for example, contends that just as there are both “source laws” and “consequence
laws” in physics, so are there such laws of natural selection.

“Source laws” describe

circumstances which produce forces, and “consequence laws” say how these forces produce
changes in the systems they act upon (Sober 1984a, 50); these laws are captured in the models of
selection which biologists produce (Sober 2010). If so, then if species experience stasis due
(even in part) to stabilizing selection, their stability is enforced (at least in part) by a law of
nature. But this law does not hold universally for all species – that is, species do not necessarily
experience stabilizing selection. Moreover, this law can lose its grip, since it is possible for a
regime of stabilizing selection to end.

It also seems possible that, for any species which

experiences stasis, it might not have. An analogous state of affairs would be a world in which
some chemical elements maintain their properties throughout the existence of the universe, but
accidentally so, while others do not, and still others maintain their properties for perhaps long
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periods of time, then, as a class, change properties. In such a world, there would be no essential
properties of chemical elements, nor would there be any way which they were bound to be.
There are at least two additional problems. First, in the literature, stasis is a phenomenon
primarily of morphology. So, if Elder’s position could profit from the phenomenon of stasis, all
essential properties would have to be morphological properties. It’s not clear on what basis he
could confine essential properties to morphological properties, even if he were inclined to. On
the other hand, Elder might be able to argue that it is plausible that, as go the morphological
properties, so go all the others. After all, if some force is conserving morphology, it is probably
doing so by preserving allele frequencies; and it seems unlikely that such a force would preserve
only the frequency of alleles governing morphology. It is unsurprising that paleontologists
should speak of stasis as a phenomenon of morphology, since they examine mostly the hard,
fossilizing parts of organisms. And in fact, Eldredge et al. contend that there are examples of
stasis in reproductive and behavioral characteristics (Eldredge et al. 2005, 135). Nevertheless, it
is theoretically possible that morphology could be conserved while other phenotypic traits would
not be, traits which Elder would probably want to count as essential.
Second, stasis occurs when there is little or no net change. Paleontologists include
among species exhibiting stasis even those which have changed, at some point in their existence,
greatly in terms of some morphological characteristics, provided that such change is
counterbalanced by change in the “opposite” direction. Lack of net change is a statistical
abstraction. It doesn’t mean the species never changes; rather, it means change oscillates around
some mean value. There would also be an epistemological problem: the essentialist would be
claiming that essential properties are those which exhibit no net change over the species’
lifetime. But that means one could not determine which properties were essential until the
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species had gone extinct. Moreover, it would simply be a matter of fact that the property (or
species) in question exhibited no net change. The essentialist must claim that no net change was
(metaphysically) possible. This seems unlikely, unless it were true that particular types of
species are more likely to experience stasis than others, something Hunt in his meta-analysis did
not find (Hunt 2007). So it seems that, given any species that ends up in stasis, it is possible that
it might not have. Since the cause (or causes) of stasis are in dispute, it would be premature to
claim that every species which experiences stasis does so necessarily. An essentialist might try
to claim instead (or additionally) that essential properties are those which exhibit little change, as
opposed to no net change. But she would put herself in the uncomfortable position of having to
specify, on a non-ad hoc or non-question-begging basis, just how much “little change” a species
can undergo in that property before it ceases to be the same species.
Finally, it is not true that organisms belong essentially to their species. LaPorte (1997),
Matthen (2009), and Okasha (2002) have all produced arguments against the view; I shall merely
rehearse them here.
LaPorte asks us to imagine a peripheral isolate becoming separated from its parent
species. On the Biological Species Concept, if the isolate becomes reproductively isolated from
its parent, the isolate becomes a separate species. Yet for any organism in the isolate, it is true
that it might not have been in the isolate; so it is true that it might not have belonged to its
species.
Matthen also focuses on reproductive isolation, but here of populations within a species,
which he views as a collection of populations. He argues that organisms can change their
species during their lifetime. Suppose a population in a species of pre-chickens begins to evolve
in a new direction, due to the spread of a novel gene. Before this population becomes a new
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species (of chickens) due to its achieving the reproductive and ecological integration which
separates it from its ancestor, it counts as part of the ancestor species. Once integration is
achieved (by severing the bridge between the pre-chickens and the chickens, due to the death of
the last organism serving as this bridge), all the organisms in this population simultaneously
become members of the new species (they are chickens). Organisms which formerly were part
of one species are now part of another, and without undergoing any change in their intrinsic
properties.
Finally, Okasha proposes this counterfactual thought experiment: suppose that, 100,000
years after Homo sapiens originated (300,000 years ago), a lineage split from Homo sapiens, and
become lost on an island, while the rest of the lineage evolved as in the actual world. On the
Phylogenetic Species Concept, Homo sapiens would have gone extinct 200,000 years ago, and
all humans today would be part of another species.
These counterexamples neglect the Ecological Species Concept, but a counterexample
can easily be constructed by modifying LaPorte’s example. Imagine that a lineage diverges, with
some of the organisms coming to occupy one ecological niche, while others go on to occupy a
different niche. For any organism that comes to occupy one of the niches, it is possible that it
might not have been part of the lineage that occupies that niche, and so it is possible that it might
not have been part of its species.
3d. The General Problem: Specifying the Essential Properties
An essentialist might object to the foregoing arguments by rejecting the characterization
of the evolution of color patterns on butterfly wings as “major.” The essentialist might contend
that this is a mere accidental property, and that what she has in mind is something else, such as
butterflies evolving six wings without speciation, or bodies the size of Boeing 747s, or (as Elder
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has asked about in personal communication) human beings evolving two hearts, or some other
bizarre physiological change.
But it is not clear why the essentialist gets to reserve for herself the right to determine
what qualifies as a “major” change, or why only bizarre, concocted examples should count.
Herein lies the general problem I mentioned above:

the specification of alleged essential

properties. The changes in H. melpomene and H. erato are dramatic, they are adaptive, and they
involve mutations in major genes. Again: surely, the essentialist would want to count a species’
adaptations among its essential properties.

Were an essentialist to have encountered H.

melpomene and H. erato prior to the evolution of its mimetic morphs, or Biston betularia prior to
industrial melanism, or a mosquito species prior to DDT resistance, she would likely have
declared the ancestral pattern or state to be an essential property. Yet, in somewhat the same
way as I argued above, in the case of the butterfly species, thousands of years later, both species
have either acquired as many as 11 adaptive and therefore essential properties, or have lost their
original essential property, or both, all without speciation or extinction, which on the
essentialist’s view is impossible. Or, recall lactase persistence in humans. If Holden and Mace
are correct, this is an adaptation to dairying, an adaptation which many humans lack. This does
not make them belong any less to Homo sapiens.44

44

Were an essentialist to make the dialectical move of demanding an example of major change without speciation,
then, when it is produced (as I have above) deny that it constitutes major change, it would strike me as eerily
reminiscent of the dialectical strategies of creationists. Anti-evolutionists are notorious for demanding evidence of
evolution, being presented with an example of evolutionary change in, say, a fruit fly species, then attempting to
dismiss the evidence by claiming that “they’re still fruit flies,” thus attempting to deny that what they were presented
with was true evolutionary change – that is, what they had in mind, or are willing to entertain, as evolutionary
change. Likewise, in discussions I’ve had with other philosophers about essential species properties, philosophers
have shown a preference for features of gross morphology (or bizarre modifications of them) as essential properties,
as opposed to less visible or dramatic features like lactase persistence or lactose intolerance, or blood type. Yet it
would be purely arbitrary of an essentialist to deny that lactose intolerance could be an essential property of Homo
sapiens, merely on the grounds that it’s not some highly visible feature of gross morphology, and it is those features
that they have in mind when they think of essential properties.
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Nor could the essentialist escape by claiming that, say, “having wings” or “having wings
with some pattern or other” is an essential property of a butterfly species, but that the actual color
pattern of those wings is an accidental property – or, to use a different example, why “having
eyes,” or even “having compound eyes,” might be an essential property of a species of fruit fly,
but that the color of the eyes (red as opposed to white) is accidental. For there would seem to be
no principled, non-question-begging basis upon which the essentialist could make such a claim.
Indeed, the very effort to provide a basis would seem to expose the essentialist project as the ad
hoc enterprise it almost certainly is.
Butterfly wings, like any genotypic or phenotypic property, do not come in
undifferentiated, homogeneous form. The essentialist must therefore say something about the
properties of each species she regards as essential. If the characterization is too vague, the
essentialist encounters a dual problem. It will become difficult to show that the species no
longer satisfied the characterization, raising the suspicion that the characterization was juryrigged to avoid refutation.

To be a robust position, essentialism must expose itself to

falsification. And a vague characterization will apply to multiple species, raising questions about
its essentialness. So the essentialist must be specific in her characterizations. The species
definitions or descriptions which taxonomists use are quite detailed and specific. There is no
reason the essentialist should not be held to the same standard.
Yet, as Hull points out, the more specific the characterization, the greater the chance of
refutation, since the characterization will not likely hold across the entire species for the entirety
of its existence (Hull 1965).

Moreover, anything about, say, butterfly wings which the

essentialist might wish to incorporate into the essentialness of that property – size, shape, vein
number or pattern – will be subject to change, just as color pattern is. Nor, to avoid refutation,
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could the essentialist disallow certain wing properties (like color pattern) as themselves essential
on the grounds that such properties are known to vary or evolve without speciation, and that they
are therefore accidental. For this involves the essentialist conceding her position to the antiessentialist, acknowledging the possibility of major evolutionary change without speciation, and
then engaging in a cherry-picking of properties based on scientists’ knowledge of which
properties in various species have changed without speciation (and attempting to ignore the
larger theoretical point about the evolution of characters). If not, it is simple question-begging in
favor of essentialism. There would seem to be no principled reason for an essentialist to simply
assert that color just always is an accidental property.
Note that I am not saying that the essentialist project is ad hoc simply because the
essentialist mistakes (in terms of the essential/accidental distinction) accidental species
properties for essential properties. As Elder acknowledges (discussing whether our concepts of
kinds always track the actual essential properties of kinds), kinds may have essential properties
about which we are ignorant, and we might mistake “usefully widespread markers” of kinds for
essential properties (Elder 2004, 41). Of course, on the view I am defending, the essentialist falls
into this error every time she attempts to identify an essential intrinsic species property;
essentialists always mistake accidental properties for essential properties. While a species may
have usefully widespread markers which permit identification and induction, none of them rise to
the level of essential properties. Rather, the ad hoc nature of the project becomes apparent in the
manner in which it would likely be carried out: the confident assertion as to the essentialness of
a property, with the implicit claim that traits of that kind are strong candidates for essential
properties; followed by refutation, the revised claim that the property was, after all, accidental,
and a fallback to some other property or set of properties; and all the while ignoring the larger
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theoretical point. For an essentialist to claim that the case of H. melpomene and H. erato just
shows that the original color pattern was not essential looks like either intransigence, or the
triumph of hope over experience.
There is, of course, one other reply the essentialist could give, and we saw it in the
discussion of Devitt’s essentialism: she could insist that, in a case such as that of H. melpomene
and H. erato, punctuational change was in fact associated with speciation, because the species
changed in one of its essential properties. The problem is the same as it was before: it would put
the essentialist quite out of step with the science. Even if this were not a concern in itself, the
burden would be on the essentialist to provide biologists with a method of determining which of
a species’ properties are essential, and which accidental (so they could determine when
speciation had occurred). Now, a defender of Devitt’s essentialism could claim that she has just
such a method:

the essential properties are those genetic properties which are causally

responsible for the phenotypic properties which feature in the lawlike structural generalizations
about the species (this would be similar to a possible method we will briefly encounter in the
chapter on individuality and inductive inference, that the essential properties are those which can
be reliably projected in inductive inference). I hope I have cast sufficient doubt upon that
strategy. But it would also fall to the essentialist to show how this new theory of speciation
supplements existing theories of speciation in an explanatorily fruitful way, or provides a fruitful
alternative theory which does not invalidate existing theories (as, say, sympatric theories of
speciation, or peak-shift theories, are to standard allopatric theories), or is superior to those
theories and thus supplants them.
Having argued that there is no way which the organisms in a species are, in Elder’s sense
of the term, bound to be like, allow me to now take some of that back with an important
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qualification.

Perhaps it is true that some species characteristics, even described as the

taxonomist would, are not likely to change, or even will not, as a matter of fact, end up changing.
If we think of genetic or other properties as occupying a space, the developmental mechanisms
required to induce the sorts of profound, science-fiction-like morphological changes in which
Elder, in particular, is interested, might be too far away in genetic space to be reached without
some accompanying reshuffling of the genome such as Eldredge and Gould hypothesize might
occur during speciation (drawing upon, in particular, theories such as Mayr’s “genetic
revolution,” although such ideas have come under recent attack [Coyne and Orr 2004]). It is
more likely that tigers could cease to have stripes or their characteristic tawny fur (in fact, there
are white tigers, some without stripes) than it is that they will become herbivores, since the
developmental changes needed to change the species from carnivore to herbivore are more in
number and farther away in genetic or developmental space, involving as they would more major
reorganizations of tiger physiology.

The required changes might themselves require

interruptions in gene interactions which would be very hard to disrupt (perhaps because they
would be deleterious), or they might need to come in some particular order, the chances of which
happening are very small.
Nevertheless, all of this would confer only a high probability of lack of change (again,
roughly characterized) in certain traits, and make lack of change a contingent matter. For any
trait which a species currently exhibits, no matter how characteristic, there is a nonzero
probability that the trait could be lost without a speciation event taking place – which is, on
contemporary evolutionary theory, one of the ways in which a species can cease to exist, the
other being the death of every organism. It would fall short of the metaphysical necessity
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involved in (at least) Elder’s view.45 It might be open for Elder to claim that, when it comes to
kinds like electrons (and apparently all other natural kinds, including artifacts [Elder 1995,
2004]), for there to be a way in which they are bound to be is a matter of metaphysical necessity,
but when it comes to species, it is merely a matter of high probability. But this would require an
explanation of how it is that the accounts are not inconsistent, and are both essentialism.
4. Origin Essentialism
We have seen that intrinsic essentialism about species is untenable, for a variety of
reasons: it is at odds with the empirical facts; it conflicts with various aspects of evolutionary
theory (both serious drawbacks for any essentialist who wants her essentialism to comport with
the rest of biology); the essentialness of properties is not required to explain the characteristic
properties of organisms in particular species; and elaborating the essentialist intuitions which its
proponents have into a robust program which would not involve ad hoc or question-begging
stipulations is fraught with difficulties.

Nevertheless, these are all considerations against

intrinsic essentialism. Might a non-intrinsic essentialism succeed? That is, might species have
not an intrinsic essence, but an extrinsic essence – in particular, a relational essence? Recently,
Griffiths (1999), Okasha (2002), and Wilson (1999) have all argued that species have a historical
essence. In what follows, I shall defend the view that the only essential property which a species
has is its origin from its actual ancestor. However, following Ereshefsky (2010), I shall argue
that this falls short of being (at least a traditional) species essence, since it fails to fully play the
explanatory role which essences are supposed to play, even though it provides a species’ identity
condition and a species belonging-to or parthood criterion.

45

And, speaking of carnivory and herbivory and the evolution of one into the other, in Chapter 3 we will briefly
meet the dinosaur species Falcarius utahensis, which may have evolved from carnivory to herbivory.

120

To argue that origin is essential to a species, in conjunction with the view that species are
individuals, without giving some reason to think that the argument pertains only to species, is to
provide an argument which could generalize into an argument that origin is essential to any
material object or individual. Salmon notes just as much in his discussion of Kripke’s famous
Footnote 56 argument in Naming and Necessity for origin essentialism, although in that case the
argument has to do with tables and the hunks of wood they are made from (Salmon 2005). But if
Salmon’s diagnosis of Kripke’s argument is correct, it cannot succeed without assuming a
nontrivially essentialist premise regarding transworld identity of objects like tables. And, if later
commentators such as Damnjanovic (2010) are correct, not only has no one come up with a
successful Kripke-style argument for origin essentialism which simultaneously does not involve
question-begging premises and lacks implausible essentialist implications, but no one is likely to.
Since it is not my purpose here to square the circle and prove origin essentialism generally, I will
not mount an explicit argument for it.
Regardless, many people, philosophers included, have very strong intuitions that origin is
essential to material objects. Many find Kripke’s assertion not merely plausible but indubitable
that we cannot imagine this very woman – e.g., Elizabeth II, uncontroversially an individual –
coming from a different combination of sperm and egg, given that she does in fact so come
(Kripke 1980). Given that she has the biological parents which she does, she necessarily has
those biological parents, and no others. Salmon himself has suggested that essentialist principles
of identity are “fundamental to a very common point of view – perhaps the ordinary point of
view” regarding hunks of matter and the objects made from them – that if it’s possible for a
table, say, to be made originally from a particular hunk of matter according to some plan, then
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necessarily any table made originally from that hunk according to that plan must be that same
table, and no other (Salmon 2005, 215).
To the extent that one has the modal intuition that no individual organism, human or
otherwise, could have had any other biological parents than its actual parents, given that species
are individuals, one ought to accept that a species can have no other ancestor than its actual
ancestor. And to the extent that one has the accompanying modal intuition that any individual
organism resulting from a different conception event in those parents – at a much different time,
or involving different gametes – would be a different organism, one ought to accept (as
suggested above by Ereshefsky, and myself, in our independent usage of speciation events to
individuate species) that a species arising from the same ancestor but at a much different point in
history would not be the same species, any more than I (born in 1963) would be my brother
(born in 1969) had “I” been conceived six years later than I was.
Rather than attempt to prove origin essentialism generally, or even to prove origin
essentialism for species, let me instead give three arguments in its favor. First: If one does not
share the intuition that it is impossible to have produced this very species from a different
ancestor, some theoretical considerations might make those intuitions more plausible, and at the
same time accord with Kripkean thoughts regarding the necessity of individuals coming from
particular sperms and eggs, or tables coming from particular blocks of wood. It may be that the
genetic properties of the organisms in a species’ founding population help to set the probabilities
of its evolving in particular ways: how its gene frequencies are likely to shift, which adaptations
it is likely to acquire, which niches it is likely to occupy. 46 This cannot be all upon which these

46

How many organisms must be in a founding population can vary; according to Mayr (1963), it can be dozens, or
as few as a single fertilized female. Likewise, I am going to consider here that how many generations there can be
in a founding population might vary: that all the organisms in all the generations between, in a case of allopatric
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probabilities depend. They surely also depend upon the environments which the species finds
itself in (if only because different environments produce different selection pressures, causing
gene frequencies to shift in different ways), including other species, and, in particular, closely
related species, since other species will either block niches, or leave others open, or get into
competition with other species for a niche. Transfer of genetic information between species is
not uncommon, either through introgression, or lateral gene transfer. So, if the gene pool of a
species constrains the probabilities of its evolution, and the existence of other species (with their
own probabilities of evolution, dependent upon the existence of other species) constrains the
possible gene pool of a species, then the probabilities of a species’ evolutionary trajectories
depend upon other species as well. Perhaps a more philosophical way of thinking of this is that a
species’ actual origin orders – or at least strongly influences the order of – the set of possible
worlds in which it appears. It determines – or at least strongly influences – how close or how far
from the actual world those various possible worlds are.
Second: as Hull notes, every species is a segment of the phylogenetic tree, a chunk of the
genealogical nexus (Hull 1978). The ‘is’ at work here is the ‘is’ of identity. Once one realizes
that all of life on Earth constitutes one gigantic phylogenetic tree, and that each species is
identical to a branch of that tree, a segment of that tree, one sees that no species could have a
different ancestor than it had. To be that branch of the phylogenetic tree is not a matter of the
intrinsic properties of the branch. The branches get their identity from their relation to other
branches. For a species to have had a different ancestor would be for it to have occupied a
different position in the phylogenetic tree. But if position, which is a matter of relation to other
branches, determines the identity of branches, then the same branch could not have occupied a

speciation, the initial geographic separation and the achievement of reproductive isolation make up the founding
population. There is a great deal of room in and in the making of such a population for contingent mischief.
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different position. A species with a different ancestor would have been a different branch of the
phylogenetic tree, and thus a different species, with, as Hull would put it, some other insertion
into history.
Third: the very question, “Could species S have had a different origin – from a different
ancestor, or at a different time – than it actually had?” seems to either be incoherent, or to be
surreptitiously assuming that species are natural kinds (of a traditional sort). For the question
might have an affirmative answer were species natural kinds. Compare the following question:
could gold have had a different origin than its actual origin? Could the history of the universe
have played out differently, such that the first samples of gold appeared at a different point in
space, or in time? Intuitively at least, it seems that it could have, for there doesn’t seem to be
anything essential to that natural kind that it have the origin it did. All of the putative essential
properties of gold are intrinsic, qualitative properties.
This points to the reason why the question about the origin of a species is incoherent.
The question requires us to think counterfactually. But any constructive counterfactual thinking
requires us to keep some things fixed. In thinking about species S, we have to keep something
about S fixed, so that we know we are tracking the same entity across possible worlds or
counterfactual situations. Someone who believes S could have had a different origin is, I
suggest, attempting to track S using a set of essential, intrinsic, qualitative properties, in the same
way she tracked the natural kind gold above.
Yet (especially) if species are individuals, they are not the sorts of entities which can be
defined in terms of a set of essential, intrinsic, qualitative properties. They are instead lineages
of organisms or populations, which trace back to the inception of the lineage from a particular
ancestor in a particular speciation event.

So what we are tracking when we think
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counterfactually about species is a lineage which, regardless of the subsequent history we
imagine for it, is anchored in that ancestor and event. It is just as firmly so anchored as any
individual we track across possible worlds is anchored to its inception, regardless of the
subsequent history we imagine for him (as in Kripke’s famous examples of alternate-history
Aristotle and alternate-history Nixon). So, to ask, “Could S have had a different origin?” is to
ask, “Could S, simultaneously, in the same possible world, both have its actual origin, and not
have its actual origin?” Which is to ask, generally, “Could x, simultaneously, in the same
possible world, be both φ and not-φ?” The answer, of course, is “No,” since nothing can both
possess and lack the very same property at the same time.
One way in which I think an opponent might attempt to respond to the argument I’ve just
given from counterfactual reasoning would be to claim that they are tracking that individual
which has in the actual world exactly the particular set of properties which it has at this point in
time, or which is composed of just exactly the organisms of which it is composed (either
currently or in its history up until now). Then, as in the case of tracking a natural kind, it is that
set of properties, or that set of organisms, which they are keeping fixed and using to track the
individual across worlds. The problem with such a response is that it comes close to implying, if
it doesn’t simply imply, that the set of properties being used for tracking is necessarily possessed
at this time by the species-individual in the actual world, or that the species-individual is
necessarily composed at this time by just that set of organisms. But the species-individual has
the properties it currently has, and is composed of the organisms of which it is composed, only
contingently. So, if we decouple the species from its origin, how will we know whether we’ve
got the same individual in our sights, as opposed to a distinct individual which is qualitatively
indistinguishable from the one in our world, or the same individual with dramatically different
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properties, or made up of different parts, when we look into another world? Either this strategy
relies upon being able to grasp and track a species haecceity, or it is really just smuggling in
origin surreptitiously.
So we have reason to think that originating from numerically the ancestor which it does
in the actual world is an essential property of each species. But does originating from just
numerically that ancestor constitute a species essence?

Okasha suggests that, whichever

relational species concept we adopt, the relational property which determines species
membership – be it interbreeding for the BSC, being part of a distinct lineage for the PSC, or
sharing the same ecological niche for the ESC – would constitute the species essence, since it
would play the same membership-determining role which an intrinsic “hidden structure” plays in
the “Kripke-Putnam model” of the essences of natural kinds (Okasha 2002, 203). Griffiths
argues that each species has a historical essence, since no organism which does not share in the
historical origin of a species can be a member of that species (Griffiths holds that species are
natural kinds after Boyd’s concept of homeostatic property cluster kinds, not individuals).
Sharing in that origin is a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the species
(Griffiths 1999, 219).

Griffiths is also highlighting the membership-determining role

traditionally played by intrinsic essentialism.
Ereshefsky argues that these attempts to “resurrect biological essentialism” fail
(Ereshefsky 2010, 683). Traditionally, essentialism does not merely set membership conditions.
It also plays an explanatory role. In a traditional essentialist account, members of a kind
resemble one another because each shares the kind essence, and this licenses inductive inferences
over them. Ereshefsky agrees that membership in (or, I would add, being part of) a species is a
matter of relational, not intrinsic properties. But, on its own, historical or relational essentialism
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fails to fill the explanatory role. As we have seen, relational properties are part of an explanation
for the fact that organisms in a species have the intrinsic properties that they do. But, as Okasha
himself notes, and Devitt is eager to point out, the fact that organisms interbreed with certain
organisms but not others, or are descended from particular organisms, does not itself explain this
(and we saw this in an analogous way in my first use of the House of Windsor example). A
complete explanation of characteristic species properties also involves the genetic properties of
organisms, and the environments in which they develop (Okasha 2002, 204).
Ereshefsky appears to assume that the same property must satisfy both the “membership
requirement” and the “explanatory requirement,” and that is why relational essentialism is not
essentialism, and a relational essence is not an essence. Yet as we saw above, there doesn’t seem
to be any a priori reason why the same property must play both roles. Ereshefsky is correct,
however, that whatever the essence is, it must meet both requirements, and to the extent that
relational essentialists such as Okasha and Griffiths attempt to jettison the explanatory
requirement, their essentialisms are deficient. The actual problem is that it is impossible to
construct an adequate essence, not even a hybrid essence consisting of a conjunction of a
relational property (or properties) to meet the membership requirement, and a combination of
relational/historical properties and intrinsic genetic properties to meet the explanatory
requirement. This is because the intrinsic properties would not be essential to the species, even if
the relational properties were. So, even if, as I have suggested (and Ereshefsky does not appear
to dispute this point), origin is a species’ only plausible essential property, it would not count as
the species essence, since it meets the membership requirement but fails the explanatory
requirement. While every species has its origin (and so its position on the phylogenetic tree) as
its essential property, full-blown species essentialism should remain a dead issue.
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5. Coda: Specious Essential Species Properties
There is perhaps a final escape route for the essentialist which needs to be cut off. Recall
that one way of interpreting the essentialist’s claim is that an essential (intrinsic) species property
is one which it has in every possible world in which the species exists. In their now-classic
paper on developmental constraints, Maynard Smith et al. differentiate between universal
constraints – ones which organisms would face due to the laws of physics, or due to the
properties of the materials they are made of – and local constraints, which would be confined to
particular taxa and arise just as a consequence of particular features of the organisms in those
taxa. Their example of a universal constraint is the law of the lever: “any uncompensated
change in the shape of the skeleton that increases the speed with which some member can be
moved will reduce the force which that member can exert” (Maynard Smith et al. 1985, 267).
All organisms will be subject to this law.
Such considerations may seem to give comfort to the essentialist. It is almost certainly
true that, for every species, none of its organisms will be made of uranium (or at least not of a
high-grade uranium in a quantity of critical mass), nor will any of them be larger than the
universe, nor will they be capable of traveling, under their own unaided power, as fast as or
faster than the speed of light. Yet, wouldn’t this mean that it is an essential property of Homo
sapiens that humans not be made of uranium, or travel (under their own power) faster than light?
After all, there would be no possible world in which Homo sapiens exists where it lacks either of
those properties.
But if these are essential properties, they are specious essential properties. They are
much like what Plantinga has called “trivially essential properties” – properties which “enjoy the
distinction of being instantiated by every object in every possible world,” such as “having a
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color if red” and “being self-identical” (Plantinga 1970, 465).

Specious intrinsic essential

species properties need not be instantiated by every object in every possible world to be
specious. Some may be possessed, of necessity, either physical or metaphysical, by everything,
or by only things of a certain size, or made of certain materials, and so on. Rather, they are
specious because, even if they are possessed by everything in a world, or all worlds, they fail to
fill the role which essential properties are supposed to play. They neither set the membership (or
parthood) conditions for a species, nor do they explain why organisms belonging to a species are
the way they are, in any biologically useful way.
Trivially, of course, a property like being subject to the law of levers sets a membership
(or parthood) condition for a species, since to be part of a species, an organism must exist
physically, and to exist physically it must, at least in this world, be subject to the law of levers.
But it sets no species-specific membership condition, which is what the essentialist wants of an
essential (intrinsic) species property. An essentialist might attempt to avoid this objection by
denying that some trivial property by itself was an essential species property, perhaps by tacking
it (or a catalog of trivially essential properties) onto an alleged set of species-specific
membership-determining intrinsic properties, such as the following: {p1, p2, p3, …, pn} and
‘being smaller than the universe’. The claim would be that, together with the other properties,
which do provide membership conditions and fulfill the explanatory role, the trivial property is
essential. But in such a case, the properties would clearly be idling, since they would set no
further conditions on membership, nor do any further work in explanation, than the set minus the
trivial properties.
Recall that in Devitt’s essentialism, the genetic properties which cause stripes in tigers
were held to be essential, because they explained why all tigers are striped. Specious essential
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properties do no explaining, not in the species-specific way which the essentialist seeks, and not
to questions which biologists would ask. That Tony the tiger isn’t made of high-grade uranium,
even though he weighs far more than 15 kilograms, explains why he doesn’t explode in a nuclear
chain reaction. But this isn’t a question any biologist would ask or likely be interested in, nor is
the question even in the domain of biology, and it was to this domain that species essential
properties were being recommended.
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Chapter Three
Induction and the Individuality Thesis
1. Introduction
A puzzle arises when we consider, on the one hand, the thesis that biological species are
individuals and, on the other hand, the connection between natural kinds and our ability to make
successful inductive inferences. At least since Mill, and certainly since the resuscitation of
essentialism by Kripke and Putnam, natural kinds have been taken to provide the ontological
ground for the inductive practices of science. But if species are individuals with organisms as
their parts, and not natural kinds with organisms as members, how is it that induction –
generalizations, predictions, and explanations – regarding species is possible? That is, if species
are individuals, how is it that biologists can infer, by sampling some parts of that individual,
what unobserved parts of that individual will be like, when we frequently cannot do this with
other objects, either scattered or spatially contiguous? How is it that generalizations such as “All
tigers are striped” hold? As Elder (2008) notes, biologists use induction to gain knowledge of
various sorts about species, including the recurring properties, both phenotypic and genotypic,
that characterize the organisms belonging to the species, and in what sorts of proportions they
characterize them. Yet if species are individuals – objects scattered across space – it seems to be
a mystery how they could, given that no one infers that Chicago is covered in railroad tracks
upon encountering the railyards at the edge of Chicago, or that North America is covered by
mountains, given a sampling of mountains rising from the Pacific shore (Elder 2008, 354).
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What we have is a species “problem of induction.”47 As Reydon (2006) points out, a
number of philosophers have recently recognized the need for an account of species that makes
them into the sorts of ontological entities which can ground inductive practices. For most of
these philosophers, the species problem of induction is twofold. First, most natural kinds over
which inductions can be run are homogeneous, whereas species are heterogeneous.

Their

heterogeneity manifests itself in two important ways: in the presence and absence of traits (not
all organisms belonging to a particular species possess all the same properties; species gain and
lose properties over time; species exhibit variation across their geographic ranges), and in the
character of those traits which organisms in the species can be said to have in common (e.g., size
or color). Second, natural kinds are generally regarded as suitable targets of induction because
they are characterized by essential properties, guaranteeing that the kind properties projected in
inductive inferences will reoccur in other members of the kind. But species have no intrinsic
essential properties.
Following in the tradition that links inductive inference with natural kinds, Boyd (1988,
1989, 1991, 1999a, 199b), Elder (2008), Griffiths (1994, 1996, 1999), Millikan (1999, 2000),
Reydon (2006), and Wilson (1999, 2005) have all proposed accounts whereby species would be
natural kinds which could support generalizations and predictions, although these authors
disagree about the features of species which would make them natural kinds. To greater or lesser
extent (with the exception of Elder, who holds a traditional essentialist view of species), these
authors attempt to respect the consensus in biology and philosophy of biology that species have
no intrinsic essential properties, whereas natural kinds are all held to have essences.

For

Griffiths and Millikan, this is a matter of making a species’ essence historical. For Boyd and
47

I engage scare quotes because this particular problem, while related to the general problem of how to justify
inductive inference, is not the general, Humean problem of induction, and I won’t be addressing or trying to solve
the general problem here.
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Wilson (both of whom draw upon Boyd’s notion of “homeostatic property cluster” or HPC
kinds), this is a matter of making the essence either a disjunctive cluster of varying properties,
neither individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for membership, or the causal mechanisms
which produce these clusters, and keep the properties in them correlated. That these mechanisms
maintain these correlated patterns is what makes them homeostatic.48

They also all take

themselves to respect the historical nature of species, which they see as being the salient point
raised by Ghiselin and Hull in their defenses of the individuality thesis.
None of these philosophers has explicitly claimed that species cannot possibly serve as
the ontological ground of inductive practices if they are individuals. As we saw in Chapter 1, the
closest any philosopher has come to an attempt to refute the individuality thesis on this basis is
Elder (2008); and we also saw there that Boyd attacks the individuality thesis on similar grounds.
But Reydon has thrown down a gauntlet like unto these: because the parts of an object need not
be the same, whereas the members of a kind do, advocates of the individuality thesis must
explain how inferences involving species are supported (Reydon 2003). This makes the species
problem of induction threefold for advocates of the individuality thesis. An account which
provides for each of these – heterogeneity, anti-essentialism, and individuality – is needed. As
Reydon observes, “[n]o such accounts have been provided so far” (Reydon 2003, 53).
The present chapter attempts to provide just such an account. The starting point for my
account will be Griffiths’ account (Griffiths 1999), in which “phylogenetic inertia” licenses
inductive inferences within taxa. Because certain traits, or patterns of traits, are conserved over
evolutionary time due to common ancestry, biologists can infer that it is more likely that they
will appear in related organisms rather than in unrelated organisms; the closer the relationship,
Griffiths also endorses Boyd’s approach, although he denies that the causal homeostatic mechanisms constitute a
“traditional” essence. Rather, they “play the traditional role of an essence,” since these mechanisms generate the
instances of a kind, and guarantee the projectability of the kind (Griffiths 1999, 219). More on this below.
48
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the more likely the appearance. Drawing upon review work by Blomberg and Garland (2002)
and Shanahan (2011), I argue, however, that the current lack of consensus among biologists
about the term “phylogenetic inertia” renders the concept too nebulous at present to rest an
account of induction upon it. Nevertheless, it is clear that biologists who use the term are trying
to identify and explain instances of conservatism and uniformity within and across taxa.
Drawing inspiration again from Griffiths, who proposes there are two sorts of phylogenetic
inertia – traits being maintained by selection, and traits being maintained by developmental
factors – I argue instead that the required account of induction rests upon the causes of the
instances of uniformity and conservatism which biologists are seeing.

Species are

heterogeneous, but not completely so; they are clearly characterized by a degree of uniformity
among their organism-parts. I am thus adapting Griffiths’ account to the individuality thesis, and
sundering his single supporting concept or phenomenon of phylogenetic inertia into multiple
supporting concepts or phenomena.
During and after my presentation of my account of how inductive inferences over species
are grounded, and thus possible, I suggest other ways in which inductive inferences involving
species still are grounded by natural kinds. This addresses the concern that if good inductive
inferences are being made, then there must be natural kinds somewhere in the picture providing
their grounds.

I address this partly through the use of examples drawn primarily from

paleontology. These examples are meant to console philosophers worried that if particular
species – and indeed, higher taxonomic groups – are not themselves natural kinds, then inductive
inferences involving them (rather than simply inductions over them – generalizations, that is,
over the properties of the organism-parts) in biology fail to be grounded. For those still thinking
species are natural kinds, due to the success biologists have in making inferences over them, I
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then indicate how the heterogeneity of species makes them like individuals, and inductive
inferences over them like inferences involving, or over the parts of, individuals. Part of this
effort involves drawing upon some thoughts by Lange (Lange 1999) on the confirmation of
generalizations in science.

Combining Lange’s work here with Griffiths’, I show that,

sometimes, generalizations about the parts of individuals can be at least somewhat lawlike, in
that they support limited counterfactuals. This addresses one of Griffiths’ concerns regarding the
species problem of induction: in order to satisfy the inductive practices of biology, species must
be entities which are capable of supporting lawlike (that is, counterfactual-supporting)
generalizations.
I next address the second area of concern I listed above: essential properties. I argue that
inferences about the sorts of entities normally focused upon by philosophers writing about
induction and natural kinds and essential properties generally – i.e., chemical elements and
fundamental particles – do demand that the projected properties are either essential, or without
exception in this universe for some reason in nature (or we lose our reason to trust our inferences
about the distant past, or distant parts of the universe). But the inferences which biologists make
about species do not. All that is required is that the projected accidental properties be relatively
stable. At the same time, I rebut a related criticism which Reydon lodges against Griffiths, and
which affects my account as well: that while phylogenetic inertia is promising as a ground for
inductive inferences, by itself it is insufficient, as it will either license inferences across too many
taxa, or will fail to license inferences within species over the entirety of their range or lifespan.
Along the way, I address possible objections to all of the positions I develop, dealing finally with
what I imagine might be a global objection to my account, that it creates an inelegance in the
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general picture which philosophers have developed about the grounding of the inductive
practices of science by natural kinds.
Before I begin, a brief note about the various uses of the term ‘species’ in this chapter
may be in order, to prevent confusion. My position (with a caveat regarding species pluralism) is
that there is a natural kind denoted by the term, ‘species.’49 Every particular species – Panthera
tigris, or Gorilla gorilla, or Homo sapiens – is an instance of that natural kind, and an individual,
just as every piece or atom of gold is an instance of the natural kind, ‘gold.’ Particular species
are not themselves natural kinds; ‘Toxicodendron radicans’ denotes an individual, not a natural
kind. Each organism in that species is a part of that individual. In what follows, I will use
‘species’ sometimes when discussing particular species, and sometimes when discussing the
natural kind itself. I will attempt to make it clear in which usage I am engaging, partly by
reserving ‘species’ (i.e., the word within single quotes) for discussion of the natural kind. An
analogous distinction that might be helpful is the type-token distinction. ‘Species’ (the natural
kind) is a type of biological thing – a type of population, or group of populations, or a type of
lineage – just as gold is a type of element; each particular species is a token of that type.50
Let me also ward off here a possible linguistic objection to this position: I claim that
‘species’ denotes a natural kind, but also claim that when I refer to “a species” or “that species,”
I refer to an individual, not a kind. Yet ‘gold’ denotes a natural kind, but no one would refer to
“a gold” or “that gold,” but would instead refer to “a piece of gold” or “that sample of gold.”
Isn’t this incongruous? Shouldn’t I say things like, “Toxicodendron radicans is a sample of
species,” or “a piece of species,” rather than “Toxicodendron radicans is a species”? Don’t both

The caveat is this: if we ought to be pluralists about species in the vein suggested by Ereshefsky – that there is no
single kind which is denoted by the term ‘species,’ but instead there are only various kinds of species, such as
“biospecies” or “ecospecies” – then there are several such relevant natural kinds of things.
50
I thank Kathy Fazekas for suggesting this comparison.
49
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the fact that we speak in the latter way, not the former way, and the latter locution itself, strongly
suggest that each species is a natural kind? My response is that such linguistic evidence is far
from conclusive, or even suggestive. Many philosophers would claim that ‘tree’ denotes a
natural kind. Yet they find nothing odd in referring to “a tree” or “that tree” when they want to
talk about an individual, particular tree, and surely do not conclude from such usage that when
they do so refer, they are in fact referring to an entity which is a natural kind unto itself – a kind
within a kind – rather than to an individual which is an instance of the natural kind, ‘tree.’ The
same is true when it comes to usage of the word ‘species.’

2. Natural Kinds and Induction
It is part of the philosophical tradition, extending back at least to Mill, that natural kinds
are suitable targets of induction. According to the tradition, it is not only a necessary condition
of a putative kind’s being a natural kind that it must permit inductive inferences. Successful
inductive inferences are possible only because there are natural kinds. Mill, for one, claimed that
the “warrant for all inferences from experience” was both the uniformity of nature, and the
governing of the universe by “general laws” (Mill 1950 [1895], 182). For Mill, natural kinds
ensure that “whatever is true in any one case is true in all cases of a certain description.” Natural
kinds underwrite our ability to extend our knowledge, since the natural coincidence of the
properties diagnostic of the kind allows us to discover the kind’s other properties (Mill 1950
[1895], 302).

Venn, to whom we owe the term “natural kind,” also held that only “the

arrangement of things in natural kinds, each of them containing a large number of individuals”
could explain the regularities in nature, and our ability to classify objects into statistically
uniform groups such that successful prediction is possible, given that natural objects, unlike
man-made objects, vary (Venn 1876, 48-49). Quine, while holding a permissive view regarding
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which classes of entities could count as natural kinds, and disavowing de re essentialism, also
regarded sameness in kind as confirming and licensing induction (Quine 1969), as did Russell.
Latching onto a property which is a characteristic of a natural kind makes it safe to generalize
about that property after experiencing only a few instances of it; discovering that a few instances
of copper conduct electricity permits the generalization that all copper does (Russell 1948).51
More recent accounts of the connection between induction and natural kinds have revived
de re essentialism, and have argued strongly for the role natural kinds play in science. Kornblith
(1993), Elder (1994a), Ellis (1996, 2001), and Sankey (1997) all hold that induction is vindicated
by the existence of mind-independent natural kinds, characterized by essential properties; only if
nature is carved into such kinds can induction be vindicated generally. Absent the existence of
natural kinds characterized by essential properties – properties by which instances of no other
kind may be characterized – scientific inductive practices, including prediction, would lose their
warrant, since there would be insufficient reason to think that the kinds discovered through
scientific investigation would continue in the future to exhibit the properties which they exhibit
today (Elder 1994a, 255).
Ellis and Sankey also both hold that the characterization of natural kinds by sets of
essential properties holds out the prospect for the solution of Hume’s problem of induction. This
is a component of Ellis’ “scientific essentialism,” one of the tenets of which is that the laws of
nature depend upon the essential natures of things, in particular their causal powers. If the laws
of nature are grounded in the essential properties of natural kinds of things, then the uniformity
of nature is guaranteed, and inductive inferences ranging over the instances of natural kinds are
51

All of these conceptions of natural kinds, and their relation to induction, are examined in greater detail in Hacking
(1991), which provides a useful historical overview of the subject. Hacking argues that while the connection
between induction and natural kinds is “sound” and “never to be forgotten,” it is subsidiary to the use of kinds by
artisans: “Were not our world amenable to classification into kinds that we cognize, we should not have been able
to develop any crafts” (Hacking 1991, 114).
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justified. Similarly, for Kornblith, natural kinds are exhibitions of the causal structure of the
world, and this structure “provides the natural ground of inductive inference” (Kornblith 1993,
7). Collier argues as well that natural kinds are indispensible for science, since science requires
causal laws, which reflect discoverable necessary connections (i.e., causal relations) among
classes of entities in the world. Since these classes are related causally, the basis of their being
classified into kinds is natural, and they are the natural kinds (Collier 1996). For all these
authors, natural kinds are either posits given as the best explanation of the reliability of
induction, and of the success of science, or are discovered (and discoverable) entities the
existence of which explains the reliability of induction and the success of science. One of the
goals of science is, therefore, to discover nature’s kinds.52
The link which philosophers have perceived between, on the one hand, natural kinds,
and, on the other, laws of nature and the ability of science to produce generalizations,
predictions, and explanations, explains the interest of the philosophers of biology and
biologically minded philosophers mentioned at the opening of this chapter in developing, with
inductive inferences in mind, an account of species as natural kinds. Debate continues to roil as
to whether there are any distinctively biological laws of nature, but a growing consensus holds
that biology requires its own set of natural kinds in order to be a science (Boyd 1999a; Griffiths
1999; Wilson, Barker and Brigandt, 2007). Biologists regularly make generalizations about
species, or make predictions about how organisms in a species will react to certain stimuli or
conditions, or offer explanations of phenomena in terms of the properties of species (or, more

52

The claim that science requires natural kinds puts these contemporary authors in conflict with their forebears
Russell and Quine. The latter two granted that natural kinds were useful for generating what Russell called “prescientific generalizations” such as “Dogs bark” and for getting science off the ground (Russell 1948, 317). But both
denied natural kinds a role in actual scientific inference. Russell claimed that a mature science would replace the
“doctrine of natural kinds” with “fundamental laws of a different kind” (Russell 1948, 444), while Quine thought it
was a sign of a mature science that it abandoned natural kinds – which he considered a vague and disreputable
notion interdefinable with similarity – for explanations in terms of the actual structures of entities (Quine 1969).
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precisely, the characteristic properties of organisms in them). Thus the puzzle with which we
started: if species are individuals, not natural kinds, what underwrites all of this inductive
practice? What makes it all part of the science of biology?

3. How Inductive Inferences Regarding Species Are Possible
The first thing to notice is that, despite the connection between natural kinds and
inductive inference, we frequently make inductive inferences about objects, whether these are
inferences about what an object will be like in the future, based upon its exhibiting some
characteristic in the present or past, or whether they are inferences about unobserved parts of an
object based upon the character of observed parts. From the fact that all of the bricks which I
have observed in the south-facing wall of a building on campus are a particular shade of red, I
infer that there are bricks of the same shade in the other walls. This inference is reasonable,
because I’ve observed other buildings on campus containing the same basic shade of brick all
around, and I already know something about human beings, that for aesthetic reasons they
frequently like maintaining these sorts of themes on college campuses – or perhaps I’ve actually
read a manifesto from the administration that all buildings are to exhibit this sort of theme.
An advocate of the view that species are natural kinds (the “kindhood thesis”) might
object here that, in this case, I have only illustrated the original problem. If my inference
regarding the bricks in the building relies upon some characteristic of human beings, and yet
Homo sapiens is, like all species, not a natural kind but an individual, what is ultimately
licensing my inference about the bricks? We’re still left with the original question of how
reliable or successful inductive inferences regarding species are possible if species are not
natural kinds. And, of course, a second objection: I cannot reasonably infer that the non-brick
parts, such as the windows on the other walls, will be the same shade of red. The first objection
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is the claim that for my inference to be justified, there must be at least one natural kind at work
somewhere; I will have more to say about both these lines of objection later. What matters for
the purposes of laying out my account of the possibility of inductive inferences regarding species
is that inductive inference has been linked to natural kinds because there is then some reason to
think that such inferences will be successful. Likewise, there is some reason why I can expect
that the unobserved bricks will be red.
The same is true of species. If species are individuals, they are not just any randomly
occurring objects. They are entities where – everyone who is party to this debate agrees – a
degree of uniformity among the organisms in the species is being promoted by natural (causal)
processes, forces, or factors which, in the generation of organisms, are at work in the ongoing
production or maintenance of these species-entities (although these or other processes also
promote, permit, or even ensure, a degree of heterogeneity). This is true regardless of the
ontological status of species. So, if they are individuals, they are objects wherein this degree of
uniformity is promoted among its parts, a degree which permits biologists to make successful
inductive inferences (however “successful inductive inference” is to be defined or interpreted for
the sorts of inductive inferences biologists routinely make regarding species) to the extent that
they are able to do so (and we have seen that the parties to this debate take it as given that they
are able to do so). There is some reason (or set of reasons) why this degree of uniformity exists.
It is not a coincidence which we have no reason to expect to continue. To further my account, I
now need to say something about what these reasons are – about the causal processes at work in
the ongoing production or maintenance of species that allow inductive inferences over their parts
to be made.
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Griffiths (1999) frames the problem, and his solution, as follows: the special sciences
need their own various sets of lawlike generalizations (as opposed to the exceptionless laws of
physics). So, they need natural kinds, which can support generalizations that have counterfactual
force and therefore are lawlike. Biological taxa are classified by homology – by the presence of
shared traits derived from a common ancestor – not by underlying microstructural essences, nor
by sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. They are classified by recency of common
ancestry. If such taxa have an essence, it is historical: if an organism does not share in the
historical origin of a taxon, it cannot belong to that taxon (Griffiths 1999, 219).
As Griffiths sees it, the challenge from induction is to explain how, if biological taxa are
natural kinds defined by a historical essence, as opposed to a traditional essence, they can
support the needed generalizations – how it is that they can underwrite explanation and
induction. His solution is to adopt Boyd’s HPC account of kinds, but tacking onto it something
which we saw Boyd eschews: an ineliminable historical component, a historical essence. When
it comes to biological taxa, particularly species, the Boydian causal homeostatic mechanism –
which produces and sustains the property clustering and is also that which licenses induction
over the kind – will be phylogenetic inertia.

Instances of homology will be instances of

phylogenetic inertia. Groups of homologous entities will form HPC natural kinds without a
traditional essence. As I noted in Chapter 1, Griffiths argues that the relation which instances of
an HPC kind bear to the causal homeostatic mechanism is the essential property which makes
them members of that kind (Griffiths 1999, 218). With biological taxa, their essence is their
historical relation to the particular instances of phylogenetic inertia. Since the mechanism at
work in the case of biological taxa is ineliminably historical, the essence of a taxon is historical,
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yet reliable induction is possible. We will have species kinds over which predicates will be
projectable and which will support the needed lawlike generalizations.
Griffiths draws our attention to two types of “inertial” phenomena, drawing analogies
with two conceptions of physical inertia. The first is “Aristotelian inertia.” This occurs when
traits atrophy in the absence of selection working to maintain them, much as Aristotelian physics
expects a body to return to rest if no forces are acting upon it. The prime example is the loss of
pigmentation and sight by cave-dwelling organisms. The second is “Newtonian inertia.” This
occurs when traits are maintained “over the longest geological timescales and the widest range of
conditions of life, with no apparent regard for adaptive utility” (Griffiths 1999, 220), much as
Newtonian physics predicts that bodies in motion stay in motion unless counteracted by some
force. Griffiths’ example is the pattern of fused segments in crustaceans. Another and more
classic example would be the pentadactyl limb in tetrapods. The arm of a human, the wing of a
bird, the wing of a bat, the flipper of a whale, and the leg of a horse, all exhibit the same basic
bone structure and relative position of parts: the humerus, the ulna and radius, the carpals, and
five digits (which have been reduced in number in some taxa, e.g., in horses, to a single digit).
For Griffiths, phylogenetic inertia licenses induction over “a wide range of properties –
morphological, physiological, and behavioral” (Griffiths 1999, 220).

Some notion of

phylogenetic inertia, Griffiths claims, extends back to Darwin, who referred to it as the “great
law” of “Unity of Type,” or “that fundamental agreement in structure, which we see in organic
beings of the same class, and which is quite independent of their habits of life” (Darwin 1859,
206). Darwin’s explanation of unity of type was “unity of descent.” Griffith’s claim is that
because certain traits have been conserved over evolutionary time, sometimes deeply so, due to
common ancestry, we can infer, upon observing a property in an organism, that “we are more
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likely to see it again in related organisms than in unrelated organisms” (Griffiths 1999, 220).
The more closely related two organisms are, the more likely we are to see the same trait in them.
Crucially, for both our purposes here, this means that organisms belonging to the same species
will be likely to share traits, more so than organisms in related species.
Griffith invokes phylogenetic inertia in order to produce an account of species as natural
kinds. Yet the concept of phylogenetic inertia is itself silent as to whether the organisms in
which traits are produced are the instances of a kind, or the parts of an object. The presence of
phylogenetic inertia cannot determine whether species are natural kinds or individuals; such a
determination must be made on other grounds. If species are individuals, they are far more
analogous to organisms than to artifacts, to things which are continuously replenishing and
replacing their parts, generating new parts out of old, where what those parts are like is due to
both endogenous and exogenous forces or mechanisms (and if they are analogous to artifacts,
then they are more like the proverbial Ship of Theseus than they are like any ordinary ship). 53
This much is implied by the individuality thesis. On the individuality thesis, phylogenetic inertia
would not count as a Boydian causal homeostatic mechanism which produces instances of a
kind; nor, on my account, would relations to it count as a species “essence.” Phylogenetic inertia
would simply underwrite the inductive inferences biologists make, to the extent that they can
make them, over the parts of the individuals which are species.
Phylogenetic inertia has a pedigree in evolutionary biology, as it is frequently talked
about by biologists, but as a concept is somewhat protean. Biologists currently use it at least two

53

If Sober (1984a, 1995) is correct, natural selection is not a mechanism shaping individual organisms. Sober
claims that natural selection explains the frequencies of traits within populations (and so why it is that a species has
organism-parts with character F rather than not-F), but does not explain why particular individuals within that
population have the traits they do (and so does not explain why some organism has character F rather than not-F).
Instead, developmental mechanisms explain the latter fact. When it comes to phylogenetic inertia, then, selection
might explain why particular traits persist in a species, or why traits are eliminated, while developmental
mechanisms would be required to explain the characters of each of the parts of this individual.
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different senses. Blomberg and Garland (2002) have divided these into “pattern definitions” and
“process definitions,” while Shanahan (2011) sees biologists appealing to phylogenetic inertia to
explain three “basic, partially overlapping categories” – evolutionary patterns, properties of
organisms, and evolutionary processes.

(Judging by their treatment of the various ways

biologists use the term, Blomberg and Garland would lump Shanahan’s category of “properties
of organisms” into “process” definitions of phylogenetic inertia, so there is not as much
difference as might first appear between these authors’ analyses of what phylogenetic inertia is).
Pattern definitions (or explanations) regard phylogenetic inertia as characterizing or explaining
similarities across taxa due to common ancestry, particularly when the taxa exist in different
environments. Process definitions or explanations regard phylogenetic inertia as characterizing
or explaining the seemingly nonadaptive retention of organism properties, the resistance to
change or unexpected slowness of change of certain properties under presumed selection, or the
blockage of expected evolutionary paths.
An examination in Blomberg and Garland (2002) and Shanahan (2011) of examples of
the use of the term by biologists indicates that there is not much consensus among biologists
about how to use the term. Sometimes it appears to be the phenomenon to be explained, e.g.,
“similarity among closely related taxa owing to historical factors” (Peterson and Burt 1992, 861;
cited in Shanahan 2011). Other times, it is given as the explanation for the phenomenon; that is,
often, for the puzzling persistence of a trait, e.g., a retained pattern of egg-depositing in
butterflies which was adaptive when done with the butterflies’ previous host, but nonadaptive
when done with the new hosts (Shapiro 1981; cited in Blomberg and Garland 2002). As Reydon
(2006) points out, Griffiths uses the term primarily in a pattern definition sense, since Griffiths
believes the grounds for inductive inferences involving biological taxa are the recurring patterns,
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due to descent, of traits within and across taxa. However, Griffiths acknowledges that the
retention of traits, both within and across taxa, stands in needs explanation. Like many of the
biologists of the past 35 years or so who have used the term, he believes the phenomenon “calls
out for a developmental explanation” (Griffiths 1999, 220).
Disparities in the use of the term have led Blomberg and Garland to call for its being as
carefully defined as “adaptation” has been (Blomberg and Garland 2002, 907). Despite these
disparities, biologists genuinely are pointing to, and seeking to explain, instances of
conservatism within and across taxa. Just as Griffiths suggests, these patterns or processes of
conservation permit generalizations (i.e., inductive inferences) over taxa, including species, to
the extent that they produce similar traits in organisms within a taxon – to the extent, that is, that
they produce a degree of uniformity among the organisms. But phylogenetic inertia may be, as
yet, too nebulous a concept upon which to rest an account of how biologists are able to make
inductive inferences involving species, if species are individuals and not natural kinds. Griffiths
might be emphasizing phylogenetic inertia because he is looking for a single, Boydian causal
homeostatic mechanism. The individuality thesis is not beholden to this constraint. It can
accommodate any number of processes or factors which are involved in what is, from the
perspective of the individuality thesis, the ongoing production, over long spans of time, of an
object by the production of its integrated parts. Thus, it might be more fruitful to inquire into the
causes of the conservatism, holding onto the insights and observations which biologists using the
term “phylogenetic inertia” are making and finding, rather than rejecting the notion entirely.
No one doubts that many traits are conserved within taxa, sometimes for extremely long
spans of time. We have seen that Darwin himself commented on the phenomenon, calling it
“unity of type.” He also invoked the “principle of inheritance” to explain why, for example,
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rudimentary or seemingly useless traits or organs are maintained in lineages of organisms
(Darwin 1859, 455); and to explain not only why offspring resemble their parents, but why
organisms descended from an ancestral species would tend to resemble those ancestors (Darwin
1859, 432).
Among contemporary commentators, Millikan has explicitly appealed to inheritance as
the factor which promotes similarity among organisms in a species, and therefore as a major
ground of inductive inferences involving species. She does so to bolster her account of species
as “historical kinds.”

As we saw before, these are, for Millikan, a natural kind with an

ineliminable historical dimension, that being that “a causal/historical link” among the members
makes them similar and thus grounds inferences about the kind, as opposed to a common inner
structure causing similarity and thus grounding inductive inference, as is the case with “eternal
kinds” such as the chemical elements (Millikan 1999, 2000). I have already given my reasons to
think that species really are individuals, and not Millikanian historical kinds. Nevertheless,
Millikan’s work in this area anticipates, independently of anything Griffiths or I have to say on
the subject, much of the line of thinking in this section. Species and individual organisms such
as individual human beings, Millikan argues, have much the same “rich ontological ground of
induction” (Millikan 2000, 24). This is in part, she says – quoting one of Eldredge and Gould’s
depictions of species in their original paper on punctuated equilibria – that both a species and an
individual organism are each “homeostatic systems ... amazingly well-buffered to resist change
and maintain stability in the face of disturbing influences” (Eldredge and Gould 1972, 114;
quoted in Millikan 2000, 24; see also Hull 1978, 199). This is one factor which makes it
possible to infer that “if Xavier is blue-eyed, tall, good at mathematics and intolerant of gays
today, it is likely he will be so tomorrow and even next year” (Millikan 2000, 24).
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As we saw, in Millikan’s conception of a historical kind, later instances of the kind are
produced by “something akin to reproduction or copying” from earlier organisms, “in or in
response to the very same ongoing historical environment” (Millikan 1999, 55). This is another
reason why one can infer what Xavier will be like tomorrow based upon what he is like today,
although Xavier is an individual, not a historical kind: tomorrow’s Xavier is “a sort of copy” of
today’s Xavier due to conservation laws and somatic cell replication (Millikan 2000, 24).
Applying this to species, the “something akin to reproduction or copying” becomes Darwin’s
principle of inheritance. Talk of “response to the very same ongoing historical environment,”
when it comes to species, is a recognition that conspecific organisms are usually subject to the
same selective pressures; thus, inheritance is not doing all the work in Millikan’s account.
Common selective pressures also promote a degree of uniformity within the species, since
natural selection will tend to eliminate variants which are less fit. More strictly speaking, the
alleles possessed by offspring and which constitute their genotype, and which are strongly
involved in the production of their phenotype, are alternate copies of their parents’ genes, in
unique combinations (at least in sexually reproducing species). That the alleles of offspring are
copies of their parents’ alleles promotes similarity. Since these genes are all drawn from a
common gene pool, where the commonality is due to relations of descent, conspecifics will tend
to resemble one another. If the species is subject to stabilizing selection, where more extreme
variations are less fit than the mean, a degree of homogeneity will be enforced as variants are
weeded out. Generalizations (i.e., inductive inferences) regarding the species will be grounded,
since there is a reason in nature for whatever resemblances occur among conspecific organisms.
At the same time, of course, because different offspring inherit different alleles, which
recombine in unique ways, there will be variation. Genetic mutations, as well as recombination,
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can produce variations which, if they increase an organism’s fitness, will be favored by natural
selection, and will therefore increase in frequency in the population. The frequency of traits may
also shift due to genetic drift. The latter two processes are not mutually exclusive; evolution
may occur due to a combination of drift and selection. As Millikan points out, this means that,
while generalizations involving species are grounded, such generalizations are unlikely to be
exceptionless (Millikan 1999, 55). This will be true not merely at a time, but over time.
Millikan’s dual emphasis on inheritance and selection puts her in the company of
biologists and philosophers of biology who have recognized that both development and
selection, in connection with the inheritance mechanisms which pass traits to offspring, may be
necessary components of any explanation for the stability of traits in biological lineages. In the
last 40 years, it has become common for biologists, particularly those influenced by the work of
Eldredge and Gould on stasis and punctuated equilibria, to postulate “developmental constraints”
as an explanation for apparent long-term trends or patterns in evolution, the seemingly
nonadaptive retention of traits, the phenotypic stability of species (stasis), or a lack or a slowness
of expected evolutionary change in response to environmental perturbations.
In a definition that has by now become something of a standard, Maynard Smith et al.
define a developmental constraint as “a bias on the production of variant phenotypes or a
limitation on phenotypic variability caused by the structure, character, composition, or dynamics
of the developmental system” (Maynard Smith et al. 1985, 266). The idea is that some features
of a taxon’s developmental system would render some phenotypes less accessible, or even
inaccessible, to the taxon, or would make the taxon resistant to evolutionary change (This should
be reminiscent, and not accidentally so, of my comments in Chapter 2 about destinations in
genetic space.). Griffiths, in his discussion of possible causes of phylogenetic inertia, notes that
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traits may be linked developmentally to other traits, rather than being each independently
produced (see also Ridley 1996, 353). Such traits would resist elimination by selection, since
selection would have to remove them all in order to remove one (Griffiths 1999, 221). Blomberg
and Garland, as well as Shanahan, have noted that hypotheses about various sorts of constraints
play a role in biologists’ discussions of phylogenetic inertia. This would include “genetic
constraints,” the notion that lack of the required genetic variation, or the exhaustion of genetic
variation by selection or drift, or the inability of a population to eliminate less fit genetic variants
due to their presence in selectively favored heterozygotes (heterozygous advantage), may also
constrain adaptive evolution (Maynard Smith et al. 1985; Futuyma 1988; Ridley 1996). Indeed,
in Blomberg and Garland’s opinion, “modern biologists often use the two terms [i.e.,
“constraint” and “phylogenetic inertia”] in an interchangeable fashion” (Blomberg and Garland
2002, 901).
Frequently, developmental constraints have been offered as alternatives – competitors –
to explanations of stability in terms of selection. But as even those sympathetic to the utility of
explanations of the stability of taxa in terms of developmental constraints have recognized, such
contrasts will probably be almost impossible to sustain, or likely represent a false dichotomy.
This is because, in the former case, selection can operate at multiple levels, or is multifarious and
subtle (e.g., sexual selection may maintain a trait which on its face appears to make its bearer
less fit)(Maynard Smith et al. 1985, 282); or, in the latter case, because “the only constraints on
evolution are the very systems that make natural selection (via development and the reliable
inheritance of developmental systems) possible” (Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006, 127). Organisms’
developmental systems are merely one more aspect of their phenotype, and are as subject to
natural selection as any other trait. Indeed, it is hard to see how selection could fail to be part of
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an explanation of phylogenetic inertia, since, as Blomberg and Garland point out (Blomberg and
Garland 2002, 900), population genetics tells us that, absent selection, we can expect random
mutation and genetic drift to produce evolutionary change. Since genes influence development,
were selection not operating on a population, we ought to see the evolution of the population’s
developmental system. That the system does not evolve, producing variant phenotypes, suggests
the operation of selection at some level.
Shanahan points out that there are at least two ways in which selection could be related to
development in the promotion of phenotypic stability in lineages.

First, something like

Wimsatt’s mechanism of “generative entrenchment” may be at work (Wimsatt 1986; Schank and
Wimsatt 1986): modifications to the phenotype get added on to pre-existing developmental
systems in organisms; modifications to “downstream” developmental processes may be easier to
make than modifications to entrenched, underlying “upstream” systems. Modifications to older,
entrenched parts of the system would be more disruptive to organismal development, and thus
would be eliminated by selection. Griffiths – who as we saw believes that the exhibition of
different patterns of phylogenetic inertia by different traits “calls out for a developmental
explanation” (Griffiths 1999, 220) – himself cites “generative entrenchment” as a possible
explanation of phylogenetic inertia (Griffiths 1996, 1999), acknowledging the “major role”
which selection would play in this developmental account. Alternately, selection might itself
favor, and therefore have produced, developmental systems which fail to produce variant
phenotypes (Schwenk and Wagner 2004). A third way in which development and selection may
work together is implied by pleiotropy, the fact that a single gene can have effects in more than
one part of an organism’s body. Due to pleiotropy, genetic mutations might also disrupt an
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organism’s developmental system, or cause it to produce a disadvantageous phenotype (Ridley
1996).
What we see in all of these possibilities is that selection may work or interact with
development in a number of ways to promote phenotypic stability in species. Selection may
eliminate alterations to “upstream” developmental processes, permitting only a kind of
downstream tinkering. Selection may favor developmental systems which do not produce much
variation. Organisms with disrupted developmental systems may be eliminated, perhaps before
they are even born. Selection may eliminate organisms with less-fit phenotypes produced by
alterations to their developmental system (although selection will also favor organisms whose
more-fit phenotypes have been produced by an altered developmental system).

And

developmental systems which inhibit variation may be heritable.
This is but one factor or process, or combination of factors and processes, which could
promote the sort of uniformity in species which can license inductive inferences. There are
others. Ereshefsky notes that advocates of the individuality thesis have cited three processes as
promoting species cohesion – the cohesiveness of species being one of the grounds for the thesis
(Ereshefsky 2001, 114; see e.g., Eldredge and Cracraft 1980, 90). Although Ereshefsky writes of
them as three separate processes, they are actually interrelated, and Hull considers the possibility
that all three are involved in maintaining a species’ evolutionary unity (Hull 1978). We can
enlist these causes of cohesion (and evolutionary unity) as causes of species stability and
uniformity.
The first of the processes is gene flow. This is related to the process of heredity which
Millikan emphasizes. Mayr notes that few species consist of a single, continuous population;
most consist of many, partially isolated local populations. Nevertheless, most species exhibit
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remarkable uniformity throughout their range (Mayr 1970, 301). Partly, this is due to genes
constantly immigrating into local populations from other local populations, normalizing local
populations and preventing them from diverging greatly from the other populations.

As

Ereshefsky points out, if new traits arise and are adaptive, they will be transmitted to other
populations through gene flow. At the same time, gene flow hinders the arising of new traits.
Since many phenotypic features are the results of interactions among alleles of a locus and
among loci, natural selection will bring together genes which can interact harmoniously; the
genes in the gene pool will be “integrated” or “coadapted” into a “gene complex” (Mayr 1970,
184). New genes will become established only if they fit well against an existing “genetic
background.” The more genetic variability in a population, the more “stringently” the new gene
will be tested, since gene flow will cause it to be tested against multiple backgrounds
(Ereshefsky 2001, 115), with greater prospect of failure. Thus it will be difficult for new traits to
become established.
The second of the cohesion- and uniformity-promoting processes is genetic homeostasis.
We’ve already encountered in this section Eldredge and Gould’s answer to the phenomenon of
stability and uniformity lay in regarding species as “homeostatic systems” which are “wellbuffered to resist change and maintain stability in the face of disturbing influences” (Eldredge
and Gould 1972, 114). Eldredge and Gould maintained that such homeostasis was a more
important anti-differentiation force than gene flow.54 As emphasized by Ereshefsky, who draws

Eldredge and Gould’s emphasis on genetic homeostasis, in contrast to or to the exclusion of gene flow or
selection, surely derives from, and would be beholden to, their “punctuated equilibria” view of the production of
new species, which depends upon Mayr’s hypothesis that a “genetic revolution” would take place in a peripheral
isolate. Mayr’s basic idea is that a small group of organisms, isolated from its parent species, bearing a random and
unrepresentative sample of the species’ genes, and subject to new selective pressures, would undergo a “genetic
revolution,” ultimately stabilizing into a new, different genotype (the “equilibrium” of punctuated equilibria)(Mayr
1963). As a result of this history, the new species would, Eldredge and Gould suggested, acquire its “own powerful
homeostatic system” (Eldredge and Gould 1972, 114). Whether Mayr’s genetic revolutions actually occur is a
matter of some dispute (Ridley 1996; Coyne and Orr 2004).
54
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upon Waddington (1957), homeostasis is a matter of “canalization,” the tendency for a
selectively favored phenotype to continue to be produced despite changes in the genotype from
the influx of new genes. Selection would be expected to produce genotypes that stably produce
favored phenotypes despite perturbations. At the same time, selection would be expected to
produce genotypes which produce phenotypes that do well despite change in the environment.
Genotypes that produce an adaptive phenotype despite the influx of new genes or environmental
changes would be homeostatic, and would produce species uniformity (Ereshefsky 2001, 115).
As emphasized by Mayr (who draws the concept from Lerner [1954]), genetic homeostasis is the
phenomenon of the restoration of an original phenotype in a population after selection for a new
phenotype has been relaxed or removed. Mayr explains the phenomenon in terms of integrated
or coadapted genotypes. If a population comes under strong selection for a new phenotype, this
will produce “disharmony” between the newly favored genes and the rest of the genotype,
lowering fitness.

If this new selection pressure is later removed, selection will move the

population, at least partially, back to the “historical combination” of genes that was most fit,
restoring, at least partially, the original phenotype. This sort of homeostasis, or “inertia,” will
make a species phenotype resistant to change (Mayr 1970, 182) – and would be an example of
Griffith’s “Aristotelian inertia.”
The third cohesion-promoting process is selection. We have already seen how selection
and development might interact to promote stability and uniformity. As Ereshefsky points out,
advocates of the ecological species concept maintain that what unites a lineage of organisms into
a species is their being subject to the same selective pressures. Strong stabilizing selection
weeds out traits that might cause a species to diverge. Selection can also cause advantageous
traits to become prominent (Ereshefsky 2001, 115). Hull notes that something other than gene
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flow must be involved in the maintenance of species uniformity, since asexual species also
exhibit evolutionary unity (Hull 1978, 344). External forces – the pressures brought on by an
external environment – are a plausible candidate.
Inheritance, development, gene flow, genetic homeostasis, selection, or other processes,
may all work to promote the sort of trait stability and uniformity which can underwrite inductive
inferences involving species. That is, they work in the ongoing production of an object, an
individual, by the production of that individual’s parts. These processes make the parts – the
individual organisms – such that reliable inductive inferences over those parts is possible. They
can do so in virtue of common ancestry, especially recency of common ancestry. The processes
or forces at issue make these parts (the ones that are organisms belonging to a particular species)
uniform relative to each other, to the extent that they do, as opposed to making other parts
uniform relative to these parts, because these parts are all descended from the same more recent
common ancestor. Indeed, I would argue that because these processes repeatedly occur in or
affect many species, their presence or action – being subject to them – or the results of their
presence or action or being subject to them, is a property of the natural kind, ‘species’ (i.e., the
species category; or whatever categories we come up with if we must be pluralists). This means
that at least one natural kind is grounding inferences from observed parts to unobserved parts of
particular species.55 It is just that the natural kind at work is not the particular species itself; that
is an instance of the natural kind, ‘species,’ and an individual. If this is correct, it helps to dispel
the first objection I considered at the beginning of this section in my example of inferring the
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But the processes I have adumbrated may not always be operating simultaneously in every species (a sexually
reproducing species might at some point in its history fail to be under any selection), and in some asexual species,
some may not operate at all, e.g., development, in species of bacteria (although in such species, gene flow, ordinarily
associated with sexually reproducing species, might plausibly operate in the form of lateral gene transfer). If the
species category is a natural kind, and the properties of a kind are essential to the kind, this might be a reason to be a
species pluralist.
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character of the unobserved parts of an individual from the character of the observed parts: that
some natural kind must ground any such inference.
As Elder (2008) and Reydon (2003) have observed, with many objects with a multiplicity
of parts, especially when those parts are heterogeneous, reliable inductive inferences from
observed parts to unobserved parts is not possible. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
infer, just from a few scattered automobile, airplane, or motorcycle engine parts, what the parts
of the rest of the automobile, airplane, or motorcycle of which the engine was part was like – or
to infer from a few scattered windows and load-bearing beams what the rest of a skyscraper was
like.56 But the extreme heterogeneity of such artifacts is not of concern to my account. Such
artifacts are not produced through the uniformity-promoting processes involved in the ongoing
production or maintenance of species. Reydon is correct: the parts of an individual need not be
qualitatively similar to one another. But this simply means that this is not a necessary condition
of being an individual. It does not mean that the parts of individuals cannot be qualitatively
similar. In species, they are, and biologists know something about the reasons why this is the
case.
This is not to neglect the processes involved in the production of the heterogeneity, often
pronounced, that species exhibit. It does, however, highlight an important distinction, and
disanalogy, between species as individuals and the sorts of objects which opponents of the
individuality thesis have in mind in their challenges from induction to the individuality thesis.
And it affords an important contrast: one might know, or be able to surmise, that a particular
artifact is an airplane part. If one knew that such a part was used in only a particular kind of
airplane – a Boeing 737, say – one could infer, based upon one’s knowledge of what Boeing
56

Although not absolutely in every case involving artifacts. As I have suggested, one could probably reliably infer,
based upon a sampling of some of the bricks used to build a house, what the other bricks are (or were) like. This
would, of course, be a poor basis upon which to infer what the windows were like, or even that there were any.
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737s are like as a kind (and, if Elder is correct that such artifacts form “copied kinds,” the Boeing
737, or versions of it, do constitute natural kinds; see Elder 1995; 1996), what the other parts of
the individual airplane to which the part belonged were like. It might be possible to infer, with
less reliability, what those other parts were like if one knew that the original part had been used
in several different kinds of Boeing jet. But one could not infer that merely from knowing that
it’s an airplane part – knowing it’s a part of some individual of the generic ‘airplane’ kind
doesn’t help. In contrast, if one encounters an organism, one knows that it is (probably) a part of
some species.57 It’s (probably) part of an instance of that natural kind. But one thing we know
of that kind is, its parts exhibit a degree of uniformity. Thus, just on the basis of knowing it’s an
organism, one can infer what other parts of the individual of which it is a part will be like. This
contrast or disanalogy disposes of the second objection which I considered near the beginning of
this section.
There is a different, more serious obstacle in the path of the above account. It arises from
the critique which, as I mentioned near the beginning of this chapter, Reydon lodges against
Griffiths. It appears in Reydon’s own account (Reydon 2006) of the grounding of inductive
inferences regarding species. Reydon’s project is to establish what, ontologically, species must
be in order for them to be able to ground the generalizations which biologists make about them,
and then to establish on this ground what the correct species concept is. Following Griffiths’
usage of the term, Reydon divides phylogenetic inertia into two sorts:

“selection-induced

This requires the qualifier “probably” because sterile hybrids belong to no species. Mules do not compose a
species (although they do have a species-level classification, made up of the names of the two species of which they
are hybrids: Equus asinus x Equus caballus. This denotes their status as hybrids. But this is not a species name.)
But this anomaly is fairly easily dealt with, I think. If it’s possible to infer properties from observed mules to
unobserved mules, this is due to the evolutionary forces and processes which have shaped the two species from
which the mule’s parents come. Just as one gets commonalities and uniformities in those species, so for the same
reason one gets commonalities or uniformities in their hybrids. If there are regularities among mules which can be
counted upon for inductive inference, might this mean that mules form a natural kind? Perhaps; it is not a question I
intend to pursue here. But since mules do not compose a species, that natural kind would not be a species.
57
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phylogenetic

inertia”

(SPI)

and

“development-induced

phylogenetic

inertia”

(DPI),

corresponding roughly to the sorts of phenomena Griffiths describes as “Aristotelian inertia” and
“Newtonian inertia,” respectively (Reydon 2006, 244). He argues that neither SPI nor DPI, nor a
combination of the two, is sufficient to ground explanatory and predictive generalizations about
species. This is because instances of DPI tend to persist over time scales that are much longer
than the lifetime of a species. This means that instances of DPI will license inductive inferences
over a broad range of taxa, not merely individual species. On the other hand, instances of SPI,
Reydon argues, tend to persist over time scales that are shorter than the lifetime of a species.
This means that the inductive inferences which SPI licenses won’t be good over the lifetime of a
species, but merely a portion of a segment of the tree of life, a portion which biologists would
not recognize as a species (since the instances of SPI do not necessarily coincide with a
permanent split in the branches of the tree). What is more, instances of SPI may cross the
boundary between two species (stem species and daughter species) in a splitting event. So,
inferences across this boundary may hold up better than inferences from early in the species’
existence to much later in its existence (Reydon 2006, 246-249).
My account does not explicitly invoke the concept of phylogenetic inertia.
Reydon’s criticism threatens to extend itself to my strategy.

Still,

Developmental processes or

constraints which promote species uniformity might indeed extend over vast lengths of
geological time, and thus over more than just the target species; and selection and other
processes might fail to extend over either the entirety of a species’ local populations or the
entirety of the species’ lifetime, or might extend across a speciation event. But because these
concerns coincide with other crucial points about how long-lasting generalizations about species
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need to be in order to be reliable – points which it would be distracting to try to develop in this
section – I defer this objection to Section 6 of the present chapter.
In the preceding, I have shown that there is some reason to expect organisms in a species
to resemble each other, and so that there is some reason to expect that inductive inferences over
their parts will be successful. These reasons are the various natural forces or processes to which
species are typically subject. These processes or forces are at work regardless of the ontological
status of species. Being subject to such processes or forces is part of what it is for something to
be an instance of the natural kind, ‘species.’ So not only is there some reason to expect the sort
of uniformity in species which can ground inductive inference, there is at least one natural kind
involved in such inferences. So inductive inferences over species are grounded, even if species
are individuals.
4. The Natural Kinds Involved in Inductive Reasoning About Species
Critics of the individuality thesis might lodge the following objection at this point:
suppose I have plausibly shown what the grounds are of inductive inferences over species of the
sorts with which the philosophers we met at the beginning of this chapter are primarily
concerned – generalizations or predictions about the properties of the organisms belonging to the
species. Nevertheless, something has been lost. As Boyd has pointed out, species are involved
in other sorts of inductive reasoning in the myriad of related disciplines that constitute biology
(and evolutionary biology). We saw in my earlier discussion of his attack on the individuality
thesis that this is precisely why he believes species must be HPC natural kinds:

the

accommodation demands of biology require it. Indeed, we can construe Boyd’s thesis as the
inductive (or abductive) argument that because the accommodation demands of all sciences
require the existence of natural kinds, and because biology is a science, and because species
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contribute to the accommodation demands of biology (and have HPC-kindlike properties),
species are (HPC) natural kinds.58 So, if species are individuals, one might fear that many more
sorts of inductive inferences will lose their grounds than merely generalizations about the
properties of their constituent organisms.
What I shall attempt to show in this section is that we need not fear that anything has
been lost. Species need not be relied upon as natural kinds in making inductive inferences in
biology. Other interpretations, or reconstructions, of how such inferences are made and succeed
are available. Of course, if species are individuals, then they are not relied upon as natural kinds
in such inferences at all. But advocates of the kindhood thesis might be imagining that species
are relied upon as natural kinds to such a great extent that for them to be individuals would
bowdlerize all the other inductive practices of biologists, beyond simple generalizations.
Because I am responding here to what I have construed as an inductive argument –
Boyd’s – I cannot win the day merely by providing a single counterexample. On the other hand,
I cannot exhaustively survey all of the sorts of inductive inferences which biologists make which
involve species. There are simply too many of them. What I hope to do is to weaken Boyd’s
inductive argument by surveying just a few types of inductive inferences where species are
involved. And, if Boyd’s argument is inductive, that is all I need to do. By doing so, I hope to
alleviate just a bit more of the lingering skepticism which I suspect advocates of the kindhood

One can reconstruct Boyd’s thesis as a deductive argument: “Everything which contributes to the accommodation
demands of a science is a natural kind. Species contribute to the accommodation demands of biology. Therefore,
species are (HPC) natural kinds.” But one can do so only at the cost of eliminating the distinction between kinds
and individuals, since, as Boyd points out, certain things we ordinarily take to be individuals (e.g., the rock of
Gibraltar; Oliver Cromwell) contribute to the accommodation demands of certain sciences (Boyd 1999a, 163). As
we’ve seen, Boyd is content with a merely pragmatic distinction between kinds and individuals. If we reject this, as
I’ve argued we should, then we cannot reconstruct Boyd’s thesis as a deductive argument. I also think construing
the thesis as an inductive argument is more in keeping with the manner in which Boyd lays out his case: drawing up
multiple lines of evidence to support the thesis that species are HPC kinds.
58
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thesis will exhibit toward my account of induction and the individuality thesis, and possibly offer
consolation to the philosopher.
The strait between Scylla and Charybdis to be navigated this time is pointed out by
Sankey (Sankey 1997), who is among the many philosophers arguing that reliable inductive
practices require natural kinds for their grounds. Sankey considers the objection to his view that
induction cannot be grounded in natural kinds, since it is possible to make sound inductive
inferences about artifacts and other non-natural kinds. One can infer that it would be dangerous
to step into the path of an oncoming car, since it has been dangerous to do so in the past. Setting
aside the possibility (defended, as I pointed out earlier, by Elder; but also by Millikan [1999,
2000]), that artifacts are themselves members of natural kinds, Sankey’s response raises a
relevant point. Sankey suggests that reliable inductive inferences about artifacts and “other nonnatural kinds” turn on “facts about them which obtain in virtue of their being members of natural
kinds” (Sankey 1997, 251). This is unfortunately ambiguous. It is unclear whether Sankey
means that individual artifacts and the members of non-natural kinds are also members of natural
kinds, or whether he means that artifacts constitute a non-natural kind, and this and the other
non-natural kinds themselves are members of one or more natural kinds. Regardless: what I
take Sankey’s claim to be, and the relevant point for us here, is simply the first objection we
encountered at the beginning of Section 3 again: that whenever an inductive inference is being
made, some natural kind or other is serving as its ground.
Thus, one can make reliable inferences about the dangers of stepping into the path of an
oncoming car, because cars, as artifacts or members of a non-natural kind, are members of some
natural kind, such as ‘object of large mass,’ and the inference is made regarding objects of large
mass moving at high velocities. Applied to the present discussion, this means that if species are
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not the natural kinds grounding the inductive inferences about them, or which involve them, then
other natural kinds must be at work. The challenge for the advocate of the individuality thesis,
then, is to identify those kinds. Of course, different inferences involving species and their parts
will be grounded by different natural kinds. So it will be impossible, especially within the
confines of the present chapter, to exhaustively identify the kinds involved in biological
reasoning. Again, my aim here is to identify some of these kinds, in order to take a step toward
alleviating the worries of the skeptic. In what follows, I will assume not only that there are
numerous biological natural kinds (and in this I am, we’ve seen, in good company) but that they
are of different sorts. Some are what Ellis calls “substantive” natural kinds (Ellis 2001, 67-76).
These are the sorts of kinds usually found in discussions of natural kinds: chemical elements and
fundamental particles. Others are what Ellis calls “dynamic” natural kinds. These are kinds of
causal processes or interactions, the instances of which are singular events. Ellis’ examples are
chemical reactions and electromagnetic radiations; for my purposes, they would be processes
such as natural selection, genetic drift, crossing over, and translation.
Consider first paleontological reconstructions of extinct organisms of which there is but
one, or perhaps only a few, incomplete samples. Paleontologists must infer what the missing
parts of the organism were like. Even if biological species were natural kinds, it still could not
be that only species-kinds underwrite inferences from parts of organisms to other parts.
Paleontologists in such cases cannot rely upon the organisms in question belonging to a kind
which is co-extensive with a biological species, since they frequently have the remains of but one
or a few incomplete samples of organisms in the species – not enough to draw conclusions of
similarity due to membership in the same kind. Assumed similarity between the organisms in an
extinct species and extant species may be at work in such inferences, but it’s not clear that the
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reasoning being employed is one of similarities between kinds of things, or even between two
things (organisms) which are themselves members of some higher-level kind (a genus, say).
If my account of induction over the parts of species is correct, then the mere fact of
relatedness is what’s at work. As we saw earlier, recency of common ancestry is what licenses
the comparison of organisms in one species to organisms in another; the more recent the
common ancestry, the more similar we can expect those organisms to be. If natural kinds are
involved in these sorts of inferences, they are the natural kinds of processes – the sorts of factors
and processes which Griffiths had in mind in considering developmental phylogenetic inertia –
which make it the case that the more closely related two species are, the more we can expect the
organisms belonging to them to resemble each other (and for the parts of organisms to resemble
each other). There does not seem to even be any need to postulate that a more inclusive taxon to
which both species belong is a natural kind. Similarity due to descent with modification – a kind
of process which is itself a compendium of many kinds of events and processes like those we
encountered in Section 3 – handles the grounding, along with the status of both species as
instances of the natural kind, ‘species.’
Natural selection, another kind of evolutionary process, is likely grounding other sorts of
inferences regarding unobserved properties of organisms, those made when biologists
extrapolate from the known adaptive significance of a trait in an extant species to its likely
occurrence in another species which occupies a similar environment. Dolphins and whales tend
to have darker dorsal coloration and lighter ventral coloration. Presumably, the dark color
camouflages them better from above, while light color provides better camouflage from below.
Now, consider plesiosaurs, the long-necked, flippered marine reptiles which existed from the
Late Triassic Period until the Late Cretaceous. What was their coloration like? While it might
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prove extremely difficult to confirm (since pigmented skin is unlikely to fossilize), a reasonable
hypothesis would be that plesiosaurs also had dark dorsal coloration, and light ventral coloration,
since this would have provided them the same adaptive advantage. It is not obvious that any role
is being played in this inference by similarity between or within natural kinds of the sort which I
imagine advocates of the kindhood thesis like those we considered at the beginning of this
chapter have in mind. In the present context, these kinds would be identical to the various
taxonomic groups, of various rankings, which biologists recognize. But there is no immediately
obvious candidate for a natural kind here, one easily identifiable with a taxonomic group, which
would encompass dolphins, whales, and plesiosaurs, but which would exclude non-marine
mammals and reptiles, both extinct and extant. Rather than the inference being made on the
basis of similarities between species-kinds, or even kinds of another taxonomic rank, to the
extent that natural kinds play a role in the inference, it is predictable adaptation to a particular
kind of life or niche which is at work.59
Many contemporary inferences regarding the structures and functions of the parts or
systems of extinct organisms are made on the basis of what Plotnick and Baumiller have called
“paleobiomechanics.” Paleobiomechanics is “the uniformitarian extension” of biomechanics –
the assumption that, in the past, the same principles and processes involved in contemporary
biomechanics were in operation, e.g., that ocean wave dynamics were the same then as today.
Biomechanics itself “examines the interrelationships between biological structures and physical
processes” (Plotnick and Baumiller 2000, 312). It postulates relationships among known factors
of biological materials – for our purposes, biological natural kinds such as various sorts of tissues
– and known physical and engineering processes or factors, such as fluid drag and lift. This
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I thank Andrew Bush for these two examples of paleontological inferences, and for directing me to the following
discussion of paleobiomechanics and the general use of engineering principles in paleontological inferences.
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permits paleontologists to “quantify the functional properties of biological structures” and infer
how they would react to various stresses and forces, thus permitting them to infer either the
character of other structures, or to test hypotheses about the function or “faculty” of a structure
(Plotnick and Baumiller 2000, 312).60 Significantly, paleobiomechanics need not rely upon the
existence of a living homolog to a biological structure, or a machine analog. Instead, “principles
of physics and engineering are directly applied to infer [a structure’s] function and faculty”
(Plotnick and Baumiller 2000, 312).
Plotnick and Baumiller give as a classic example of the use of paleobiomechanics the
analysis of the giant Eocene bird Diatryma gigantea by Witmer and Rose (1991). A longstanding hypothesis is that Diatryma, with its large mandible, was predatory. However, since no
bird “even remotely similar” to Diatryma exists, trying to support this hypothesis simply through
comparisons of morphology and function with living birds cannot succeed (Witmer and Rose
1991, 95). Inferring Diatryma’s mode of life by comparing its skull with the skulls of extant
birds, and then simply scaling up in size, would be fallacious, since change in size can translate
into change in functional possibility. Instead, Witmer and Rose modeled Diatryma’s mandible
as a curved beam, and used engineering principles from beam theory to determine whether the
skull was equipped to withstand the enormous bite forces, including the crushing of bone – either
through predation, or scavenging – which would have been involved.

Witmer and Rose

hypothesized that, based on a reconstruction of the skull, Diatryma possessed a craniofacial
hinge like those found in some modern birds such as parrots, which could have acted as a
fulcrum for the mandible, which then could be treated as a beam. The required bite forces,
Plotnick and Baumiller define a “function” as “what a feature [i.e., any part of an organism, whether
morphological, behavioral, or physiological] does or how it works,” and a “faculty” as “the combination of a given
form and a particular function”; the faculty is “what the feature is capable of doing in the life of the organism”
(Plotnick and Baumiller 2000, 306). The distinction is a matter of drawing fine points to differentiate their view
from an earlier, rival view, and correcting what they perceive as a lack of clarity in its concepts.
60
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coupled with beam theory, predicted that the skull of Diatryma should exhibit nearly all its actual
features. Thus the skull could withstand the required bite forces, supporting the predation
hypothesis.
In another analysis, Witzel and Preuschoft applied biomechanical principles to explain
the prominence of the bony roof of the nose in humans, which is a fairly unique and striking
feature among primates. In many other primates, including the great apes, the roof of the nose
does not project much above the facial profile, which in the great apes tends to be concave.
Another striking feature of humans is our low midface, the region between the upper row of teeth
and the frontal bone in our neurocranium (roughly the forehead bone); this feature is also found
to some degree in some Old World monkeys. Assuming that bone material is homogeneous and
isotropic, Witzel and Preuschoft created several computer models of various sorts of midfaces,
and applied various bite forces to them. The projection of the nasal roof proved to be as it would
need to be to distribute compression forces caused by biting in an organism with a low midface
(Witzel and Preuschoft 1999). Indeed, although Witzel and Preuschoft did not do this, the
method they used suggests that, if paleontologists possessed a human skull that was missing (for
whatever reason) the bony roof of the nose, they could, relying upon the skull’s low midface, the
characteristic properties of kinds of tissue (such as bone) and kinds of compression forces,
predict the projection of the bony roof.
I fully expect a skeptic to immediately seize upon the fact that Witmer and Rose
hypothesized a similarity between Diatryma and parrots in order to form and test their
biomechanical hypothesis (a skeptic might also attempt to seize upon comparisons which Witzel
and Preuschoft make between species in Homo and other primates, although here it is far from
clear that such comparisons formed any basis of the hypothesis being tested; they are the
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explananda [plural], not part of the explanans). I expect the skeptic would argue that Witmer and
Rose’s analysis therefore depends upon the properties of a natural kind, namely the ‘bird’ kind
(indeed, I would expect Elder and Sankey, among others, to claim that it depends upon essential
properties of the ‘bird’ kind – although other philosophers we have been considering would not
make that claim). Taxonomically, birds are the class (clade) Aves. That, I expect the skeptic to
argue, suggests that taxonomic groups, including species, are actually natural kinds.

The

properties of one natural kind, Diatryma gigantea, were inferred from the properties of another
natural kind, in this case the yellowheaded Amazon parrot, Amazona ochrocephala (see Witmer
and Rose 1991, 99), on the basis of the membership of both in a higher-order natural kind, the
clade Aves (which happens to correspond to the colloquial kind, ‘bird’).
But as I suggested above, this need not be so.

Common ancestry – descent with

modification – a kind of process – licenses any such inference from extant birds to Diatryma,
e.g., that a particular feature of Diatryma’s skull is a craniofacial hinge.61 True, the more closely
two species are related to each other, the stronger the case for the inferred resemblance, and
Diatryma and Amazona ochrocephala are more distantly related than, say

Amazona

ochrocephala and some other modern species of parrot. This shows only that the inference about
the craniofacial hinge is weaker between Diatryma and Amazona ochrocephala than between
two modern species of parrot. But they are all descended from a common ancestor, more
recently than they and some other taxon are descended from a common ancestor (say, the
common ancestor of all birds and dinosaurs); and given the patterns of conservatism in traits that

And here I expect a rejoinder from the skeptic: “The various species at issue (and the more inclusive clades to
which they belong) are natural kinds, and descent with modification just explains why the kinds are similar. That is
why descent with modification licenses inferences from one kind to another.” I shall address this rejoinder in the
next section, and at the end of the chapter.
61
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show up again and again in the living world among closely related taxa, the inference is still
reasonable.
Permit me to address one other possible objection. Recall from Chapter 1 LaPorte’s
argument that for every property, there is a corresponding kind, “the essential mark of which is
to possess that property” (LaPorte 2004, 15). Since red is a property, there is a corresponding
kind: redkind. Whether a kind is natural is a matter of degree, and depends not on whether it is
produced in nature, nor on whether the extension of the term for it is determined by experts in a
Putnamian linguistic division of labor, nor on whether conditions for the application of the term
for it is grounded by paradigmatic samples in the world, but with their “theoretical significance”
– their “explanatory value.” Thus, ‘polar bear’ would be a natural kind, since an animal’s being
a polar bear explains why that animal has dense fur; ‘white’ would also be a natural kind, since
something’s being white explains why it reflects light and so does not heat up as readily as a dark
object. The ‘made on a Tuesday’ kind would be non-natural, since it is very likely of little or no
explanatory value (LaPorte 2004, 19). So, a skeptic motivated by something like LaPorte’s view
might claim that, in my example of the plesiosaurs, there is a natural kind at work underlying the
inference, perhaps something like ‘large marine organism.’ On LaPorte’s view, species of
dolphin, whale, and plesiosaur would each constitute natural kinds, and they would themselves
all be members of a more inclusive natural kind (e.g., ‘large marine tetrapod’), and so kindhood
is back in the game.
Aside from concerns I have that LaPorte’s view, like Millikan’s and Boyd’s, threatens to
blur, or does blur, the distinction between kinds and individuals,62 this objection changes the

Consider that there is the property of being Joseph LaPorte, so there is the corresponding ‘being Joseph LaPorte’
kind. And this kind might very well be natural, since it’s arguably explanatory. If Joseph has a quirk of personality,
some very idiosyncratic behavior upon encountering a particular situation, a new acquaintance might be met with a
62
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parameters of the discussion so far. What makes a kind natural for Boyd, Elder, Griffiths,
Millikan, Reydon, and Wilson, whose views I have been considering, is that there are some sorts
of causal forces (either natural or the outcomes of human activities and choices) which make it
the case that the members of the kind are all alike. What makes a kind natural is some
metaphysical fact, whereas for LaPorte it is an epistemological fact.63 For those reasons, the
philosophers whose views I have been considering are also more wedded to kinds of organisms
being co-extensive with taxa recognized by biology, and would be likely to reject something like
‘large marine organism’ as a natural kind. I have also already granted that, epistemologically,
species may seem like natural kinds. But I have argued that this is insufficient to establish their
metaphysical status. Again, as Hull put it, if the epistemological perspective requires that
species are classes of similar organisms, “then so much the worse for the epistemological
perspective” (Hull 1987, 176).
I have here provided only a few examples, or reconstructions, of inductive reasoning
either about some species or other, or in which species play some role, and all are drawn more or
less from paleontology. In all of these, natural kinds are at work, but none of them are species
kinds. Other sorts of kinds fill the gaps which an advocate of the kindhood thesis would be
liable to insist will be formed once species as kinds are removed as the grounds of, or as being
among the grounds of, inductive inferences involving species. It would surely not be a leap to
conclude that these sorts of reconstructions could be had in other biological domains than
paleontology, e.g. in the study of speciation (to use Boyd’s own example [Boyd 1999a]). Of
request for an explanation from Joseph’s friends about why Joseph acted just the way he did just then with, “that’s
just Joseph.” That is, that he is Joseph LaPorte explains why he did as he did.
63
This is not to say that LaPorte would regard ‘large marine organism’ as a biological taxon. For LaPorte, kinds can
be more or less natural, and biological taxa (i.e., those recognized by taxonomists) would be more natural than other
kinds (LaPorte 2004, 20-26), presumably due to the organisms in them being descended from the same common
ancestor, a causal process. But this fact just means that one can get more scientific explanations from them; their
greater naturalness is due to their greater explanatory usefulness, not per se to their unification by causal processes.
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course, this way of thinking about the situation distorts the actual picture. For if the individuality
thesis is true, then species were never involved in inductive reasoning as kinds in the first place,
and reconstructions of inductive reasoning which supposed they were kinds were in error. To the
extent that any inductive inferences involving or regarding species were grounded, they were
always grounded by other kinds, of the sorts which I have pointed to in the above
reconstructions. We also see now that my accounts, if correct and if species are individuals, are
not reconstructions in any pejorative or revisionist sense. They are the actual accounts, or are
something close to them, of the ways in which these long-standing sorts of inductive inferences
have been made by biologists all along.

5. Species Heterogeneity, and Induction Over the Parts of Individuals
The previous section was all by way of consolation. Allow me to now attempt to do a
little of the reverse: to unsettle a bit of the confidence in their own view which skeptics of my
view may have. In doing so, I shall also address one of Griffiths’ concerns: that the special
sciences which deal with species need to be able to come up with lawlike generalizations
regarding them.
Those who feel that something has been lost, or that species must be natural kinds
because of the frequent success which biologists have in projecting their properties from
observed to unobserved organisms, may be paying too much attention to the ways in which
species are uniform. And in fact, I stressed uniformity – or, more accurately, a degree of
uniformity – in my account of how inductive inferences over species are possible. But a degree
of uniformity is not the whole of the picture. Recall that one of the features of species which
generates the species “problem of induction” is species heterogeneity. As noted by Wilson, who
highlights heterogeneity in his own account of induction involving species, there is no finite set
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of phenotypic or morphological properties according to which species are “intraspecifically
homogenous” and “interspecifically heterogeneous.” Indeed, he writes (correctly), “The inherent
biological variability or heterogeneity of species with respect to both morphology and genetic
composition is, after all, a cornerstone of the idea of evolution by natural selection” (Wilson
1999, 190; emphasis in original). The recognition of inherent and ubiquitous variation within
species is one factor which led Boyd to propose species as an example of his HPC kinds, and
which prompted Wilson to adopt Boyd’s account.

We saw that Elder highlights the

heterogeneity problem when he observes that we do not, upon encountering railroad yards on the
outskirts of Chicago, conclude that the sprawling, massive object which is Chicago is covered
with railroad tracks. This is meant to undermine one’s conviction that species are individuals,
for if they are, in inferring what unobserved parts of a species are like, based upon ones we’ve
sampled, we’d be doing exactly what we don’t do when it comes to objects like Chicago.
I responded there that, with polytypic or highly polymorphic species, inferring that all the
organisms in a species are φ based upon the fact that a sample is φ can be very much like
inferring that all of Chicago is covered with railroad tracks. Allow me to draw a further
conclusion: this means that, in some cases, inductive inferences over species are not exactly like
inductive inferences over paradigm cases of natural kinds such as chemical elements, but more
like inductive inferences over the parts of objects.
Sometimes, it is possible to correctly infer what unobserved parts of an object will be like
based upon the observed parts. As Lange has argued, discovering that a pear on a pear tree is
ripe confirms – by raising our confidence in its truth – the hypothesis that all of the pears on the
tree are ripe (Lange 1999, 635).64 It confirms the counterfactual that, had there been a pear on

64

As a side note, notice that this would involve consulting objectively privileged segmentations of the parts of the
pear tree.
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the third branch of the tree, that pear would have been ripe. Lange is dealing specifically with
the importance of laws in science, and with the confirmation of lawlike and especially nonlawlike generalizations (a problem, or phenomenon, originally pointed out by Sober [Sober
1988]). But this is simply the flip side of the projection of properties or predicates in the sorts of
inductive inferences which we have been considering. For if one were to infer, based upon a
sampling of tigers, that all tigers are striped, finding another striped tiger would confirm this
hypothesis, just as encountering a black raven would confirm the hypothesis that all ravens are
black.
Naturally, the inference from one pear to another might not be the best of all possible
inductive inferences. Lange argues that this is because the “range” of the predictions which are
confirmed by an observation like finding a ripe pear is greatly restricted (Lange 1999, 635). Had
environmental conditions on a different branch of the tree been manipulated experimentally so as
to make the branch differ from the others, the observation would not confirm the hypothesis.
That is, the evidence confirms predictions the hypothesis makes about some counterfactual cases,
but not others. This feature distinguishes, for Lange, such generalizations from lawlike or lawful
ones; the non-lawlike generalizations cannot achieve the high standard of what Lange calls
“inductive” confirmation or projection. This occurs when each prediction of the generalization
(hypothesis) “regarding each circumstance p” – that is, some set of non-nomic claims in a
language for science – “in a certain broad range” is confirmed (Lange 1999, 636).

For

“inductive confirmation,” this range will be very broad: “as far out onto p’s as [the hypothesis]
can go” without creating logical inconsistency with other hypotheses in a particular set of
hypotheses in the scientific language. If I am reading the latter half of Lange’s paper correctly,
these are generalizations (hypotheses) where scientists are willing to risk claiming that, come
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what may, all As will be Bs – that there will be no analogs to the experimental manipulations on
the pear tree branches.
Lange does not address species and inductive inference, but his arguments are
nevertheless instructive. When it comes to species, scientists will not be willing to risk the claim
that, come what may, all organisms in species S will be φ. There is always a nonzero probability
that organisms in S will fail to be φ, for any property φ. This is just one of the lessons of
evolution. An advocate of the kindhood thesis might, of course, attempt to reply here that this
only shows that generalizations regarding species properties cannot be lawlike, or at least not
strongly so. But if it is true, as I suggested in Chapter 2, that the ability to sustain counterfactuals
is a sufficient condition of lawlikeness, and that this ability simply means, as Griffiths says,
conferring a greater chance of being correct than some suitable null hypothesis (say, being right
only 50 percent of the time, no better than sheer guessing), then this objection is mistaken. But if
my suggestion about sustaining counterfactuals is not true, then such an objection cannot work in
favor of the kindhood thesis. Surely one of the features of natural kinds which makes them
suitable targets of induction is that generalizations about them are lawlike – or, indeed, lawful. If
generalizations about species cannot be lawlike, then species cannot be natural kinds. Moreover,
if Lange’s example of the pear tree is apt, then there is at least an analogy, from the standpoint of
inductive inference, between a paradigm object like a pear tree, and biological species.
Permit me now to point out some of the ways in which species can be quite
heterogeneous. The Southeast Asian swallowtail butterfly, Papilio memnon, has 26 known
female morphs, many of them Batesian mimics, i.e., they are non-poisonous mimics of the
poisonous butterflies of other species, and each morph seems to mimic a distinct species. They
vary greatly in wing pattern and size; the hindwings vary in shape and can be yellow, orange, or
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red; some have a red “shoulder” spot (where the forewing attaches to the abdomen), some have a
white spot, and others have none; some have tails, others don’t; and the abdomens vary in size,
shape, and color. Poison ivy, Toxicodendron radicans, exists in six subspecies across its range
from Mexico to Canada, as either a shrub, a trailing vine, or a climbing vine. In all cases, its
leaves come in triples (which is one of the characteristic ways hikers and other outdoor
enthusiasts identify it), but the size of the leaves differs, some subspecies having narrower
almond-shaped leaves than others, and some having leaves with serrated edges, while the leaves
of other forms lack serrated edges.
Sexual dimorphism is common in sexually reproducing species, as in familiar cases such
as the differences between males and females in Homo sapiens, or between the males and
females in bird species like the two peacock species, Pavo cristatus and Pavo muticus. But
sometimes such dimorphism is extreme, as in anglerfish, the deep sea bottom dweller famous for
the dorsal spine protruding from the head of the female (which acts as a lure to the anglerfish’s
prey). Male anglerfish are significantly smaller than the female, only a fraction of the body
length of the female. Male anglerfish are not much more than parasites, attaching themselves by
the mouth onto the body of a female. The skin and bloodstream of the male become integrated
with those of the female, and over time the male loses all of its internal organs, except for the
testes. This extreme dimorphism at one time caused the female and the male to be classified as
separate species.
Castes in some insect species render such species strikingly heterogeneous. Termite
species tend to come in three castes: workers, soldiers, and reproductives, each of which has a
characteristic form which distinguishes it from other castes, and which distinguish them from the
termite king and queen.

In the species Reticulitermes virginicus, the brown or black
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reproductives are the only winged caste; workers are whitish, with more pronounced mandibles,
while soldiers resemble most closely the workers, although they are larger, brownish, with larger
heads and more strongly developed jaws, which they use to defend the colony. The queen,
meanwhile, is characterized by an enormous, bulbous abdomen.

Inferences regarding the

unobserved members of Reticulitermes virginicus, were they based upon a sampling only of, say,
the worker caste of the species, would go seriously awry in their expectations of what other
members of the species are like. Perhaps just such a faulty inference, an expectation that the
males of anglerfish species would strongly resemble the females, initially led biologists to regard
the males not as conspecifics, but as just mere parasites attached to the female’s body.
There are any number of objections which could be raised against the foregoing. Let me
attempt to address four which I can think of. The first is that Lange’s pear tree example succeeds
– one can infer that the next pear on the tree will be ripe – only insofar as ‘pear tree’ is a natural
kind. This is, of course, Sankey’s objection once again. As Millikan has independently noticed
(Millikan 2000), it is often possible to successfully predict the future properties of a person based
upon their past behavior. Human beings, just like natural kinds, often seem to have their own
characters, or “natures.” One may finally fail, of course, if someone alters their behavior or
some other trait of personality, or it is altered in some other way (through some trauma or other
experience). If species are individuals, predicting what they will be like in the future based upon
how they are now is much like predicting how one’s friend will behave based upon how she has
behaved in the past.65

Yet if natural kinds must ground inductive inferences, then such

inferences are good only to the extent that the individual involved is a member of a natural kind.

I will have more to say about this sort of inference about species in the next section – predicting future
characteristics based upon present or past characteristics, as opposed to inferring in or for the present the
characteristics of unobserved organisms based upon the characteristics of observed organisms.
65

175

The advocate of the kindhood thesis will be tempted to claim that the relevant kind is the
person’s species, Homo sapiens. But as I argued above, it is not clear that the kindhood thesis
can score such a quick victory here. Many more organisms than those in Homo sapiens exhibit
characters, so the relevant natural kind here could be ‘organism.’ One can predict the future
properties of particular species because each one is an instance of the natural kind, ‘species.’
And there are a number of natural kinds of processes or forces which combine to make it the case
that one can make inferences over the parts of a species, or about its future properties. We
already considered Millikan’s claim (Millikan 2000) that individual humans, no less than
species, exhibit or are subject to a causally induced homeostasis which permits prediction of
their future characteristics. Just as being subject to the sorts of processes and forces I referred to
in Section 3 is a property of the kind, ‘species,’ exhibiting or being subject to this homeostasis is
a property of the kind, ‘organism,’
So it’s not clear that the natural kind grounding Lange’s example must be a species kind,
and no less due to the fact that there are several species of pear tree. Indeed, it would seem that
the candidate the advocate of the kindhood thesis would have in mind as a kind would be the
pear-tree genus Pyrus. But it’s not even clear that the inference-grounding natural kind would
have to be that genus, since there are far more types of fruit-bearing trees upon which fruits
characteristically ripen at approximately the same time. Indeed, to accommodate many of the
fruit-bearing plants and trees, one would have to ascend to the family Rosaceae, which includes
not only fruit-bearing plants, but thousands of species of flowering plants. This is not the only
family of flowering plants and fruit-bearing trees. There is the Moraceae, which includes figs,
and the Rhamnaceae, which includes the Chinese jujube; and all three are in the order Rosales.
It is not clear whether we ought to stop here, and not ascend again to the superorder Rosanae,
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which contains nut-bearing trees. Perhaps we simply would not be willing to accept that nuts
and fruits are the same kinds of things, even though, biologically speaking, nuts are fruits, and
there is the commonality that they have characteristic times and schedules of appearance and
ripening: if the walnuts on this branch of the walnut tree are ripe, then it is a good inference that
they all are. But, of course, the superorder Rosanae contains much more than the fruit- and nutbearing trees.66
We face the same problem here as we did in attempting to account for the inference that
plesiosaurs had dark dorsal coloration and light ventral coloration: there is no plausible natural
kind which contains all and only the organisms involved in the inference whose ground we’re
wondering about. Perhaps there is the LaPortean ‘fruit-bearing tree’ natural kind, although this
looks suspiciously like a kind in which we have decided to lump certain species together, rather
than a natural kind in the much more realist sense we’ve been dealing with.
But we need not go through the arduous process of trying to determine which of these is
the kind which is grounding the inference from one ripe pear to another, because none of these
taxonomic groups need to be kinds in order for the inference to be grounded. The inference is
grounded for the same reason that all good inferences over the parts of species are grounded:
there are natural kinds of processes, forces, or factors which promote a degree of uniformity
among the parts; their descent from a common ancestor grounds the inference. The pears are
66

Dupré diagnoses, indepdently, the same disconnect between the (putative) natural kind terms of ordinary language
and the taxa recognized in scientific classification. Among other examples, he notes that the only taxonomic group
which could correspond to the ordinary language term ‘lily’ would be the family Liliaceae. But that family also
includes much else, including onions and garlics. All moths appear to be in the order Lepidoptera, but so are
butterflies and skippers, and there is no recognized taxon with includes butterflies and skippers but not moths
(Dupré 1993, 28). Biologically speaking, a group like “moth” is, Dupré says, “quite meaningless” (Dupré 1993, 29).
Superficially, he appears to agree with Hull, who comments that while the division between kinds like ‘tree,’ ‘bush,’
and ‘herb’ seems natural, “it plays no role whatsoever in botany” (Hull 1987, 169). But Dupré is speaking
descriptively, while Hull is speaking normatively. Dupré might well countenance a classification scheme wherein
‘tree’ is a natural kind; Hull would not. This has to do with Dupré’s aim, which is not mine. He intends to point out
flaws in Putnam’s (1975) theory of meaning, which is supposed to provide a way of precisely assimilating or linking
ordinary languge natural kind terms to scientific classifications. This is meant as a motivation of Dupré’s own
“promiscuous realism.”
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parts of an individual (the tree) which is a part of an individual (the species of pear tree) which is
itself an instance of a natural kind, one of whose properties is being subject to these sorts of
uniformity-promoting natural kinds of processes. Assuming all the trees in whichever pear
species we are considering are descended from a common ancestor in which fruits ripened at the
same time of year, or due to exposure to the same environmental stimuli, the pear trees are all
likely to have their fruits ripen at roughly the same time.67 Surely one reason one can make this
inference is that one has observed this phenomenon of simultaneous ripening in the past, either in
trees of this very species of pear tree, or in other species of fruit-bearing trees. And whether one
is aware of the fact or not, all the fruit-bearing trees in various species are related by common
descent, and thus we have reasons to expect similar behavior among them.
My response to this objection about Lange’s pear tree example might, of course, generate
yet a further objection from an advocate of the kindhood thesis, which perhaps could be raised in
general against my account of inductions involving or regarding species. It is the objection we
saw in a footnote in Section 4, and which I deferred: common ancestry, or the action of common
processes or forces, is what explains why these kinds are similar – why the species-kind which is
one species of pear tree has properties like those of another species-kind which is some other
species of pear tree. My reply here is that this objection is simply the re-assertion that species
are natural kinds. For I am claiming that common ancestry is what makes one species-individual
resemble in certain respects some other species-individual – just as common ancestry is what
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This is, of course, barring such phenomena such the evolution, or selective breeding, of geographical varieties
which come to ripen together, but at different times from other trees in the species; or the mere adaptability
(phenotypic plasticity) of the species, such that trees in some different environment responding to different
environmental cues come to ripen at a different time from their conspecifics elsewhere. But then we would again be
dealing with the result of natural kinds of forces, this time working on a subsection of the original individual, and
the parts would all still be related to one another. Roughly simultaneous ripening within a local variety would not be
inexplicable, and would not serve as a counterexample to my general claim about the action of common kinds of
processes grounding the inferences. Even an advocate of the kindhood thesis must account for these sorts of
exceptions, and in more or less the same way.
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makes me resemble my brother, and more so than my cousins. So the success of this more
general objection rides on whether there are more independent reasons to think that species are
natural kinds than there are to think they are individuals. And that, I have argued elsewhere, is
not the case. Of course, the advocate of the kindhood thesis may regard biologists’ ability to
make successful inductive inferences about species as just one of those reasons. But that is the
very issue we are currently considering.
A second objection (the first was the objection that Lange’s pear tree example works only
if pear trees are a natural kind) to my claim that the variation and heterogeneity exhibited in
species suggests they are individuals may be that some natural kinds exhibit variation of some
sort. Chemical elements are paradigm natural kinds, yet many have isotopes, which an advocate
of the kindhood thesis might regard as analogs to morphs within a species, or subspecies, or
simply variation within a species. All uranium isotopes have atomic number 92: they have 92
electrons, and 92 protons. They differ in number of neutrons, from 141 to 146. Ellis, who
regards biological species as clusters of natural kinds, considers uranium to be a natural kind,
defined by the essential possession of atomic number 92. He regards isotopes of uranium, such
as U235 and U238, to be species (in the Aristotelian sense) of this kind, and natural kinds in their
own right, defined by the essential property of specific atomic weight (Ellis 2001). On such a
view, morphs might simply be kinds within a higher kind, the biological species itself. So, the
advocate of the kindhood thesis might suggest, variation does not weigh in favor of biological
species being individuals rather than natural kinds.
But either there’s no analog to atomic number when it comes to species, or any putative
analog would be either strained, or a form of species essentialism. Consider Papilio memnon
again. There simply is no single, unequivocally intrinsic property, analogous to atomic number
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92, which all and only the organisms in Papilio memnon share, and which would allow us to
plausibly say that all the other features – and in particular, the mimetic features – are analogous
to variation in number of neutrons in uranium. By analogous here, I mean having the same
theoretical importance as atomic number. Having atomic number 92 is not merely a property
which all and only atoms of uranium possess; it does not merely set membership conditions.
Like all essential properties, it is also explanatory, of central importance in understanding
uranium’s other properties. Those other properties derive causally (and lawfully) from its atomic
number. As we’ve seen, there is no reason to think that there is any such analogous genotypic or
phenotypic property in any species.
Of course, there is a single property which all organisms belonging to Papilio memnon
share: they are all descended from the same common ancestor. And this property meets a
condition which is itself usually cited by advocates of the individuality thesis as a disanalogy
between species and paradigm natural kinds when they argue against the kindhood thesis: it is
never lost, just as the defining properties of natural kinds are never lost. So the question might
be, why can’t that property – descent from the same common ancestor – be the analog to atomic
number? Here’s why I don’t think such an analogy will hold. Suppose ‘being descended from
the common ancestor of Papilio memnon’ is an intrinsic property of every organism in Papilio
memnon (consider: my being the son of my actual father is a relational property, but it is one I
will never cease to have; unlike, say, being a brother or a husband). Possession of that property
probabilifies the possession of other intrinsic properties by organisms in that species, and helps
to explain why the organisms have in common whatever properties they contingently have in
common. It does not, however, lawfully cause or guarantee that those organisms will possess
just those properties, as having atomic number 92 does with instances of uranium.
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The third possible objection: Elder has objected (personal communication) to the line of
thinking I am defending (that the heterogeneity of species makes them more like individuals than
natural kinds, and makes inductions over species in some cases more like inductions over the
parts of objects) that inductive inference was required to establish that all the morphs exhibited
by, say, Papilio memnon belong to the same species. Actually, some mixture of inductive and
deductive reasoning would almost surely have been required. Anderson and Levine’s classic
discovery that what had been regarded as three separate species of Solanum were actually the
males and females of a single Central American tomato species, Solanum appendiculatum (thus
establishing the first case in that genus of dioecy, the having in plants of male and female
reproductive parts in separate individuals), makes an inductive case for their conclusion – they
cite multiple lines of evidence in its favor and against the rival view that there were indeed three
separate species (Anderson and Levine 1982). However, they give a deductive argument for
each of those lines of evidence, from premises that would have had to have been established
inductively.68 Regardless: such an objection doesn’t carry much force. It would also require
inductive reasoning to determine (borrowing an example from [Elder 1998]) that some particular
piece of petrified wood dredged from the sea floor was part of a petrified table recovered from
the wreckage of an ancient, sunken ship.
The fourth possible objection: an advocate of the kindhood thesis might maintain that my
point about polymorphic or polytypic species only shows that one has to be careful to use the
right sample. True enough – just as one must pick the right sample if one is going to infer from
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They note, for example, that, due to the types of pollens they produce, none of the three alleged species, Solanum
connatum, Solanum inscendens, and Solanum appendiculatum (due to the conventions regarding the naming of
species, the “surviving” species acquired the name, ‘Solanum appendiculatum’) could be reproductively
independent, which they would have to be were they distinct species (Anderson and Levine 1982, 669). The
premises involved, as to whether particular types of pollen could be involved in self-fertilization, would have had to
have been established inductively – or themselves through a mix of inductive and deductive reasoning.
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what this pear is like to what the other pears are like, or from what this window of the building is
like to what they are all like. One would probably be hard-pressed to make a good inference in
such cases by sampling the leaves on the tree, or the bricks in the facade (unless there were, say,
a strong correlation, due to some causal processes, between the leaves on this species of pear tree
being φ and the pears being ripe). I am not trying to claim that it’s always a good idea to infer
the character of unobserved parts of objects by sampling some of the parts; this is consistent with
Lange’s point about “inductive confirmation.” Sometimes, however, it is possible to do so. It’s
possible when there is some reason to expect such similarity among the parts – such as there
being causal forces or processes at work which promote a degree of uniformity. It’s possible
when we’re dealing with an object where there is reason to think that whatever made it (e.g.,
natural selection; human architects) would make certain parts qualitatively the same. This is just
what goes on with inductive inferences over entities which genuinely are natural kinds – there is
reason to expect that the unobserved members will be like the observed ones.
I have attempted to show four things in this section. First, that particular species need not
be natural kinds in order for inductive inferences beyond generalizations over the properties of
species to succeed (beyond, that is, inferences to “All Fs are G” from a sampling of Fs). Other
natural kinds ground such inferences. Second, that there are many cases in which species are
heterogeneous, just like the sorts of objects held in mind by those whose skepticism of the
individuality thesis is due to the successful inductive practices of biologists. Third, that in some
ways, at least in certain cases, inductive inferences over species are like inductive inferences
regarding paradigm individuals.

Fourth, that some generalizations regarding the parts of

individuals can be lawlike.
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6. Essential Properties, Species, and Induction
It is time to discuss in depth an issue which I alluded to briefly, but did not explore, in the
previous chapter on species essentialism. As we saw in the first section of this chapter, a number
of the philosophers – Elder, Ellis, Kornblith, and Sankey among them – claim not merely that
good inductive inferences depend upon the existence of natural kinds, but that such inferences
rely upon natural kinds having de re essential properties.

My position is that species are

individuals, not natural kinds, and that they have no essential intrinsic properties. These twin
positions are among the causes of the species “problem of induction.” Since it is exactly a
species’ intrinsic properties (or, more precisely, the intrinsic properties of the organism-parts)
which are projected in inductive inferences over that species (and which are involved in many
other sorts of inductive inferences involving species), this means not only that inductive
inferences over or involving species are not inferences over or involving natural kinds, but that
they also are not inductive inferences which involve essential properties.
In considering an objection to the thesis that inductive inferences require grounding by
natural kinds, Sankey (Sankey 1997) briefly entertains the possibility that some inductive
inferences might concern the accidental properties of kinds. He counters that where inductive
inferences are good, they project essential properties, whereas bad inductive inferences project
accidental properties. Inductive inferences ranging over accidental properties are those which
tend to fail. Elder puts forth a similar claim (Elder 1994a, 1996). Were members of a kind to
have only just so happened to have possessed the properties projected in inductive inferences
about the kind, such as predictions, then predictions about that kind are unwarranted. Only if the
members of a kind have been “bound to display each of the listed properties” – i.e., only if the
projected properties are properties essential to the kind – are we licensed “to regard the
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undertaking of our science as legitimate” (Elder 1994a, 255).69 Indeed, if a science produces
characterizations of the various kinds which fall under that science’s taxonomy, but those
characterizations do not capture the kind’s essential nature, then the science can say nothing
“informative and accurate” about those kinds (Elder 1996, 198). Ellis argues along the same
lines: to understand our world is to understand what objects are in it, the properties they have,
and the ways in which they may or may not interact. But this is to understand the kinds of which
these objects are instances, and this in turn is to understand the essential natures of these objects
and kinds. This permits us to say how they could or could not interact in any world like ours
(Ellis 2001, 22).
If these philosophers are correct, does this mean that all inductive inferences over or
involving biological species are bad and tend to fail, or that they are unwarranted and render vast
regions of biology illegitimate?

Do biologists not truly understand the species they discover,

since those species lack essential natures? That would be an unacceptable state of affairs, not to
mention contrary to experience, since many inductive inferences over and regarding species
succeed, and we would probably like to say that biologists do understand many species.
Moreover, if philosophers such as Sankey, Elder, and Ellis are correct, the fact that many
inductive inferences about species are good would show not only that species have essential
properties, but provide the essentialist with a principled way of identifying them: they are the
ones projected in reliable inductions.70 The problems of induction and species anti-essentialism

We encountered Elder’s sense of “bound to be” in Chapter 2. For Elder, a kind is “bound” to be a particular way,
to exhibit a particular set of properties, due to causal laws of nature; and to be “bound” to be a particular way is to be
that way not just in one world, but in all worlds in which the kind exists. Elder is a necessitarian regarding laws of
nature – there is an intimate connection between laws and kinds, such that any world exhibiting the same kinds as
this world will have the same laws. In that sense, the laws of nature of this world are metaphysically necessary, and
the members of kinds behave regulated not by nomological necessity, but metaphysical necessity (Elder 1994b).
70
This would, of course, be similar to Devitt’s method: the essential properties are not those which feature in
structural generalizations (and so not those phenotypic properties projected in induction), but the genetic properties
which cause those properties.
69

184

are therefore connected, and anyone dealing with one must contend with the other, including
philosophers such as Boyd, Griffiths, Millikan, Reydon, and Wilson, who wish to
reconceptualize species as natural kinds.
I have already had much to say about species essentialism and will not rehearse those
thoughts here. But it’s not necessary to defend species anti-essentialism here all over again. To
evaluate this threat that Sankey, Elder, and Ellis pose to both the individuality thesis and to antiessentialism, we need to consider why we care about our inductive practices regarding various
kinds. Whether the kinds or entities over which induction ranges need be characterized by
essential properties for inductive inferences to be good or bad must be to some extent relative to
the needs and interests of those making the inferences, or the domain of inquiry in which the
inferences are employed (although relativity to domains of inquiry just might collapse into
relativity to needs and interests). One reason we might think it’s important that kinds such as the
fundamental particles of nature, and chemical elements, have essential properties is because we
expect (or, perhaps more importantly, we desire that) the inductive inferences we make over such
kinds hold everywhere in the universe, and for all time. Suppose the properties of kinds such as
fundamental particles and chemical elements could change – that, borrowing Elder’s phrasing,
they have only “just happened uniformly to have each of the features incorporated in our
science’s characterization of that kind” (Elder 1994a, 255). Astronomers and cosmologists
would indeed lose their warrant for concluding that stars have the evolutions which they do, or
that galaxies behave in particular ways, or that causal processes going on in distant regions of the
universe, or in the distant past, work just as they do in the present in our corner of the cosmos,
and will hold in the distant future. Much – perhaps most – of physics, astronomy, cosmology,
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perhaps geology (and other sciences) would become impossible. All of these sorts of long-range
conclusions about distant times and places would be suspect.
The same would be true to a certain extent in evolutionary biology. Here, too, it’s
important that certain kinds of things maintain their properties over vast stretches of time – on
the order of hundreds of millions, or billions of years – and across great geographical distances.
For many of the inferences which biologists make in this field, if certain kinds of things do not
have their properties as essentially as do chemical elements and subatomic particles – or very
nearly so – biologists could not justifiably conclude that evolution works in particular ways.
They could not make warranted conclusions about much of the natural history of life on Earth.
But while ‘species’ as a natural kind might be among those kinds of things, such kinds need not
include particular species.

Rather, they are kinds of things such as DNA, RNA, genes,

chromosomes, biochemical pathways, or kinds of processes such as meiosis, reproduction,
mutation, natural selection, genetic drift, predator-prey interactions, adaptive radiations, or kinds
such as ecosystems and niches, and the kinds of species (e.g., sexually reproducing) and kinds of
populations (e.g., peripheral isolates) which inhabit them. The ability to make reliable inferences
about evolutionary processes and patterns depends upon these sorts of kinds having either
essential properties, or properties which are very nearly so (this is because certain kinds of
biochemical processes, no less than species, exhibit variation. The blood clotting process is
different in lampreys than it is in human beings). It might be crucial to explaining, for example,
a mass extinction such as occurred at the end of the Permian and Cretaceous periods, how kinds
of ecosystems behave, how kinds of species affect ecosystems, and how their behaviors affect
one another. And, of course, it might be crucial to know at least some of the properties of the
particular species thought to be involved.

186

Consider, as an example, the famous “overkill” hypothesis for the extinction of the large
Pleistocene mammal species that used to inhabit North America, such as the mammoth and
ground sloth. The claim, promoted primarily by Paul Martin, is that such species were hunted to
extinction approximately 11,000 years ago by Homo sapiens. Although the paleontological and
archaeological consensus is that this hypothesis is false (Grayson and Meltzer 2003), it could not
possibly be true if the Clovis people who inhabited North America at the time were not predators
– and, by extension, that Homo sapiens was then, as it is now, a predator species, subsisting to
some extent upon hunting. These properties, however, need not be essential. Indeed, probably
no paleontologist reasons explicitly as follows: “Being a predator is an essential property of
Homo sapiens. Therefore, humans 11,000 years ago were predators. Therefore, given that the
extinction of the giant mammal species coincides approximately with the arrival of Homo
sapiens in North America, it is reasonable to think that hunting by Homo sapiens drove these
species to extinction.” Martin’s own reasoning also takes into consideration documented cases
of extinctions that followed the invasion of islands by humans, the discovery of a few kill sites
with the remains of large Pleistocene mammals, and so forth. 71 But the overkill hypothesis does
rely upon “being a predator” being a stable trait of Homo sapiens, stability in this case involving
a span of a couple tens of thousands of years (a blink of an eye in evolutionary time). If this is
false, then Homo sapiens cannot possibly be implicated in the extinction of the Pleistocene
mammals.
This provides us with a general way of responding to Sankey, Elder, and Ellis. For the
purposes of biology, properties projected in inferences about species need not be essential

71

According to Grayson and Meltzer (2003), Martin also fails to consider other important factors, such as the
dynamics required for island extinctions versus continent-wide extinctions, and the fact that the Pleistocene
extinction began thousands of years before the arrival of the Clovis people, factors which doom the “overkill”
hypothesis in the minds of most paleontologists who study Pleistocene North America.
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properties. They need merely be properties which biologists would have reason to believe are
very stable. How stable? Stable over the timespans or the geographical distances over which
biologists are projecting those particular properties. As we saw with Hunt’s meta-analysis (Hunt
2007), different types of traits are subjects to different degrees of variation over geological time
scales. Suppose biologists concluded something about what organisms in a number of species
were like at the end of these species’ existence at the end of the Permian, and therefore how
those species might have reacted or contributed to the factors which caused the mass extinction
at that time, basing their conclusions on (at least in part) samples of organisms from much earlier
in those species’ lifetimes, on the order of hundreds of thousands, or millions of years. For these
biologists to have a very good chance of being right, the properties being projected need to be
stable over the time span between the time the sampled organisms existed, and the time of the
mass extinction.
The real gist of Elder’s and Sankey’s claims is that our projections of sets of properties in
inductive inferences is unwarranted if the correlation among the properties is merely a
coincidence. If we have no reason to expect the correlation to continue, then we lose warrant for
the inference. But there are causal forces or processes at work which do promote stability in
species, over geographic distances and sometimes over great expanses of time, at least for
particular traits or kinds of traits. Being shaped by, or being subject to, such uniformity- or
stability-promoting processes or forces just is – at least here on Earth – one of the properties of
the natural kind, ‘species.’ Indeed, the “stasis” which many species exhibit – their lack of
pronounced change, at least morphologically, over the span of their existence, which can be
millions of years – was one of the phenomena which Eldredge and Gould were trying to account
for in their theory of punctuated equilibria (Eldredge and Gould 1972).
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In terms of the

distinction between accidental and essential properties, all species properties are accidental. But
it is not a coincidence that the same roughly characterized properties turn up repeatedly among
organisms that belong to species; their correlation within the species is not a coincidence.
Biologists’ inferences will be as good as the traits (properties) they project can be counted upon
to remain over the timespan or geographic distance which the biologists making the projection
are interested in at that time, for that particular investigation.
Biologists will have at least some idea of which of those properties are more likely to
sustain extremely long-lived inferences, or inferences which are good across space, than others.
As I noted in Chapter 2, nearly all tigers are striped (some white tigers are stripeless, or virtually
stripeless), and all tigers are carnivores. And, as I noted, tigers are much more likely to remain
carnivores over the lifetime of their species than they are to remain striped, since switching tigers
from carnivory to herbivory, or omnivory, would probably require a much more extensive
reorganization of tiger physiology, and thus of the tiger genome – changes which would require a
much longer series of steps, and therefore be much more likely to be weeded out by selection in
their early stages – than would a switch from near-universal stripedness to near-universal nonstripedness. In terms which we came across in Section 3, carnivory might be more “generatively
entrenched.”72 Biologists will be able to infer that all the sparrows within a particular district
will be of a certain mean size – but outside that district, if the climate is colder, this may not
hold, since body size tends to vary inversely with ambient temperature in many species of birds
and mammals (Bergmann’s rule).

72

For those skeptical of my claim that evolution from carnivory to omnivory or herbivory in tigers is a possibility:
the dinosaur species Falcarius utahensis, discovered in Utah in 2001, is hypothesized as one of the earliest members
of the therizinosaur dinosaurs, which were herbivores. Falcarius is a transitional form between fully carnivorous
ancestors and fully herbivorous descendants, possessing characteristics of both. Its teeth, for example, appear
transitional between those adapted for a predatory diet and an herbivorous diet (see Kirkland et al 2005; Zanno
2010). Herbivory could not have sprung forth from obligate carnivory overnight. At least one species or other has
to have undergone the transition, and Falcarius appears to be one of the ones which did.
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This means only that certain inferences in biology will be more fallible than others, with
some of them – the ones projecting species properties over great expanses of time – being more
fallible or deserving to be treated with caution than the inferences made by physicists or
astronomers. Suppose we had reason to think that the properties of electrons were not essential,
that, like the traits of biological species, they could evolve, so that the voltage of electrons
changed over time, as did their mass and spin. Suppose the changes occurred over an enormous
span of time, on the order of billions of years, such that a certain percentage in a given region of
the universe could be expected to change over a specifiable period, a sort of cosmic electron
half-life. We could treat those properties, in the here and now, for all the world as if they were
essential properties. Our inductive inferences ranging over electrons would be perfectly reliable
for many of our present purposes. We could still build and use digital computers and electron
microscopes.

Suppose also that Ellis is correct (Ellis 2001), and the laws of nature are

determined by the essential causal properties of kinds, such as the universe’s most fundamental
particles. We would have to accept that the laws of nature in the distant future will be different,
that the laws were quite different in the past, and that laws in distant regions of the universe may
also be different (perhaps they are unobservable to us, since the laws of our region do not hold
there). If for some reason we could not be sure how the laws would be transformed, and what
they would be in the distant future, it might be impossible for us to reach warranted conclusions
about what even our own corner of the universe would be like billions of years hence. Some of
our sciences, or at least some portions of them, would become impossible, or we would at least
not be able to extend them into all of the circumstances we might have wanted to. Yet some of
our inductive practices would remain untouched. The point of these considerations in general is,
whether inductive inferences involving a kind must project essential properties in order to be
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good inferences can depend upon how reliable, in terms of universality and long-lastingness, one
needs such inferences to be.
If the properties of some of the biological kinds which I ran through above turn out to be
subject to change, then biologists are in the same position epistemically as in the “evolving
electron” universe. Their inferences don’t hold for all of time and space. With species, a degree
of caution and humility is called for regarding biologists’ conclusions about, at least, certain
subsets of the properties of a species over long expanses of time. Biologists’ conclusions about
events such as the Permian extinction will be subject to revision – more subject than their
conclusions about the likely effects of, say, climate change over the next century on present-day
species. This is surely not something biologists themselves don’t already know, and it does not
mean the illegitimacy of fields such as paleontology. A great deal of astronomy, chemistry, and
physics would become impossible, or unreliable, if electrons were like biological species, and
could change or vary in their properties on the same time scales. Anthropology and archaeology
will not come to a crashing halt if it’s possible for humans to cease being predators, nor will the
already exception-ridden world of zoology become impossible if there’s a possibility of tigers
becoming herbivores.
Nor, to address Ellis’ contention, does it seem to me that we do not understand the world,
or that we understand it less, if species lack real essences (or if they are lacked by the “subspecies” which are the natural kinds that make up the natural kind clusters which Ellis claims
species are). Biologists can confidently say how organisms within a species will interact with
conspecifics, or with organisms belonging to other species – or, more precisely, how they are
likely to react. They must merely qualify such claims with the proviso that these claims,
particularly if they are predictions about the distant future, assume that organisms and the

191

environments they inhabit (which include organisms belonging to other species) remain across
the relevant reaches of geography and time as they are now. Again, this will not be news to
biologists. Indeed, that biologists must qualify such claims seems to show all the more that we
do understand the world. Those who thought species don’t evolve did not understand the world
as well as we do. We understand the world more thoroughly when we understand that there is a
nonzero probability of tigers becoming vegetarians. Knowing how organisms belonging to a
particular species are likely to interact, either with each other or with other elements of their
environment, but also knowing that this could change, reflects better understanding of the world
than the thought that such reactions are essential or eternal.
It remains now in this section to finally take up Reydon’s criticism of Griffith’s account:
that instances of development-induced phylogenetic inertia (DPI) will license inductive
inferences over a broad range of taxa, while instances of selection-induced phylogenetic inertia
(SPI) won’t be good over the lifetime of a species. My response to the latter concern should be
fairly evident. It is a genuine concern only insofar as one assumes that all inductive inferences
regarding species properties must be good over the lifetime of the species. Biologists expect
species to evolve, so the fact that inductive inferences grounded by SPI may fail sometime during the
species lifetime is merely a caveat of which biologists are surely aware already. Suppose properties
projected in inductive inferences regarding a particular species were maintained by stabilizing
selection. The properties will continue to be projectable as long as the species remains under the
same stabilizing selection regime. If biologists working with this species have good reasons to think

that the species will remain under the selection regime, then their inferences remain warranted.
They remain warranted for just as long as the biologists have reason to think the selection regime
will remain in effect. This can hardly be news.
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Reydon is also correct that DPI will license inferences over broad ranges of taxa.
Suppose the pentadactyl limb is an instance of DPI, as Reydon himself supposes. Based upon
the presence of the pentadactyl limb in Homo sapiens, under the sort of account Griffiths and I
are recommending, biologists can infer that the same property will be found in the fossilized
remains of human ancestors, in living primates, and so on. But this seems to me to be a problem
only insofar as one thinks that biologists would be committed to expecting to find the same finegrained pattern of the pentadactyl limb (or whichever DPI-produced property is at issue) in all
related taxa. Surely biologists’ knowledge of the workings of evolution – that evolution shapes
traits inherited from an ancestor to better fit new environments – spares them from this
commitment; and given this knowledge, biologists are surely not so naive as to expect to find the
same fine-grained patterns. They can and will expect variations, and reasonably so, especially
with regard to adaptations to particular modes of life.
Again, my claim (and Griffith’s) is that, due to the various sorts of causal forces to which
species are subject, the more closely related two organisms are, the more we can expect them to
exhibit similarities. Conversely, the more distantly related they are, then the greater the chance
of variation, and the greater the expected variation, especially if the two organisms occupy much
different niches. The pentadactyl limb is such a good example because, while the basic pattern is
the same across a diverse range of taxa, it has been modified, presumably by selection, for
application to a diverse array of environments and lifestyles. Notice that this proviso regarding
inferences which project DPI-produced traits means that if biologists discover that some feature
or trait is very highly conserved – if it does not exhibit much variation at all at a fine level of
detail across broad ranges of taxa – that this extreme conservation will stand in need of
explanation. But this is exactly what those biologists who propose developmental constraints as
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explanations for such phenomena already emphasize and accept. That is the puzzle they find so
compelling.
Let me comment briefly on Reydon’s overall proposal, as it touches on the issues in this
section. He proposes to define species as a unit (a natural kind) over which properties can be
projected – about which generalizations can be made – throughout the entire geographic and
temporal extent of the unit, and where such generalizations or projections are good across only
the members of that unit (although he grants that, variation being ubiquitous, there will be
exceptions [Reydon 2006, 249]). This, he argues, requires that species be “tree-segments”
defined not merely by common ancestry but by the possession of an apomorphy (i.e.,. a derived
character) throughout their existence (Reydon 2006, 251).73 The presence of DPI and SPI, plus
presence of the apomorphy, will ground the required generalizations about this unit. This is
problematic, for two reasons I can think of. First, unless there is some guarantee that all the
other properties about which biologists might want to make generalizations will be correlated
with the presence of the species-defining apomorphy throughout the species’ existence, we are
faced all over again with the original problem of SPI-produced properties which introduction of
the apomorphy is meant to resolve. Generalizations about properties other than the speciesdefining apomorphy will not be guaranteed to hold throughout the species lifetime, nor can they
be guaranteed to hold only among members of the unit. For them to be so guaranteed would be
tantamount to their being, in Elder’s terms, some way in which each species is bound to be. That
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It might seem that Reydon is adopting here the cladistic species concept of Nelson and Platnick, whereby species
are the smallest diagnosable unit of organisms marked by the possession of a unique set of properties (i.e., at least
one apomorphy)(Nelson and Platnick 1981). But he is actually advocating for the Composite Species Concept of
Kornet and McAllister, whereby species are not “internodons” – lineages between two splitting events – but clusters
of internodons, marked at their starting point by an originator formed in the permanent split of a lineage and in
which an apomorphy emerges, and by extinction at the other end. Thus, contrary to the (hard-core) cladistic view, a
species may survive through many splitting events. The species cluster includes all the originator’s descendant
internodons, except for those in which a novel character state also evolves (Reydon 2006, 236; Kornet and
McAllister 2005).
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this would be so should alert the reader to the second problem: Reydon’s proposed solution to
the “species problem of induction” is a version of species essentialism.
Reydon’s own position is that exceptions to generalizations based on SPI are not the
problem. The problem is the “small ranges of applicability of SPI-supported generalizations”
(Reydon 2006, 249). He has thus anticipated my reply to his concern about SPI. But if this is a
serious problem, one which awareness of the potential fallibility of the generalizations at issue
cannot address, it remains just as serious for Reydon’s account, under which generalizations for
only a single species property – the species-defining apomorphy – are grounded.

If

developmental and selectional processes, or combinations of the two, can ground generalizations
about all the other species properties in which biologists are interested, why can they not do so,
as philosophers such as Griffiths, Millikan, and I suggest, across the board on their own? After
all, something must be maintaining the presence of the apomorphy.74

7. Conclusion
Let us take stock of what has transpired in this chapter. I applied Griffith’s attempt to
solve the species “problem of induction,” in which phylogenetic inertia acts as the Boydian
causal homeostatic mechanism producing a relative amount of uniformity within a taxon, to the
individuality thesis. I tried to avoid any problems which may arise from the current lack of
consensus among biologists as to what “phylogenetic inertia” actually is by appealing directly to
the sorts of causal processes, forces, or factors to which species are subject which produce the

It also may be that some of our disagreement follows from Reydon’s position that species are natural kinds, or that
they need to be for the inductive practices of science, versus mine that species are individuals. If species are to be
natural kinds, then some of Reydon’s concerns about induction and generalizations have to take the character which
they do. That is, it seems more urgent that the generalizations hold over the entire spatial and temporal extent of the
species, and that they hold only over organisms in that species. It does not seem to me that these concerns need to
take on the same character if species are individuals.
74
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instances of uniformity and conservatism which biologists who use the term “phylogenetic
inertia” are pointing to, attempting to explain, or trying to bring to light.
Next, I argued that inductive reasoning in biology about species, or which involves
species, need not suffer from the fact that species are not natural kinds, but individuals, since
there are many other sorts of natural kinds which can warrant the inductive inferences that
biologists make. Moreover, I demonstrated some of the ways in which inductive inferences over
species are like inferences made over the parts of individuals, and argued, using work by both
Lange and Griffiths, that some generalizations about the parts of some individuals are
counterfactual-sustaining and therefore count as lawlike, even if they are not counterfactualsustaining come what may. This satisfies the need, which Griffiths (and others) have stressed,
for lawlike generalizations in the special sciences, including those which deal with species. And
I responded to philosophical concerns that for inductive inferences in the sciences to be
warranted, they must project essential properties – which species lack, at least among their
intrinsic properties – by arguing that, for the inferences to be warranted, the projected properties
need only be stable over the length of time or the extent of space or the possible worlds which
the inference is meant to encompass. Throughout all of this, I have attempted to respond to
objections which I believed could be raised against my arguments or positions.
Allow me to conclude this section by taking up what I imagine could be a final, global
objection to my account of how induction regarding species proceeds given that species are
individuals, my defenses of it, and my attempts to resolve lingering problems which it raises.
The objection, I believe, would be that this is all quite inelegant, or perhaps baroque, or that it
gives us an inelegant picture of how the natural sciences work. It might appear that in all the
other sciences, everything over which inductive inferences can be run as they can be run with
species (or other taxonomic groups) is a natural kind, but when we turn to biology (or at least some
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disciplines within biology), the picture is different. We are supposed to accept that species are
individuals (and that other taxonomic groups apparently aren’t natural kinds either), and yet
inductive inferences can be run over them often with great success. This might seem to make the
relevant domains of biology stick out like a sore thumb; jagged ugly pieces that don’t fit neatly into
the rest of the elegant jigsaw puzzle which is the reconstruction that philosophers have given us of
the practices of the sciences. If this is so, why should we accept instead the less elegant picture I
present? Why accept that species are individuals? Are there other naturally occurring objects which
other sciences deal with that also can support inductive inferences the way species can?
The first thing to say about such an objection is that it is a new challenge, one which
concedes I’ve met the original challenge, which was to show how inductive inferences involving or
over or regarding species are possible given that they are individuals. The objection acknowledges
that I’ve done that; it just doesn’t find, when it draws back to take in the entire panorama, that the
resulting view is aesthetically pleasing.

But if I’ve met the original challenge, then species simply

become one more object over which inductions are run (like pear trees), just an object which tends to
more strongly support many more lawlike generalizations than are to be had with other objects, and
one over which inductive inferences are run more frequently than other objects with which the
special sciences may find themselves concerned.

And this may help explain the feeling of

incongruity. The inductive inferences in question are run so frequently because the objects (species)
are ubiquitous, unlike the other objects over which inductions may be run, and are run with less
frequency. Or perhaps it is that we have not realized that we are running inductions over the parts of
other objects as much as we really are, so that, faced with a myriad inductive inferences over species,
we conclude that they must be natural kinds.
Second, the objection considers it is implausible that there could be just one sort of naturally
occurring object over which inductive inferences can be made in the way they can be made over
species. But suppose species are the only such sort of naturally occurring object. Why be surprised
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that there is only one kind of these objects in nature? The processes which would need to be
involved in the production and maintenance of such an object – such that there was a sufficient
degree of uniformity among the parts to support generalizations about them – would probably need to
be much like those involved in the production of and maintenance of species. That is, given what it
would take for there to be some other sort of naturally occurring object, it may be that it would have
to be so very much like a species that that is precisely what it would have to be, and that therefore
there can be only one such naturally occurring object, at least here on Earth or anywhere else like it,
or in a world with laws like those in this world. Or, the existence of other such objects might be a
matter of degree, depending upon the causal forces or processes involved in their production and the
heterogeneity such processes produce, with the highly generalization-supporting objects which are
species on one end of a spectrum, less generalization-supporting objects like pear trees somewhere in
the middle, and objects which are not very generalization-supporting at all at the other end of the
spectrum.
Perhaps what is going on with this global objection amounts to this: kindhood advocates
dismiss the reasons for thinking species are individuals, impressed by the ways in which species can
be regarded as, or look like, natural kinds for certain purposes of inference-making. So we get
objections such as the one in Section 4, where common ancestry as the ground of an inference of
similarity from one species to another is transmuted into the explanation of the similarity of kindhood
which supposedly grounds the inference in question. Individuality advocates are impressed by the
reasons to think species are individuals, and adopt something like the account of inference which I
have given, embracing the startling facts of individuality. If that is where we end up, and not in
kindhood advocates undergoing a conversion experience, I am content to have brought matters to a
draw. If the account I have given of inductive inferences involving species, along with the other
reasons to think species are individuals and not natural kinds which we encountered earlier, can’t
convince kindhood advocates to come into my camp, but only blunts or maybe even softens and
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begins to dissolve their skepticism, at least I have shown them approximately where the trail lies
should they wish to follow it and join me.
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Chapter Four
Is Species De-Extinction Possible If Species Are Individuals?
1. Introduction
So far, I have defended the individuality thesis against recent attempts to recast species as
natural kinds. We have seen how it is well-suited to handle and defeat, in ways in which a view
of species as natural kinds cannot, species essentialism. I have provided an account of how it is
that successful inductive inferences over the organism-parts of species (or, perhaps more
precisely, over the properties of the organism-parts) and involving species are possible, if species
are individuals and not natural kinds. Throughout, we have seen how the individuality thesis is
consistent with, and can meet what Boyd would call the accommodation demands of, modern
biology. Now, it is time to turn to an emerging collection of projects in conservation and genetic
engineering which pose a tantalizing challenge to the individuality thesis and to anti-essentialism
about biological taxa: species “de-extinction.” These projects in general seek to use cloning
technology to create new organisms from extinct species, and thus resurrect those species, in
either one of two ways: standard somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) cloning (the method used
to create all cloned organisms so far, including the first cloned mammal, Dolly the sheep), in
which organisms would be created from the oocytes of a related species implanted with the
nuclei of preserved cells taken from organisms in the desired species prior to its extinction; or
through methods to create gametes directly from preserved cells.
Such projects are underway. The cloning of a female kid using preserved DNA from the
extinct Pyrenean ibex subspecies Capra pyrenaica pyrenaica (Folch, et al. 2009) has already
been hailed in the technical and popular literature as species resurrection (Gray and Dobson
2009; Piña-Aguilar, et al. 2009)(only one kid was produced, and it died of lung abnormalities a
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few minutes after birth). In March 2013, a group of loosely affiliated Australian scientists who
call their de-extinction efforts the Lazarus Project announced that they had cloned short-lived
embryos using preserved cell nuclei from the gastric brooding frog species Rheobatrachus silus,
which became extinct shortly after it was discovered in the early 1980s (Kolata 2013). The same
group previously attempted to clone the extinct thylacine, or Tasmanian tiger. The publication in
2008 of the genome sequence of a wooly mammoth (Miller et al. 2008) led to speculation that it
might be possible for scientists to create something like a real-life Jurassic Park by cloning a
mammoth (Lopez-Saucedo et al. 2010; Nicholls 2008; Piña-Aguilar 2009). In 2012, Russian and
South Korean scientists announced a joint venture to do just that, although by attempting to find,
in mammoth remains in permafrost, intact cell nuclei well-preserved enough to be used in
cloning, rather than by attempting to synthesize a mammoth genome (Zimmer 2013). Since
1996, an international consortium of zoos, museums, aquariums, and universities has maintained
the “Frozen Ark” project, based at the University of Nottingham, which stores frozen cells
containing DNA from organisms in endangered species. Earth is currently experiencing a
profound number of species extinctions, largely due to human activity (Davies et al. 2006; Kerr
and Currie 1995); the goal of the Frozen Ark is to preserve the genetic information of
endangered species for study, but also in hopes these species, if they become extinct, could be
resurrected through cloning (Johnstone 2004). A similar and independent program has existed at
the San Diego Zoo in California since 1976 (Kumar 2012).
Would organisms created through what has also been called “conservation cloning”
belong to the same species as the organisms whose cells had been preserved? The nuclear DNA
of the cloned ibex kid was confirmed as being identical to that of the organism from which it was
cloned (Folch, et al. 2009), as was that of the gastric brooding frog embryos (Smith 2013). If
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belonging to a species were a matter of possessing certain essential genetic properties, then the
cloned ibex kid belonged to Capra pyrenaica, and the embryos to Rheobatrachus silus. This
would be particularly intuitively plausible if species were natural kinds, at least on views of
species as natural kinds (e.g., Boyd’s) where belonging to a species is not a matter of historical
relations. Cloning an ibex would be a matter of creating an instance of this kind. Resurrecting a
species would then just be a matter of reinstantiating the kind by creating its (genetically or
phenotypically defined) instances. But it is my position that species are individuals without any
essential intrinsic properties. The biological consensus is that an organism is part of a species
not in virtue of its possession of a set of (necessary and sufficient) phenotypic or even genotypic
properties, but in virtue of its relation to other organisms, in particular in virtue of descent. An
organism not descended from a species’ common ancestor is not part of that species, no matter
how similar it is to organisms in the species; and an organism which can so trace its ancestry is
part of the species, no matter how different from other organisms in the species. And a different
complication arises on the individuality thesis. Extinct species don’t exist. We generally believe
that once an individual’s existence is terminated, the individual is gone forever; no individual
can take a “vacation from existence” (Elder 2011, 19). So, is de-extinction possible given that
species are individuals without essential intrinsic properties?
Since the announcement of the cloning of the Pyrenean ibex, the efforts of the Lazarus
Project, and the joint Russian-Korean project, the popular and scientific literature on both the
science and the ethics of de-extinction has been expanding (Callaway 2011; Kolata 2013; Kumar
2012; López-Saucedo et al. 2010; Ogura et al. 2013; Piña-Aguilar et al. 2009; Redford et al.
2013; Zimmer 2013). De-extinction was the subject of a National Geographic cover story in
April 2013, and of a National Geographic-sponsored TEDx conference the previous month, at

202

which technical and ethical issues surrounding de-extinction were discussed.

But on the

conceptual question – whether what are now being called efforts at de-extinction would produce
numerically the same species as the extinct one – very little has been published. In his early
work on the individuality thesis, Hull claimed that it is a conceptual truth that once a species
goes extinct, it cannot reappear. Hull took this to be a point in favor of the individuality thesis,
since it is one more characteristic which species have more in common with individuals than
they do with paradigm natural kinds like chemical elements. Were a baby born today which was
identical “in every respect” to Adolf Hitler, including genetically, it would not be Adolf Hitler,
but rather “as distinct and separate a human being as ever existed because of his unique
‘insertion into history’” (Hull 1978, 349). The same with species.
Turning to more recent literature, only three papers, so far as I can establish, all published
in roughly the last 20 years, have taken up the conceptual aspect of de-extinction. Two of those
(Elliot 1994; Gunn 1991) appear in the environmental ethics literature, within the context of
ecosystem restoration, and whether a restored ecosystem can either be identical to, or of equal
value to, the original. Gunn, who addresses the resurrection question from the perspectives of
species as natural kinds and as individuals, argues that “recreating” species is a logical
impossibility whether they are kinds or individuals, due to the meaning of extinction as of a
“permanently null class” (Gunn 1991, 299). Resurrection is moreover logically impossible if
species are individuals, Gunn claims, because it is logically impossible to recreate an individual.
In response, Elliot argues that, were organisms cloned from DNA remnants left by or taken from
the organisms in the extinct species, the clones would “clearly be members of the species
population” (Elliot 1994, 138-139). This is because the clones would instantiate the same
“similarity relation” to one another which the original members of the extinct species bore to
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each other, a relation he takes to be definitive of species membership (he also takes species to be
natural kinds, and the relevant similarity to be similarity of genotypes).
Most recently, Delord relies merely upon an intuitive argument that resurrection is
possible. Suppose scientists managed to clone many individuals from genetic material left from
organisms which had belonged to an extinct species, also employing “the exact epigenetic
conditions (nuclear and cytoplasmic) necessary to enable the normal development of any
individual” with any particular genotype from that species (Delord 2007, 661). The clones
would not, of course, be reproductions of the organisms of which they are clones, but rather
numerically distinct individuals. But Delord considers it simply undeniable that the process
would produce organisms belonging to the very same species.

The undeniability of this

conclusion, he believes, proves that species are unreal atemporal classes.75 Species, according to
Delord, have no real existence; every species name merely denotes “an abstract or conceptual
way of classifying things according to certain properties,” in particular genetic properties,
according to a “cluster analysis” of species (Delord 2007, 662-663; emphasis in original). If this
is so, then the species could vanish as many times as we like, and be resurrected as many times
as is (technically) possible.
Since both Elliot and Delord affirm that an extinct species can be resurrected, and
because they regard species as natural kinds or classes rather than individuals, I will not be
elaborating on or discussing their positions in what follows.76 Given my advocacy of the

75

Although he regards organisms and the populations they constitute as real. For Delord, organisms are parts of
populations, while being members of a species. Both organisms and populations, he believes, are individuals; and
some populations are numerically coextensive with species. But species are merely convenient ways we have of
classifying organisms according to characteristic properties. Because the species concept is convenient, Delord
thinks we should continue to employ it, and so does not consider himself a species eliminativist like, for example,
Mishler (1999) or Ereshefsky (1992, 1998).
76
I also disagree with Delord’s approach. I do not believe we should decide first, by appeal to untutored intuition,
whether a species can be resurrected. Instead, we need to start with an understanding of what species are,
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individuality thesis, and species anti-essentialism, I obviously regard Elliot’s claim that species
are natural kinds in which membership is a matter of satisfying a genotypic similarity relation to
be fundamentally mistaken. And if I can successfully argue that it is possible to resurrect an
extinct species on the individuality thesis, I will have refuted Delord’s claim that the possibility
of resurrection by cloning disproves the individuality thesis. I regard Hull’s claim to be one
about the possibility of a species re-evolving, and I will take it up shortly. This leaves Gunn’s
arguments concerning the impossibility of resurrecting an extinct species in general, and in
particular on the individuality thesis.
What I shall be doing in the remainder of this chapter is the following. I shall argue, as I
think is uncontroversial, that a relation holds between organisms and their offspring, whether
these are the result of sexual or asexual reproduction, a relation of immediate descent of one
from the other. I will call this is the progenitor relation. That the progenitor relation holds
between two organisms is normally sufficient to establish that both are parts of the same species.
I shall argue shortly that this relation also holds in cases of reproductive cloning. Because the
progenitor relation holds between organisms belonging to a species which goes extinct, and the
organisms cloned from them, the clones are parts of (belong to) the same species as the
organisms from which they were cloned. Provided they are viable and fertile, and the species
internal organization or ability to function as an integrated whole has been established, deextinction has been achieved (I will have a few things to say about this extra condition, as it
involves the view that a species can be extinct even when some of its organism-parts are still
alive). Then, I shall address Gunn’s arguments against resurrection, in particular the one aimed

ontologically, in order to say whether, or under what conditions, they can be resurrected. The former should inform
our answer to the latter, not the other way around.
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directly at the individuality thesis, which attempts to trade on the fact that the clone of an
individual is a numerically distinct individual.
Now, since species are individuals, the possibility of resurrection means that species can
be temporally discontinuous individuals. This will surely raise worries, so I shall bring forth
some examples of temporally discontinuous individuals to try to assuage them. Moreover, Hull,
among others, has argued that evolutionary theory requires species to be spatiotemporally
continuous. Indeed, we saw in Chapter 1 that this was one of the reasons Hull gave in favor of
the individuality thesis.

But, drawing upon remarks by Hull (1987) as summarized and

expressed by Ereshefsky (1992), I hope to show that what is actually required in the case of
species is historical continuity, which is maintained in de-extinction.

In nature, historical

continuity accompanies temporal continuity; they are, in nature, inseparable. But the technology
which would be used in de-extinction allows humans to pry them apart, to have the former
without the latter. Finally, for those still concerned about temporally discontinuous individuals, I
shall show why alternatives to my view which do not involve temporally discontinuous
individuals are deficient.
Before we move into the master argument for de-extinction, I need to make explicit a few
background assumptions in, and aims of, this chapter. Based upon their public statements and
statements in the literature, a number of biologists (and, from conversations I have had with
them, some philosophers and laymen) have the intuition that were scientists able to clone
mammoth-like organisms from the cells of dead mammoths, or otherwise construct creatures
with the same basic genetic properties as them, they would have resurrected numerically the
same species as the one which went extinct millennia ago – because of the genetic similarity or
identity (and likewise for any of the several species for which scientists have either undertaken,
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or plan to undertake, de-extinction). Of course, I believe biologists who think that species are
simply groups of genetically or phenotypically similar organisms, or that possession of a
particular genotype is a necessary or sufficient condition for belonging to a particular species,
haven’t tuned in to what some of their colleagues, and their colleagues’ friends in philosophy of
biology, have been saying for the past several decades about the nature of species. And, like
Hull, I’m unimpressed if philosophers and laymen hold similar presuppositions. Nevertheless,
my aim here is to attempt to accommodate, on anti-essentialism and the individuality thesis, this
intuition that de-extinction is possible, as much as I think can be done. It is in the air, and is
being seriously discussed and worked on. Given the twin tenets of the individuality thesis and
species anti-essentialism, this means a good amount of conceptual groundwork needs to be done.
And, given the broad explanatory power and fecundity of evolutionary theory, it needs to be
done in a way which is consistent with, and holds onto and is motivated by, as much of that
theoretical apparatus as is possible. This includes, as will become important, species being
composed of organisms, not the detached parts of organisms. This constraint also precludes, or
weighs against, other ways in which we might think about de-extinction than those which I will
advocate (and I shall address such alternatives at the end of the present chapter).
In what follows, I shall confine my comments to, first, de-extinction of vertebrate
species, since vertebrate species predominate in discussions of de-extinction, and it is for
vertebrate species which actual de-extinction attempts have been proposed or attempted; and,
second, to the methods of de-extinction which have been proposed for vertebrate species.77 I
shall also be confining myself to the metaphysics, and not the ethics, of de-extinction.78

77

One method I will not examine is explored in (Nicholls 2008) with regard to the mammoth, or any other species in
which there is no fully intact sample of DNA: to attempt to fill in the gaps in the DNA sequence, synthesize a
genome, snythesize choromosomes and divide the genome into the proper segments, synthesize a cell nucleus in
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2. Why Care About Numerical Identity?
One of the motivations for biologists investigating the technical possibility of
resurrecting species is that species extinctions threaten global biodiversity, and threatened
species are frequently crucial components of the ecosystems which they inhabit. Human lives
and economies in turn depend upon the stability of such ecosystems. Another motivation is
scientific study of particular species. Yet another is generation of products which could serve as
pharmaceuticals.

And another is the further applications which could be generated by

developing the technologies of de-extinction. Restoring a species might be of great practical
concern.
But, as Gunn and others have pointed out, it might be possible to serve the needs of
biodiversity and ecosystem preservation by producing populations and lineages, through
conservation cloning, that were in almost every respect very much like the extinct species,
without actually being the same species (Sherkow and Greely 2013; Gunn 1991). The properties
or products of species which biotechnologists might find useful for pharmaceutical or other
commercial purposes presumably could likewise be found in a “resurrected” species which was
very much like, but not numerically identical to, the original. Biologists in the near future might
be able to learn a great deal about an extinct species that had been insufficiently investigated
while it existed by examining the clones, or their fairly immediate descendents, generated from
which to place the chromosomes and which could be implanted in the oocyte from an extant species. The technical
hurdles here would be great, and no one associated with de-extinction has seriously proposed this method.
78
Although I believe the ethical questions are important. Here are but four: Scientists contemplating resurrecting
extinct species need to consider what sort of existence the genetically engineered organisms will have, since they
may encounter ecosystems, including predators, different from those in which they once thrived and to which they
became adapted. Some resurrected species might never be able to be released into the wild, meaning lives lived in
sheltered settings in zoos, dependent upon human beings for survival, and to fend off inevitable re-extinction.
Conversely, scientists also need to consider whether resurrected species which have been absent for decades or
centuries might now prove to be invasive species which could disrupt, rather than bolster, extant ecosystems. And
there are the twin concerns that conservation efforts might themselves suffer, if it were widely believed that any
species can be brought back from extinction; and that the great expense which de-extinction would involve in terms
of time, resources, and money might be better appropriated for preservation of currently endangered species (see
e.g., Ehrenfeld 2013; Sherkow and Greely 2013; Gunn 1991; Zimmer 2013).
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the cells taken from the now-extinct organisms, even if what they are examining is not
numerically the same species. Why, then, be concerned whether de-extinction would produce
numerically the same species – whether the generations produced after the extinction would
constitute generations of the same species as those existing prior to the extinction?
First, since every species is unique, never to re-evolve, it might be that the extinction of
any species constitutes a loss that is of intrinsic concern, rather than as something which is of
instrumental concern, that is, of concern only insofar as it affects the satisfaction of human
interests. A number of philosophers have argued that we have a moral duty not to cause the
extinction of species, that anthropogenic extinctions occupy a distinct moral class from natural
extinctions (Aitken 1998; Card 2004; Gunn 1991; Johnson 1991; Rolston 1988). I will argue
neither for nor against such positions here. Yet if we do have such a duty, and it seemed to be
within our power to resurrect species, it would merit investigation into whether, for any given
endangered species, that very species could be resurrected – whether any organisms which might
be produced through cloning, say, would constitute the very same species. If they would not, it
might be all the more important, morally speaking, for humans to refrain from causing the
species’ extinction, since the species could not be restored. If they would, then resurrection
might actually become a moral duty in cases where humans had caused the extinction. Scientists
involved in or commenting on de-extinction are already making such moral claims (Sherkow and
Greely 2013; Zimmer 2013).
Second, suppose scientists such as those involved in the Russian-South Korean joint
venture were able to clone a mammoth-like creature. Several scientists have expressed how
“cool” it would be to see a living mammoth or saber-tooth tiger (Sherkow and Greely 2013;
Kolata 2013; Zimmer 2013). But if scientists haven’t succeeded in producing an organism
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belonging to the same species, Mammuthus primigenius, then anyone wishing to satiate a desire
to see a living mammoth – something no man has done for thousands of years – could not do so
by viewing any of the “mammoth” clones in, say, a zoo or wild animal preserve on the Russian
steppes. At best, they would have experienced an ersatz mammoth, rather than a genuine
mammoth. No doubt, they would have experienced the product of a biotechnological tour de
force, and it might be cool to see a living organism which is just like a mammoth, or saber-tooth
tiger.

But they would no more have experienced a mammoth than someone would have

experienced the Mona Lisa if they viewed a painting exactly like it, painted with the same sort of
paint used to paint the actual Mona Lisa – or would have examined a Gutenberg Bible by rifling
through an extremely well-made facsimile. If there is value in having experienced the genuine
article as opposed to a very good reproduction, then we need to know whether a cloned
mammoth is the genuine article.
Finally, I think the question is simply intrinsically interesting.

Species, like other

individuals, are unique. They come into existence at a particular point in space and time, they
undergo changes due to various sorts of natural processes, themselves of great theoretical and
practical interest, and they ultimately go out of existence, never to appear again anywhere else on
the phylogenetic tree of life, either here on Earth, or anywhere else in the universe.79 Given this,
I think it is simply interesting in its own right to determine whether one of these unique
individuals can, as the same branch on that tree, be brought back into existence. Or, put another
way, can one of these branches, once it has seemingly ceased to grow, actually have more
material added to it? At any rate, I here borrow a page from Hull’s own writing on the

79

This last statement may sound like a declaration from the get-go that de-extinction is logically impossible. To
speak more correctly, once a species is gone, its re-evolution is impossible. I shall be arguing that de-extinction is
not re-evolution, but rather exactly what it proposes to be: the de-extinction, or resurrection, of numerically the
same species. I address this issue below.
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individuality thesis. To those questioning the value of determining the ontological status of
species – whether they are individuals, or natural kinds, or of some other sort of ontological
category – Hull responds that if the ontological status of space-time in relativity theory is
sufficiently interesting to justify the great quantities of work philosophers have devoted to it,
then the ontological status of species “should also be sufficiently interesting philosophically to
discuss without any additional justification” (Hull 1987, 338). I think the same is true of the
identity of a “resurrected” species: it is sufficiently interesting philosophically in its own right
that, while it is possible to give it further justification, it is not necessary to do so.
3. Master Argument for De-Extinction
As I noted earlier, the consensus in biology is that descent is in general a necessary
condition for an organism to belong to a species. To repeat Hull’s dictum, “in the typical case, to
be a horse one must be born of horse” (Hull 1978, 349; emphasis in original). This does not tell
us what the “typical case” is. But what Hull says next is instructive. There weren’t always
horses, so “there must have been instances in which non-horses (or borderline horses) gave rise
to horses” (Hull 1978, 349). This hopefully reminds the reader of Maathen’s example of the
origin of the first chicken species and its pre-chicken ancestor; some chickens were not born of
chickens (Maathen 2009). The atypicality of such cases seems to lie in their occurring during
speciation events. Typical cases, then, are those which occur under typical states of affairs,
which are those which obtain during a species’ lifetime between speciation events.
As Hull points out, “the operative term is still ‘gave rise to’” (Hull 1978, 349). In typical
states of affairs, not only is descent a necessary condition of belonging to a species, it is
sufficient. This requires some refinement, however, since all humans are descended from the
common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans, yet none of us belongs to that species. So, let us
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say instead that immediate descent is sufficient for belonging to the same species (in the typical
case), where we can, at least provisionally, think of immediate descent as follows: in a normal
case of reproduction, y is immediately descended from x if y is the offspring of x. And, if
organism y is immediately descended from organism x, then y is part of species S if x is part of
species S. In fact, we can say more: if organism y is immediately descended from organism x,
then y is part of species S if and only if x is part of species S – bearing in mind that, since there
will be cases during speciation events in which organisms like borderline horses give rise to
horses, certain ceteris paribus clauses will need to be in place to handle the atypical states of
affairs. But it is fairly uncontroversial that these sorts of clauses will be required, regardless of
whatever questions we’re considering about de-extinction.
Advances in reproductive technology, however, demand elaboration of this view of
immediate descent, offspringhood and species parthood. Consider a case of surrogate pregnancy
in which fertilization has occurred in vitro using the gametes of a human couple, and the
resulting embryo is implanted in the uterus of the surrogate, who is not one of the gamete donors.
Of whom is the resulting child the offspring? In the first such case ever to be brought before a
court, the California Supreme Court declared in 1993 in Johnson v. Calvert that Mark and
Crispina Calvert, the genetic parents of the child carried to term by their surrogate, Anna
Johnson, were the natural parents of the child under California law. Of course, a decision by a
court does not necessarily decide a philosophical question. California law, at least at the time,
recognized only one natural mother per child, so the court had to decide upon one. But in
philosophical discussion, we might conclude that the genetic child of the Calverts has two
mothers, and is the offspring of three people (indeed, the court ruled that both Anna and Crispina
presented sufficient proof under the law to establish maternity, Anna by giving birth, and
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Crispina by blood test which established her genetic relationship to the child [Calvert, 5 Cal.4th
84 at 92]).80
Now, it would seem absurd to claim that the resulting child was not at all the offspring of
Crispina Calvert. So, we are left with two things we can say. One thing we could say is that
being a supplier of the genetic information or material which gives rise to an organism is
necessary and sufficient to make one a biological parent of that organism (the parent, in asexual
cases like parthenogenesis; whereas in cases of sexual reproduction, the other parent will be the
supplier of the opposite sex of genetic material or information) – and, conversely, that an
organism’s genetic information or complement having come from some other organism (or
organisms, to accommodate sexually reproducing species) is necessary and sufficient to establish
that the first organism is the offspring of the second (or second and third; again, to accommodate
sexually reproducing species). The other thing we can say, if we think the Calvert’s child has
three parents, is that either supplying the genetic information or material which gives rise to an
organism, or being the owner of the womb in which that organism develops (and so being a
supplier of epigenetic information or factors in development), is sufficient to make one organism
the biological parent of another – and, again, conversely, either that an organism’s genetic
information or complement having come from some other organism or organisms is sufficient to
establish that the first organism is the offspring of the second, or that an organism’s having
gestated in the womb of another organism is sufficient to establish that the first is the offspring
of the second. Either way, whether we make the first or the second claim, we are committed to
80

Deciding there are three parents might be the correct option, since epigenetic factors at work during pregnancy
may be equally as important to the developing fetus as we nowadays take the genetics to be (Carey 2011). If so,
then it would not merely be coming from the combination of just the particular sperm and egg from which it actually
comes which would be essential to an organism (in a sexually reproducing species) – as Kripke famously assumed
(Kripke 1980). Also essential would be gestating in just the womb in which the organism in fact gestated, and at the
very period in the life of the womb-mother as the one during which the pregnancy occurred, since different life
stages of the mother – including whether she had been pregnant before – can influence the epigenetics of the
development of the offspring.
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the view that receiving one’s genetic complement from some organism is sufficient to establish
that one is the offspring of at least that organism. And if that is so, then given the thoughts above
about immediate descent, offspringhood, and species parthood, receiving one’s genetic
complement from an organism in S is sufficient to establish that one also belongs to S. This
remains true whether we are considering normal (ordinary, usual) or non-normal (extraordinary,
unusual) cases of reproduction.
Yet notice now what this says about cloning. Take as an example Dolly the sheep, the
first cloned mammal. Dolly was cloned from a cell taken from a ewe in the species Ovis aries.
Let us call that ewe at least Dolly’s progenitor, if not one of Dolly’s biological parents (although
if I’m correct in what follows, that ewe is at least one of Dolly’s biological parents). 81 It
provided the genetic material, or the genetic information, involved in the production of Dolly. In
normal cases of reproduction, whether sexual or asexual, the organisms we would ordinarily
regard as parents are also progenitors, since they, too, provide the genetic material or information
involved in the production of their offspring.82 But given the considerations raised in our
discussion of surrogacy, a clone is no less the offspring of the organism which is its progenitor
than is an organism produced in a normal case of sexual or asexual reproduction. Indeed, it must
be the offspring of its progenitor. From this it follows that a clone is immediately descended
from its progenitor. So, for any organisms x and y, if x is a progenitor of y, then y is immediately

I had assumed in calling the cell donor the “progenitor” that I was engaging in some philosophical term-coinage,
until I accidentally discovered there was a precedent for using this term in exactly this way: (McLaren 2000, 1779).
I thank Tom Bontly for raising the possibility of skepticism regarding Dolly, or any clone, being part of the same
species as the organism of which it is a clone.
82
In a sexual species, it is clear that both parents are equally progenitors of their offspring, since each contributes
genetic information to the offspring. Yet it may be that crucial non-genetic information – epigenetic information –
in the oocyte is also transmitted during reproduction (Carey 2011; Griffiths and Gray 1994; Oyama 1985; Sterelny
2000; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999). If so, then even Dolly may have two progenitors: both the ewe from which the
cell nucleus used in Dolly’s cloning was taken, and the ewe which contributed the oocyte in which that nucleus was
implanted.
81
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descended from x. Indeed, this can be expressed more strongly: for any organisms x and y, x is a
progenitor of y if and only if y is immediately descended from x.
All together, this gives us what I shall call the Progenitor/Parthood Claim: For any
organisms x and y, x’s being the progenitor of y implies that y is part of S iff x is part of S. But
now it follows simply that cloned organisms produced in a de-extinction attempt are part of the
extinct species. The organisms from which the clones would be generated are the clones’
progenitors, no less than the ewe from which cells were taken in the cloning of Dolly was
Dolly’s progenitor, and those organisms are unequivocally part(s) of S. Therefore, the clones
derived from them are part(s) of S. This means that the cloned ibex kid is in fact part of Capra
pyrenaica, and the gastric brooding frog embryos are parts of Rheobatrachus silus (I shall
presently take up the question whether those taxa have been resurrected).
There might be reason to doubt this were this a speciation event; that is, were this an
atypical state of affairs. But speciation events involve bifurcations (at least) of lineages – of the
flow of genetic (or other) information, or heredity relations, or whatever information is
transmitted by such relations, or the stream of tokogenetic relationships (Hennig 1966). There
would be no apparent such bifurcations in cases of de-extinction. Nor could this be some sort of
speciation not involving bifurcation, as in the alleged mode we encountered in Chapter 2,
anagenetic or phyletic speciation. Again, this is the idea that a new species can arise simply
because a lineage of organisms which is a species changes drastically over a long period of time
in its morphological or other properties. Evolutionary theory has abandoned such a view of
speciation (Ridley 1996; Sober 2000; Coyne and Orr 2004, the most comprehensive recent
volume on speciation, does not even mention it). And in any case, the profound sorts of
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phenotypic transformations which were claimed to be involved in anagenetic speciation would
simply not occur in cases of attempted de-extinction.
Since de-extinction is not a case of speciation, and the clones would be part of the extinct
species (because the proper relation holds), de-extinction would be, even on the individuality
thesis, exactly what it claims to be: the resurrection of numerically the same species as the one
which went extinct. What is also significant is that de-extinction is also a conceptual possibility
even on the view that species have no essential intrinsic properties. De-extinction does not
depend upon the clones possessing the same genotypic or phenotypic properties as their
progenitors. It is a matter of the clones, and their descendents, which would make up the postextinction segment of the species, bearing the right relationship to the organisms from which
they are cloned, and their ancestors (which make up the pre-extinction segment of the species).
One conceptual issue relating to species identity remains which I can see, although it is
not peculiar to the individual thesis. The primary method being contemplated for de-extinction,
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), would require that cell nuclei from organisms from the
extinct species be implanted in the oocytes of closely related extant species. If we are justified in
thinking that the relevant information transmission which occurs between parent and offspring is
genetic information, encoded in DNA, consider that in a number of cloned mammalian
organisms, the resulting clones’ mitochondrial DNA (which ordinarily comes exclusively from
the mother) reveals degrees of heteroplasmy, a mixture of DNA from the donor cell and the
recipient cell (Beyhan et al. 2007). In de-extinction, at least some of the resulting mitochondrial
DNA would come from organisms in other species, because the mitochondria are found in the
egg cell, which in de-extinction by SCNT will have to come from a distinct, although related,
species. This influx of mitochondrial DNA, even if it became mixed with that of the resurrected
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species, would be similar to a case of introgression (when genes from the gene pool of one
species get introduced into the gene pool of another species through hybridization). Many
biologists have a tolerance for occasional episodes of introgression. They do not think it violates
reproductive isolation, which is not an all-or-nothing affair. So this may not be sufficient to cost
the identity of the species which scientists are trying to resurrect. The requirement of descent is
that no organism which does not share in the ancestry of a species can belong to that species, and
the clones would share in that ancestry (it is just that some of their ancestry would extend outside
the species of which they are part).83 In fact, introgression apparently occurred in our own
species. It now seems clear that ancient Homo sapiens in Europe and Asia interbred on an
extremely limited basis with Homo neanderthalensis, and that other ancient Homo sapiens
interbred on a very limited basis with the recently discovered Denisovans, a group of humans
living in southern Siberia and more closely related to Neanderthals than to modern humans. In
both cases, the hybrids were incorporated back into Homo sapiens (since modern European and
Asian humans possess a small percentage of Neanderthal DNA, and Melanesians possess a small
percentage of Denisovan DNA)(Gibbons 2011).
Still, if there is any concern about introgression, a different proposed method of
“cloning” organisms holds the prospect for avoiding it: to induce the preserved cells of the
organisms in the extinct species to return to a semi-embryonic state and form induced pluripotent
stem cells, and from these cells create sperm and egg cells which could be used to produce whole

83

I shall here only very briefly get into the controversy as to whether the concept of monophyly, as cladists
understand the term, should apply to species, and so whether species must be monophyletic (because cladists do not
recognize non-monophyletic taxa), and so whether a resurrected species produced by SCNT would be nonmonophyletic due to introgression of mitochondrial DNA. As cladists understand the term, a monophyletic taxon
contains all and only the descendents of a common ancestor. It’s hard to see how monophyly could then apply to
species, since species can have descendent species (which under the concept of monophyly we’re considering would
actually have to be the same species as their ancestor). If monophyly does not apply to species, then the fact that the
resurrected species would contain all the descendents of that species’ ancestor, but not only the descendents of that
ancestor (since they get mitochondrial DNA from another species and hence a different ancestor), will not matter.
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organisms. Such methods have already been used to create both sperm cells and egg cells in
mice, both of which have, when combined with naturally produced cells from the opposite sex,
resulted in viable mice pups (Hayashi et al. 2011; Hayashi et al. 2012). One complication with
this method is that, so far, the early stages of these cells have had to have been implanted into
living mice in order for the sperm and egg cells to be generated.
4. Extinction and De-Extinction
How many organisms must be cloned in order for a species to be resurrected? I’ve
claimed that the ibex kid and the frog embryos were parts of their respective species. Did
scientists resurrect the Pyrenean ibex subspecies, if only for a few minutes, by producing a single
live clone? Can de-extinction be achieved by the production of a single clone? Or does it
require multiple clones, and, if so, why?
Probably, the common view of extinction of a taxon, such as a species, is that the last
organism in that taxon has died.84 By such a standard, a species continues to exist so long as a
single organism in it is alive. This suggests that a species would be resurrected if only a single
live organism were produced – which means the cloning of the Pyrenean ibex would have
resulted in the de-extinction of that subspecies for a few minutes. But confining ourselves to this
view of extinction (and de-extinction) would be appropriate only if species were natural kinds.
For if species were natural kinds, extinction would mean, as Delord and Gunn point out,
rendering the species an empty class, and this would happen when the last organism had died.
De-extinction would then simply be reinstantiating the kind by producing another member. But
species are not natural kinds.

They are cohesive, integrated wholes.

So the integration

The standard set by the International Union for Conservation of Nature is that a species is extinct “when there is
no reasonable doubt that the last individual has died” (IUCN 2012, 14). This, interestingly, makes extinction
epistemic rather than metaphysical.
84
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appropriate to that species must be achieved.85

To understand why, and what achieving

integration means, we must examine what can count as extinction, at least under the individuality
thesis.
Delord helpfully differentiates four “modalities” of extinction (Delord 2007, 657). The
first is the common view of extinction, the death of the last organism in the species. The second
modality is “extinction by hybridization,” or, more accurately, extinction by the fusion of two
species. This is not to say that two species cease to exist if organisms in them hybridize; rather,
it is extinction by the reproductive barriers between two species breaking down, such that they
freely interbreed, thus creating a third, new species. The third modality is “extinction by
anagenesis” – by a new, derived character (apomorphy) developing in a lineage; although, as
Delord points out, this is regarded by contemporary biologists as “pseudoextinction,” not true
extinction.

This is because there is no anagenetic speciation; speciation occurs only by

cladogenesis, the splitting of a lineage. This takes us to Delord’s fourth modality, one which we
have already briefly encountered, “extinction by cladogenesis.” When one species splits into
two or more daughter species, the original species is extinct.86
In the second and fourth modalities (or, in the case of the fourth modality, when there has
been a 50-50 split or very close to it), it is easy to see that what has happened is that the species
has, in de Queiroz’s words, “ceased to function as an integrated whole;” or as Hull puts it, its
85

This is not to say that mode of integration is essential to any particular species. A species in which mode of
integraton changed would not necessarily cease to be that particular species. The modes I will consider below are
gene flow and natural selection. Gene flow is the mode appropriate to a sexually reproducing species because, as
the species currently exists, this is how the species persists: by sexual reproduction of its organism-parts.
86
How strictly to apply this is a matter of controversy. Many cladists will insist that any permanent species lineage
split counts as extinction of the stem or “parent” species, even if the split involves only the offshoot of a small
peripheral isolate. Their complaint would be that to countenance the parent species as still existing would be to
arbitrarily draw the boundary between where one species ends and another begins (what percentage of the stem
species must remain in less than a 50-50 split for the stem species to have survived?). See, e.g., Hennig 1966.
Others, while sympathetic to cladism, believe it makes more sense to say that a species still exists if it “buds off” a
small peripheral isolate which becomes reproductively isolated from the stem species, but if the great bulk of the
stem remains – in the same way in which we regard the original hydra as still existing when it buds off a small
daughter (Hull 1978; Sober 2000).
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“internal organization” has been “disrupted” (de Queiroz 1999, 70; Hull 1978, 348) (This is why
Hull believes that the occasional production of a fertile hybrid does not mean that two species are
actually one, since occasional introgression is insufficient to disrupt a species’ internal
organization.). However, de Queiroz points out that there is another way in which a species can
cease to function as an integrated whole, and that is when the organisms in a species are no
longer able to reproduce. At that point, the species is extinct, even though the organisms may
still be alive; this is analogous to cells in an organism briefly living on after the organism itself
has died. De Queiroz’s example is an obligately sexually reproducing species in which all the
living organisms are of the same sex and lack the ability to change their sex (de Queiroz 1999,
70).
We can extend this thought to asexual species by drawing upon the work we encountered
in Chapter 1 by Holsinger, which comes from the debate over species monism versus pluralism:
what distinguishes an individual from a mere collection of objects is that, “with respect to a
particular process,” an individual is an entity which “behaves as a whole and is independent of
similar entities” (Holsinger 1984, 295). When it comes to species, individual organisms, one to
another, “cohere with respect to certain processes.” The processes Holsinger has in mind include
interbreeding, or ecological forces such as the selective pressures which make up an adaptive
zone. These are, of course, causal processes; and recall that one of Ereshefsky’s criticisms of
Boyd’s HPC account of kinds was that it blurred an important metaphysical distinction between
kinds and individuals: the parts of an individual must be causally connected, whereas the
members of a kind do not (Ereshefsky 2010).87

Indeed, Holsinger argues that the job of

systematists is to “circumscribe” taxa according to the biological processes to which they are
87

Recall, also, that in my account of how inductive inferences over species are possible given the individuality
thesis, I, too, appealed to various causal forces and processes which cause the parts of a species to cohere into a unit
(and which, furthermore, promote just the degrees of uniformity among those parts to permit reliable induction).
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subject as a unit. Acknowledging Holsinger’s perspective, Ereshefsky presents one very much
like it: there is a single genealogical tree of life, which the forces of evolution segment into
different types of lineages. Forces of interbreeding segment parts of the tree into lineages that
form interbreeding units, forces of environmental selection segment parts of the tree into lineages
that form ecological units, and forces of common descent segment parts of the tree into
monophyletic taxa (Ereshefsky 1992, 676).
Holsinger and Ereshefsky intend these considerations to be arguments for species
pluralism. Both contend that evolutionary processes or forces provide multiple, incompatible
ways in which biologists may taxonomize organisms into the basal units of evolutionary biology,
where all such resulting taxa are real, and not human constructs. This would mean that one and
the same organism could belong to multiple, incompatible or cross-cutting taxa: with respect to
an interbreeding process, an organism might belong to taxon A, but with respect to an ecological
process, it might belong to taxon B – which Ereshefsky, following (Grant 1981), suggests calling
“biospecies” and “ecospecies,” respectively.

Organisms which stand out as a unit by the

reconstruction of phylogenies would be “phylospecies” (Ereshefsky 1992, 680). Moreover,
Holsinger and Ereshefsky argue that there is no higher, or further, or more inclusive parameter or
process by which these types of units could be reduced into a single type of unit (a monistic
species concept), or which determines which taxonomy is best or correct. All are equally correct
and legitimate.
What I wish to do is to attempt to leave considerations of pluralism aside. Perhaps
Holsinger and Ereshefsky are correct. Or, perhaps there are considerations by which biologists
could determine that it is best or correct in one case that organisms be taxonomized according to
the interbreeding process in which they all participate or are subject to, thus forming a
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biospecies; and in another case, concerning other organisms, that they be taxonomized according
to the ecological process in which they all participate or are subject to, thus forming an
ecospecies; and never these twain shall meet. That is, we are pluralists of a sort, but in terms of
the sorts of processes which unite organisms into species, not in terms how many taxonomies
there may be. In the end, we end up not with multiple, cross-cutting taxonomies, but a single,
best taxonomy, where different organisms are taxonomized into different types of species. Or
perhaps there are considerations which should drive us to be cladistic monists, where whatever
the processes are which unite organisms into a unit, species must be monophyletic taxa
Regardless:

if interbreeding – gene flow – counts as a relevant cohesion-inducing

process, then a sexually reproducing species in which this process completely terminates has had
its internal organization disrupted, and it is extinct, even if the organisms remain alive. The
processes which cause it to cohere into an individual have broken down, as surely as if each
organism were to be dispersed to mutually inaccessible regions of the Earth.

With the

breakdown of that process, the individual loses its coherence, and ceases to exist, as would be the
case with any individual which has had its integration-inducing processes disrupted (Sober 2000,
Chapter 6, independently proposes a similar view).
So, if gene flow is the relevant process in the case of a sexually reproducing species, then
the species is not resurrected merely upon the production of a single clone, or clones of opposite
sexes. They must be viable (as the Pyrenean ibex kid was not), they must be fertile, and they
must reproduce. Once this happens, the process with respect to which they cohere as a unit is
reinstantiated, and the species is resurrected. This actually poses an additional problem, for as
skeptics of the utility of de-extinction have pointed out, newborns in many species rely upon
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their parents to teach them behaviors crucial to their survival and mating. Without parents, the
first generation of clones may prove inviable (Ehrenfeld 2013).
On the other hand, with an asexual species where natural selection is the cohesioninducing process, the species would be resurrected upon the production of a single clone –
indeed, it is arguable that the species would be resurrected at some time before the birth of the
first clone. This is because natural selection can occur at any point in the ontogeny of an
organism (this creates another complication, which I will address in §5d below).88 But what
these considerations mean is that researchers did not resurrect the Pyreanean ibex subspecies by
producing a single kid, nor did researchers resurrect the gastric brooding frog species by
producing embryos.
Of course, species which genetic engineers do manage to resurrect may not continue to
exist long unless more organisms are produced which are viable and fertile, since both sexual
and asexual species which propagated post-resurrection from only one or a pair of organisms
might initially be susceptible to re-extinction due their lack of genetic diversity. Just how many
organisms would need to be produced in order to keep the resurrected species from vanishing
again remains a source of controversy, although it is likely that the number will vary depending
upon the species (Brook et al. 2011; Garnett and Zander 2011; Shaffer 1981; Traill et al. 2007).
But these are empirical or technical matters, not philosophical ones.
One fact which merits emphasis here is that I am not saying that a species becomes
extinct merely because the organisms cannot reproduce. This is important, because if I’m right
88

One might wonder whether this means that a sexually reproducing species would be resurrected prior to the birth
of the first clone, since, of course, sexually reproducing species are, or can be, subject to natural selection as well. I
think not. The reason is that gene flow – interbreeding – must be an essential cohesion-inducing process to sexually
reproducing species, by definition. That is, for any species to be a sexually reproducing species, there must be gene
flow occurring within it. This does not mean that any particular species which reproduces sexually is essentially
sexually reproducing. On the other hand, natural selection is not essential to sexually reproducing species in this
way. This is not to say that natural selection is an essential cohesion-inducing process to asexual species. It might
be (obviously, gene flow is irrelevant in an asexual species). Regardless, it can occur at any point in ontogeny.
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that cloning counts as a mode of reproduction, then a species from which material has been
preserved would not truly be extinct, if one mode of extinction was that the organisms cannot
reproduce. And this is because the preserved material, combined with technology of cloning,
means the organisms in fact can reproduce, albeit with great human assistance. Yet the need for
the assistance of another species cannot count against the ability of organisms in a species to
reproduce – against it being possible for them to reproduce – since many species of flowering
plants require the assistance of insect pollinators to reproduce, and those flowering species are
not extinct because of that. Inability to reproduce is important, but this is because it causes the
disruption of the species’ internal organization or its ability to function or behave as an
integrated whole. That it would be possible, both conceptually and technically, to generate new
organisms, and thus reinstantiate this organization or functional ability would not change the fact
that these features were disrupted, and it is the disruption which spells extinction. In a vein
similar to one I shall develop below, a watch which has been disassembled and its parts spread
out across the globe does not continue to exist just because it’s possible to reassemble it; nor was
Lazarus any less dead because it was possible for Jesus to revive him. The expanded view of
extinction which I take from de Queiroz and Sober does not imply that a species exists, and is
not extinct, when all that remains of it are preserved cells.
Let me also attempt to anticipate another reaction to what I have said in this section about
extinction and de-extinction. The reaction is that I now seem to have another problem. By the
Progenitor/Parthood Claim, the clones are parts of S. Yet I’m now claiming that S is extinct as
long as S’s internal organization, or its ability to function as an integrated whole, is disrupted. If
S is extinct, that means S does not exist. How can it be that S does not exist if the clones are
parts of S? And they are indeed parts of S. Their descent from other S parts confers upon them
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that status. But S does not exist merely upon the existence of its parts. In the same way, I
contend, numerically that watch (let us call it W) does not exist if the parts of W exist but they
are scattered across the globe.

With the parts combined so that there is watch internal

organization or ability to function or behave as an integrated whole, W is reconstituted, and not
until then is it. Similarly, with the organisms “combined” in such a way that there is species
internal organization or ability to function or behave as an integrated whole, S is reconstituted,
and not until then is it. If the de Queiroz/Sober view of extinction is correct, then parts of S can
exist at a time when S does not (and it should be pointed out that both are advocates of the
individuality thesis [de Queiroz 1999; Sober 1984b, 2000]). In extinction, the parts continue to
exist after S has ceased to exist. Parity of reasoning would suggest that in de-extinction, they
exist prior to S’s resumed existence (at least in the case of sexually reproducing species).
5. Initial Objections: Dolly, Hull, Gunn, and Cloning a Species
Since Gunn is the only writer I know of to address species resurrection from the
perspective of the individuality thesis, in this section I shall explicitly take up Gunn’s objections,
as well as address Hull’s contention that once a species goes extinct, it cannot reappear. What I
intend to show is that Hull’s contention is correct, but beside the point here, and that Gunn’s
objections are unsound.

What I also intend to show in this section is that any lingering

skepticism as to whether clones are, upon their creation, part of the same species as their
progenitors, cannot be sustained. In the next section, I shall take up what I believe is the more
serious objection: that de-extinction on the individuality thesis would mean that resurrected
species are temporally discontinuous individuals. In this section, I shall also take up a worry
which arises from my response to one of Gunn’s objections, namely, whether it is possible to
clone a species.
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5a. Dolly and Non-Natural Conception
First, one might protest that we shouldn’t regard a clone like Dolly to be part of the same
species as her progenitor, since Dolly – unlike the Calvert’s child – was not produced in anything
near the normal way for her species. This protest might be, or might include, that the Calvert’s
child, even though it was conceived in vitro, still was conceived in something like the usual way
for offspring in Homo sapiens – gametes were fused. Whereas, in the case of Dolly – or any
clone, for that matter – there wasn’t any conception at all. Perhaps the offspring of a clone
crossed with a naturally generated organism would be part of the same species as the naturally
generated organism. And this would be true in the case of Dolly’s own actual offspring. But
since this would require the existence of organisms which are unequivocally parts of the species,
and in a case of de-extinction there are no such organisms left, there is no hope for either clones
produced in a de-extinction attempt, or their offspring, being parts of the extinct species. So, deextinction is impossible.
I think this protest fails. That Dolly was not produced in a way normal for her species
seems irrelevant. A result (here, being part of a species) is not necessarily prevented from
counting as a result of some particular kind just because it wasn’t achieved in the normal or
characteristic way, but only if it failed to be achieved in some essential way. The necessary
condition for being part of a species is descent. So this objection regarding Dolly amounts to the
claim that being produced in the way usual for some species is a necessary condtion of descent
(as opposed to the condition I gave for descent earlier). I see no reason to grant this claim, and
will shortly raise a problem for it. But one way I can think of to try to make such a claim would
be to claim that mode of reproduction is an essential property of species. Yet, if species have no
essential intrinsic properties, then this claim is false. What is more, mode of reproduction cannot
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be an essential property of a species, for some species switch from being sexually to asexually
reproducing and back again.
Of course, I do need to qualify this in one way in order to avoid confusion: to say that
how one was generated is not a necessary condition for belonging to a species is not inconsistent
with descent being a necessary condition for belonging to a species. On what I am saying here,
and given what I have said in the past few pages, a clone would be as much a part of a species as
an organism conceived in the usual way, whereas a science fiction creature like Swampman
would not (a la Davidson 1987). It is not Swampman’s mode of creation which excludes him
from Homo sapiens, but his lack of descent.
Second, if the protest indeed was that Dolly wasn’t conceived, it would have to rely upon
a notion of “conception” which would encompass all the known modes of conception in nature,
yet exclude in a non-ad hoc way or on non-question-begging grounds the sort of event which
wrought Dolly (in SCNT, this involves fusing a cell nucleus from the donor with an enucleated
egg, and delivering a shock to the combination to induce cell division).

By “modes of

conception,” I mean not simply broad kinds, such as parthenogenesis, or bisexual parentage, but
also specific ways in which these modes can be brought about, e.g., all the various ways in which
parthenogenesis can be induced. A definition of “conception” suitable for exlcuding Dolly also
would have to avoid excluding unknown modes of conception, including those which evolution
may produce in the future. I am skeptical that such a definition of conception could be had. One
tempting strategy might be to try to exclude the processes involved in cloning from counting as
conception, on the grounds that they are not natural. This would involve the difficult task of
neatly separating the natural from the non-natural, with events or processes carried out by
humans falling on the non-natural side (for skepticism regarding human action as unnatural, see
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Ereshefsky 2007); or it would involve saying why it is that some process or event cannot count
as an event of a particular kind when some element of human intervention or manipulation is
involved (species extinction, for example, is still species extinction whether human action is
involved in it or not).
Yet even if such difficulties could be met, I suspect the strategy would prove selfundermining. It would surely mean that the Calvert’s child was never conceived, because even
though the gametes introduced to one another fused naturally, their introduction to each other,
and the initial nurturing of the resulting zygote and embryo, and its implantation in the uterus of
Anna Johnson, all involved human manipulation and intervention. On the objection we’re
considering, this would mean the child was not part of Homo sapiens. Indeed, if being produced
in the way usual for a species were a necessary condition of descent, and therefore of belonging
to that species, then a human child, conceived parthenogenetically yet fully naturally (as unlikely
as such a thing would be) would not belong to Homo sapiens. Naturally, I am trusting that these
are bullets which my hypothetical interlocutor would not want to bite. On the other hand, if we
allow that the Calvert’s child was conceived, because it includes the natural component of
gamete fusing, then it would seem we would have to allow that Dolly was conceived, for even
though the enucleating of the oocyte, and the introduction into it of the donor nucleus, and the
delivering of the electric shock were not natural (i.e., were the result of human action), the
resulting cell division into an embryo was. And what both cases have in common – indeed, what
all cases of conception have in common – is the induced cell division of an oocyte.89

Oderberg has proposed the following definition of “conception” in human beings: “Conception is that event,
typically involving the union of sperm and egg, which consists in a change in the intrinsic nature of a cell or group
of cells, where that change confers on the cell (or its descendents in the case of division) the intrinsic potential to
develop, given the right extrinsic factors, into a mature human being” (Oderberg 1997, 293). He intends this
definition to cover cases of cloning, as well as ordinary conception, and even hypothetical cases of parthenogenesis,
in human beings (it also carries the intentional implication that monozygotic twins are conceived at twinning). We
89
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5b. Hull and Re-Evolution
Hull’s argument is actually aimed against the view that a species can re-evolve. What
Hull denies is that if a species evolved “which was identical to a species of extinct pterodactyl
save origin” that it would actually be the same species (Hull 1978, 349; emphasis added). It
would no more be the pterodactyl species than a baby born which was genetically identical to
Hitler would be Hitler. This is because species “are segments of the phylogenetic tree,” and once
a segment comes to an end, “it cannot reappear somewhere else in the phylogenetic tree” (Hull
1978, 349; emphasis added).
But if my characterization of matters is correct, species resurrection would not be a case
of re-evolution, nor would it be the appearance of a species somewhere else in the phylogenetic
tree. It remains the same segment, and maintains its place in the tree. It would take a different
place in the tree if we supposed that it had a second origin from a different ancestor. But if I am
right, a resurrected species still has but a single origin: the one it always had. Its de-extinction
does not constitute a second origin from a different ancestor. Since its resurrection does not
constitute a reappearance in the sense to which Hull objects, the possibility of its resurrection
does not conflict with the conceptual truth that a species cannot re-evolve.
5c. Gunn: Extinction and Evolution
Let us now turn to Gunn, who raises four objections to de-extinction, three of which he
believes apply whether species are natural kinds or individuals, with the fourth being an
objection specific to the individuality thesis. I shall address the fourth of these last. The first of
Gunn’s objections I shall consider is that resurrection is logically impossible, since “the ordinary
could readily convert this into a definition of conception which would applicable to all species: Conception is that
event which consists in a change in the intrinsic nature of a cell or group of cells, where that change confers on the
cell (or its descendents in the case of division) the intrinsic potential to develop, given the right extrinsic factors, into
a mature organism.

229

language and scientific definitions of extinction are consistent,” and both are of a “permanently
null class” (Gunn 1991, 299; emphasis in original).
As Gunn acknowledges, such an argument is a resort to “definitional stop.” Gunn finds it
unobjectionable in this case, but I find it unsavory. One can imagine an opponent of Darwin in
the 1860s making a parallel argument: it is logically impossible for species to evolve, since by
both the ordinary and scientific definitions of species, species are immutable. Now, one might
regard this comment about an opponent of Darwin as a bit unfair. If we were to conceive of
species as immutable, as some of Darwin’s opponents did – including Louis Agassiz, Darwin’s
great and tragic opponent in America – then we would of course conclude that it is impossible
for them to evolve. But what happened in the 1860s is that the world learned something new
about species, namely that they are not immutable. Something similar is occurring here with
extinction: we are learning something about it which we didn’t know before, namely that, in the
words of a recent Nature commentary, it “need not be forever” (Kumar 2012). Ordinary and
scientific definitions are both revisable in the light of empirical discovery or the refinement of
theory. If my argument for de-extinction – or any argument made for it – turns out to be sound,
then we will need to revise the definition of “extinction.”
The second of Gunn’s objections to consider is a claim that species de-extinction would
be analogous to a case of convergent evolution. He notes, correctly, that if “two near identical
organisms” evolved at different places and times, they would be classified as belonging to
different species, since biological classification tries to capture history and evolutionary
relationships, not similarity (Gunn 1991, 300). The Australian red back spider and the New
Zealand katipo are very similar phenotypically, but they are separate, although related, species.
Gunn concludes, “If such similar products of non-human-assisted evolution are separate species,
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then surely so are the products of human genetic manipulation” (Gunn 1991, 300; emphasis in
original).
But because what distinguishes one species from another is its origin – its place in the
phylogenetic tree – this argument fails. The red back and the katipo are distinct lineages with
distinct origins which have converged upon similar phenotypes. If what I have been arguing up
until now is correct, and if what I argued in response to Hull’s concern is correct, in a case of deextinction, a species post-extinction has the same origin as the species pre-extinction. It is the
continuation of the very same lineage. They would not have the same origin, nor be the same
lineage, if de-extinction should be regarded instead as a speciation event; in which case, the preand post-extinction populations are separate species (and necessarily they do not share the same
origin). But if I’m right that there has been no lineage split, then there hasn’t been a speciation
event, and again we are looking at a single species with a single origin. De-extinction would not
amount to two species converging upon similar phenotypes (or genotypes).
One proposed method of de-extinction would, however, fall victim to Gunn’s points
about convergent evolution (and to Hull’s regarding the re-evolution of a species): that proposed
for the “de-extinction” of the passenger pigeon, Ectopistes migratorius. This would involve
taking DNA fragments from passenger pigeons in museum displays and attempting to
reconstruct and sequence that genome. With that knowledge in hand, genetic engineers would
edit the genomes of rock pigeons (a close relative) in order to create germ cells which contained
the variations found in passenger pigeons. Those germ cells would then be inserted into rock
pigeon eggs to produce rock pigeons with sperm and egg cells like those of passenger pigeons.
By breeding these pigeons, engineers hope to produce pigeons with phenotypes qualitatively
identical to the passenger pigeon (Cossins 2013, Zimmer 2013).
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If species were simply

genetically or phenotypically similar groups of organisms, this would be de-extinction. But
species are not groups of similar organisms, but groups of organisms related by descent. The
“passenger pigeons” thus produced would not be descended from actual passenger pigeons, but
from rock pigeons; indeed, they themselves would be rock pigeons with mutations genetically
engineered so that the birds resemble passenger pigeons. Even supposing that somehow the
genetic engineering made the “passenger pigeons” reproductively isolated from their rock pigeon
parents, but not from one another, they would then constitute a new species, not Ectopistes
migratorius. This would either be the human-attempted re-evolution of Ectopistes migratorius,
or a case of convergent evolution, with the new pigeon species converging on the Ectopistes
migratorius phenotype and genotype. Either way, it would not be resurrection.
The third of Gunn’s objections to consider is that a “recreated” species could have a
“very different ecological role” from the “original,” particularly if a long time had passed
between its extinction and reintroduction. This, Gunn says, is because “it would not have
evolved in same situation. Indeed, it would not have evolved at all” (Gunn 1991, 301). I take
Gunn’s comment about the species not evolving “in the same situation” either to mean that it
would not have gone through the series of environmental and thus selective phases which the
species would have gone through had it not gone extinct; or to mean that the reintroduced species
might begin to evolve in an environment which was unlike, perhaps even quite unlike, that in
which it had been situated just prior to its extinction.
As the beginnings of a response to this objection, consider Van Valen’s formulation of
the Ecological Species Concept: a species is, in part, a lineage (or set of lineages) “which
occupies an adaptive zone minimally different from that of any other lineage in its range” (Van
Valen 1976, 233). Now, on such a concept, it might be true that, were the species, post-
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resurrection, to take on a different ecological role (that is, to come to occupy a different adaptive
zone), it might cease to be the same species. But this is not true on all species concepts; so
Gunn’s conclusion could only follow by presupposing an ecological concept. Moreover, if the
species did come to occupy a different ecological role, it would cease to be the same species only
then. A certain amount of time would have to pass before that happened, making it a case of reextinction post-resurrection. At the moment it was resurrected, the species would still be the
same species as the one which went extinct.

This is also my response to the second

interpretation I offered above to Gunn’s claim that the species “would not have evolved in the
same situation.”
For a response to the first interpretation of that claim (and also somewhat for the second),
note that there’s a possible world where the extinct species survived yet still did not go through
the series of episodes which it would have gone through in the actual world had it survived here.
Thinking back to Gunn’s concern about the species taking on a different ecological role than it
originally had, there’s also a possible world in which the species survived, and took on exactly
the new role it takes on in the actual world post-resurrection. Under those conditions, on some
types of species concepts – interbreeding and phylogenetic concepts – the species would remain
the same species. Even if, on an ecological concept, the species would ultimately fail to be the
same species under those conditions, it would, again, at the time it was resurrected, still have
been the same species as the one which went extinct.
And just as there are two things Gunn could mean in saying the species “would not have
evolved in the same situation,” there are also two things Gunn could mean in saying that the
species “would not have evolved at all.” One would be that the species did not evolve during its
period of extinction. But while it is probably true that no species stops evolving, species identity
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doesn’t depend upon continual evolution. Theoretically, a species could fall under such strong
stabilizing selection that its gene frequencies would not change for a number of generations (or,
if it is a large population, there is no selection, and mating is random, it will go to and remain at
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium). Yet it would remain the same species. But if Gunn here means
the “recreated” species would never have evolved, he is begging the question, for he would be
assuming that the reintroduced species is a new species, not a continuation of the old one. If it is
a continuation, then it shares the same evolutionary history as the pre-extinction species, for they
are one and the same.90
5d. Gunn: Bentham’s Clone
Gunn’s final argument against de-extinction is aimed specifically at the individuality
thesis, and is similar to Hull’s example of a child genetically identical to Hitler. Gunn notes that
the most likely method (at least at the time of his writing) for resurrecting a species would be
SCNT, to “create individual organisms which would be genetically identical to the individuals
whose DNA was used” (Gunn 1991, 301). But, he counters, suppose we used cells from Jeremy
Bentham’s embalmed body to clone Bentham.

Even though this new organism would be

genetically identical to Bentham, it would not be Bentham, but “a different person, with a
different history of experiences and different role in life” (Gunn 1991, 301). Gunn then turns
from this point to his claim that a “recreated species” would also have a different role. Together,
these points are meant to establish that resurrecting a species is logically impossible, because it is
logically impossible to “recreate” an individual.
I have already addressed Gunn’s remarks on the resurrected species having a new role.
Indeed, it seems the important consideration is neither the species role, nor the different role
There is also an element of question-begging in Gunn’s use of the term “recreate” and its cognates. To call
something a “recreation” suggests, I think, that it is not the original, but a distinct object with a distinct origin.
90
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which a recreated Bentham would have, but rather the fact that genetically identical Hitler, or
cloned Bentham, have distinct origins from their namesakes, distinct “insertions into history,” to
use Hull’s phrase. They have distinct roles due to their distinct insertions into history. So, the
argument under examination now either suffers from a composition fallacy, or a category
mistake, or assumes something which is false, or all three, in the following way:
That a clone of Bentham would not be Bentham is supposed to convince us that it is
impossible to resurrect a species through cloning, if species are individuals. However: let us
grant that none of the clones produced in a de-extinction project would be numerically identical
to the organisms whose DNA was used. This does not establish that one could not reconstitute
numerically the same species through the production of clones, none of which are numerically
identical to their progenitors. That is, it does not establish that the individual composed of the
clones was not a segment of numerically the same individual as that composed of the extinct
organisms. That is the composition fallacy. The category mistake occurs in the same conclusion
from a fact about the numerical identity of cloned organisms to the numerical identity of a
species. Gunn’s argument would succeed if what is being considered was the cloning of a
species-individual. For then we would have to conclude that, because in the cloning of an
organism-individual, one does not produce a numerically identical organism but a new
individual, so in the cloning of a species-individual, one produces not numerically the same
species, but a new one. Yet what is being considered in de-extinction is not the cloning of a
species-individual, for that is not possible; and to think that it is possible is either to commit a
category mistake, or assume something which is false. So, for both these reasons, Gunn’s
argument from the hypothetical cloning of Bentham fails.
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My claim that it is a category mistake, or simply false, to think one can clone a species
requires further defense, however; and this is where I must address the problem arising from the
possibility of resurrecting a species by producing but a single organism. It requires that we get
some definition on “cloning.” For at least the sort of cloning we are generally considering,
SCNT, let us say that a “clone” of an entity is an entity produced using this process and
technology, which is genetically (but not numerically) identical to the original entity, and is of
the same category as the original; or is in a different category but is still genetically (but not
numerically) identical to the donor entity.91 Let us say, then, that “to clone an x” is to produce an
x which is genetically identical to the x from which material was taken to create the x in question,
or which is genetically identical to the donor of that material, the “x” being filled in by a sortal
term such as “cell” or “organism.” And whether one has cloned an x (as opposed to an entity of
another category) also depends upon what one intended to produce, or does in fact end up
producing, where “end up producing” has to do with where, along the developmental process
starting from the zygote or embryo generated in SCNT, one stops.
This definition will, I think, capture what biologists mean when they talk about “cloning
a cell,” or cells, which is to use SCNT to produce a cell (or cells) which are genetically (but not
numerically) identical to the cell(s) from which material was taken to produce the cell(s) in
question – the end-product cell(s). To clone an organism is thus to produce an organism which is
genetically (but not numerically) identical to the organism from which material used in SCNT
was taken. Notably, even though in both cases one starts out with an oocyte implanted with a
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The technology involved in producing organisms using the alternate method of cloning I mentioned above
(creating induced pluripotent stem cells in order to make sperm and egg cells), has not been fully elaborated, so it is
unclear whether organisms produced in this manner would be genetically identical to their progenitors, at least in a
sexually reproducing species. With an asexually reproducing species, of course, the offspring will always be genetic
copies of the progenitors, and so the method of cloning would make no difference here. So I shall confine my
remarks here to somatic cell nuclear transfer.
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somatic cell nucleus, and then a zygote and embryo, what also makes it the case that a cell, or an
organism, has been cloned is that that is where the developmental process is halted. In the case
of organisms, this is an involuntary halting point, since there is no possible further stage in the
developmental process. This definition of cloning will also capture what biologists mean when
they say they clone stem cells, since we refer to the other disjunct in the definiens. In cloning
stem cells, material is not necessarily taken from stem cells, but from a cell, or an organism; yet
the stem cells are still genetically identical to those donors. We should also say that what is
cloned may be some byproduct of some stage in the developmental process, since a cloned cell,
or cloned stem cells, will not strictly speaking be a stage in that process, but would instead be
taken from an entity which is, or is at, such a stage, e.g., an embryo.
So, what does this say about the possibility of cloning a species? Under the definition
I’ve given, to clone a species would mean to produce a species which is genetically (but not
numerically) identical to the species from which material was taken to create the species in
question, or which is genetically identical to the donor of that material. Intuitively, we might
want to say that the material has been taken from an organism, that the donor in question is an
organism. But anything taken from a part of an object is also taken from that object. So, on the
individuality thesis, if that organism is part of a species, that material was taken from a species;
the donor is also a species. Moreover, I’ve also said that in certain cases, in producing a single
organism (or even before that), one resurrects its species. Wouldn’t we have to say, then, that
biologists, in cloning but a single organism from an extinct species, have cloned the species?
And if cloning cannot produce numerically the same individual, and species are individuals,

237

wouldn’t we then have to say that a de-extinction project could not possibly produce a new
segment of numerically the same species-individual, but a new species entirely? 92
The answer is no, for two reasons. First, a clone (i.e., the entity produced), at least in
SCNT, is some stage in the developmental process from zygote to organism, or a byproduct of
that stage. A species is not a stage in that developmental process; to think so is to make the
category mistake. It is true that, in a de-extinction project, under certain conditions, upon
producing an organism, one would have reconstituted the species. But that is not the same thing
as a species being the terminal product of development, a process which can produce no more
higher-order object than an organism. While a single organism can constitute or compose a
species, it itself is not a species, nor is a species a byproduct of an organism in the way in which
a stem cell is a byproduct of an embryo. This consideration will take care of asexual species.
Second, if the relevant cohesion-inducing process cannot begin or take effect until the
cloned organisms reproduce, then one does not clone the species by cloning organisms. They
must be related one to the other in the appropriate way, and this is not effected by the process of
cloning. The cohesion-inducing process begins after at least some of the cloning is complete,
and is a process of a different kind. It would be incorrect to think that in SCNT, what one really
produces is some set of cells, and then, as an optional move in addition to that, if one induces
them to cohere in the right way such that they form an individual, that is how one clones an
organism. But that is what would have to be going on if it were correct to speak of cloning a
species. This consideration takes care of sexually reproducing species.
Notice also that the relevant sense of being “genetically identical” is missing. Cells
contain DNA, or a DNA sequence (strictly speaking, they contain at least two DNA sequences,
the nuclear and mitochondrial DNA; but let us focus on nuclear DNA, since that is the sense of
92

I thank Michael Lynch for bringing the troubling apparent possibility of cloning a species to my attention.
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genetic identity which is involved in cloning). Cell A is genetically identical to Cell B if and
only if they have or contain the same DNA sequence. It also makes sense to say that we can
have cases of organisms being genetically identical, if they also have or contain the same DNA
sequence, in virtue of their component somatic cells all containing (barring small errors from
replication or other mutation) exactly the same DNA sequence. Actually, we should probably
say that the organisms contain an enormous number of DNA sequences, if the cells properly
contain one sequence apiece; it’s just that all of these sequences are identical.
Now, organisms are composed of cells, and, on the individuality thesis, species are
composed of organisms. Can two species be genetically identical? They can, if, moving up one
level in terms of composition, they contained all the same DNA sequences, in virtue of their
component organisms containing just exactly the same DNA sequences. This would mean that
every organism in species S1 containing some DNA sequence s would be matched in the other
species S2 by an organism containing s. But, since there is but one sequence per organism
(excepting cases of identical twins), for two species to be genetically identical, each species
would have to contain exactly the same organisms (in terms of genetic identity). Since species
are temporally extended entities, this means that S2 would have to contain genetically identical
organisms for every organism which has ever belonged to S1, at least up until the moment we are
considering the question.93 That won’t be possible in a de-extinction project, since cells from
only a few of those organisms will have been preserved. That is, it won’t be possible to produce
one-for-one genetically identical organisms for every organism which ever existed in the species

93

My acknowledgment of the possibility of two species being genetically identical does not commit me to species
being natural kinds defined by genetic properties. In saying that the two species would be genetically identical, I am
not committed to their being numerically identical, any more than anyone is committed to saying that genetically
identical organisms, such as identical (monozygotic) twins, are numerically the same organism.
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being resurrected. So, in a de-extinction project, one does not obtain a genetically identical
species.94
There are two responses which I can imagine to the above line of reasoning. The first is
that it’s an accident that cells haven’t been taken from every organism which was ever a part of
the various species being considered for de-extinction. Suppose a species (again, of vertebrate
animal) were to come into existence today, or in the future, and biologists were to take cell
samples from every organism in that species, up until and including the last one. They then
create a clone of every one of those organisms. Wouldn’t that amount to making a species which
is genetically identical to the extinct species, and thus amount to cloning that species, and thus
mean that in fact a new species had been created (since a clone of an individual is not
numerically identical to that individual)? The second is that the objection, and my reply to it,
might seem to be tacitly assuming that – or at least wondering whether – the extinct species and
the one produced by producing a clone are not numerically identical. But suppose the species
produced by the cloning of an organism really is a continuation of the extinct species, that they
are numerically identical? Wouldn’t the two species have to be genetically identical, since every
entity which is genetical at all must be genetically identical to itself? And if they are genetically
identical, wouldn’t this mean that the species had been cloned, with the result that it could not be
numerically the same species?
My reply to the first response is that while the definition of cloning which I’ve given has
that conceptual implication regarding the creation of a genetically identical species, it is
completely innocuous. That’s because the response still falls victim to the considerations which
show that it’s either a category mistake, or simply false, to think that one can clone a species.
One might think it would be impossible to clone a species upon cloning a single organism just because, in Dolly’s
case, Dolly’s species was not cloned when her progenitor was cloned. The difference is that Dolly’s species still
existed, and we are here considering what it would take to reconstitute a species.
94
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My reply to the second response, which seems to generate the contradiction that the species
would not be numerically identical to itself if and only if it was, is that the response already gives
away too much. The definition of cloning involves the creation of an entity which is genetically
but not numerically identical to the donor entity.

If, by hypothesis, the created entity is

numerically identical to the donor entity, due to its being a continuation of the donor entity, then
we can’t be dealing with a case of cloning of that particular entity, but of some other entity of
another type or category.
6. Temporally Discontinuous Individuals
Let us now turn to what I imagine is the most serious objection to my argument. If
species are individuals, then if species S is extinct, then the individual which is S has ceased to
exist. If I’m right that de-extinction is conceptually possible, then resurrected species are
individuals which come back into existence. The population pre-extinction and the population
post-resurrection would be temporally disconnected segments of numerically the same
individual. Yet it is generally held that a defining characteristic of individuals is that they are
spatiotemporally continuous, and advocates of the individuality thesis have cited this as a
consideration in favor of that thesis (in addition to species being spatiotemporally restricted).
Species, in order to evolve by a process of natural selection, must be composed of entities which
exhibit spatial proximity, since there is no “reproduction at a distance,” and they must be
temporally continuous, because in order for selection to act upon traits, those traits must be
inherited by one generation from the previous (Hull 1978, 341; Hull 1987). In a defense of the
individuality thesis, Ghiselin comments that “continuity across space as well as through time” is
“obviously crucial to our conception of individuality” (Ghiselin 1997, 41). Ghiselin does go on
to say that “[p]erhaps there are cases in which something can get from one place to another ...
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without traversing the intermediate space or time,” but he thinks such things are relegated to
“science fiction.”95
Outside philosophy of biology, David Lewis for one characterizes the situation well, in
his discussion of the impossibility of travel between worlds: travel requires survival, which
requires causal continuity, even within a world (and since Lewis denies there can be trans-world
causation, there can be no trans-world personal survival, and hence no trans-world travel).
Lewis asks us to imagine that a demon annihilates people at random, while another demon in the
same world creates people at random. By coincidence, the creating demon creates someone
qualitatively identical to someone whom the destroying demon has annihilated. This would not
be a case of survival of the destroyed individual. While there is qualitative continuity between
the annihilated and created individuals, there is no causal continuity between them (Lewis 1986,
81; see also Lewis 1976).
Consider first, however, that we already accept that numerous individuals are spatially
discontinuous. A detached garage is part of the house, even though they are disconnected. The
Seventh Street Residence Hall is part of the campus of New York University, even though it is
seven or eight city blocks away from the main cluster of buildings around Washington Square.
The NYU campus itself is a highly spatially discontinuous individual. The many buildings of
which it consists are only a fraction of the buildings spread out over many blocks in Manhattan,
and the campus cannot even be thought to be made contiguous, as it at many colleges, by the
ground on which all the university buildings sit, since not all of it is owned or occupied by NYU
(this includes a number of city streets, and Washington Square itself). Alaska and Hawaii are
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Of course, in 1997, prior to the announcement of the cloning of Dolly (who is remarkable for being the first
mammalian clone, produced at a time when biologists were unsure whether mammals could be cloned), resurrecting
a species might have seemed like science fiction. See, e.g., (Ehrenfeld 1993, 203), who believes using genetic
engineering as a conservation tool is not worth serious consideration, “barring a miracle.”
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part of the United States, despite being separated from the contiguous 48 states by thousands of
miles. The Channel Islands off the Pacific Coast of California are part of the state of California;
or, if there are worries that either or both of my latter two examples have been achieved through
administrative fiat, the Channel Islands are part of the continent of North America. To invoke
the example beloved of advocates of the individuality thesis, slime molds sometimes spend some
part of their existence disaggregated (de Queiroz 1999; Hull 1987). Four dimensionalists, to
make their views seem plausible, are fond of drawing analogies between spatial and temporal
parts; so, for four dimensionalists at least, it would seem to be a natural move to extend this
analogizing to gaps. If objects can have spatially discontinuous spatial parts, why not temporally
discontinuous temporal parts? If spatial gaps, why not temporal gaps?
But I don’t wish to presuppose four-dimensionalism here, or make my account of deextinction beholden to it (even though the individuality thesis seems to fit very naturally into a
four-dimensionalist perspective).96 And even four dimensionalists may wonder what it is that
unites the temporally discontinuous segments into a single individual. Instead, let us consider
that it may not be strictly true that individuals cannot be temporally discontinuous. Perhaps we
would be willing to say that a watch, disassembled into its constituent parts and spread out onto
the jeweler’s counter for repair, continues to exist. If the owner came into the jeweler’s shop to
inquire about the repairs and asked the jeweler where the watch was, he might accept as a reply
the jeweler sweeping his hand over the watch parts and saying, “Your watch is here.” On the
other hand, the watch, if it exists, is unable to carry out its characteristic function in a

As Elder notes (Elder 2008), there is a strong streak of perdurantism in Hull’s writing. See (Hull 1989c, 187),
where Hull contrasts what he believes is the common sense view of “Moses wandered through the Sinai” with its
metaphysical reality, that Moses is a “four-dimensional space-time worm” which never moves at all. The Moses
who moves “is a momentary segment” of that worm.
96

243

disaggregated state. One cannot use it to tell time, nor dangle it in front of a hypnotism subject
and urge the subject to keep her concentration on it.
Suppose, however, that the watch were disassembled, and its parts scattered to remote
corners of the globe, where they remain; or perhaps even that each part is integrated into a
distinct watch of the same or a similar kind, where they remain for years. In either case, it seems
to be a natural conclusion to say that the watch no longer exists. Yet suppose this watch held
sentimental appeal to a man; it was his great-grandfather’s watch, given to his great-grandfather
by Theodore Roosevelt, in recognition of some service his great-grandfather had done for TR.
The enterprising man tracks down the parts, and assembles them into a watch. It would seem
strange to deny that the man had recovered the original watch. In 1931, newspaper magnate
William Randolph Hearst purchased the chapter house of the 800-year-old Santa Maria de Ovila
Monastery in Ovila, Spain, which he had disassembled, and the components shipped to the
United States. He planned to reassemble it in California, but due to the downturn in his finances
caused by the Great Depression, he was unable to. The chapter house components sat in
warehouses in San Francisco until the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, when
reassembly finally began at an abbey north of San Francisco (Hogan 2006). A very natural
interpretation of the story of the chapter house is that it existed for 800 years, then ceased to exist
for more than 70 years – like the disassembled watch, the chapter house was unable to serve any
of the functions structures characteristically do – and then was resurrected.
Cases such as disassembled watches and disaggregated buildings are, of course, inexact
analogues to the case of a resurrected species. In the examples we’ve been considering, the
watch and the chapter house are reassembled from numerically the same parts, and if my analysis
of de-extinction is correct, a species is being reconstituted out of numerically different parts. So,
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consider what I believe would be a more analogous case: a glee club exists at a high school for a
number of years, and it is composed of different students from year to year.97 Then, due to lack
of interest, or budgetary constraints, the glee club is disbanded. No students belong to it for a
decade. It is fair to say that the glee club no longer exists. A decade later, however, some
students at the high school develop an interest in competitive singing. They find the original
club’s charter typed up on mimeograph and gathering dust in the back of a filing cabinet in the
school’s administration office, and invoking the charter, and with the permission of the
administration (which, let us say, is a requirement of the charter, such approvals often being
necessary for campus clubs to be official), reconstitute the glee club. It is fair to say that the glee
club has been resurrected. It is not a new club, but numerically the same club, composed of
numerically different students.

The charter provides historical continuity between the two

phases of the club, and is what unites these phases into temporal segments of the same
individual.
Let me be more clear what my actual argument is here.

I do not claim that the

hypothetical example of the glee club establishes that, in de-extinction, the pre- and post-deextinction populations are temporally discontinuous segments of the same species-individual.
My position is that my argument involving the progenitor/parthood relation does that. Rather,
my purpose in employing the glee club example is to make the position from that argument
appear more plausible, or natural. There is an analog, too, between the common charter of the
two phases of the club and the preserved cells which would be used in de-extinction attempts;
through both runs the historical continuity which unites the two “phases” into discontinuous
segments of the same individual – or perhaps it would be better to say that both provide the
97

I owe the germ of this example to Michael Hughes, as well as the observation at the beginning of this chapter that
scientists might be able to learn much about an extinct species if what is “resurrected” is only a closely related, not
numerically identical, species.
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means by which historical continuity is maintained. The preserved cells permit the very sort of
transmission of information which is involved in descent. Note also that, in the case of a species,
because descent is itself a causal process, there is causal continuity between the two segments,
which is what was lacking in Lewis’ example of the individual-creating demon. It is true that the
causal continuity involves or has been effected by human intervention. But, as with insect
pollinators and flowering plants, the fact that descent was effected with the assistance or
intervention of another species does not make it any less a case of descent.
Yet it would be incorrect to claim that the species still existed during the period between
extinction and resurrection in virtue of the existence of the preserved cells. Species are not
composed of cells, but of organisms (or populations of organisms). Derivatively, they are
composed of cells, since organisms are composed of cells, and species are composed of
organisms. But mere cells, not united into organisms, do not compose a species, and so the
preserved cells which conservationists would have set aside for future study and possible deextinction projects do not compose a species. So the species does not exist at times when all that
remains of it are preserved cells.
Moving away from analogies involving temporally discontinuous objects, consider again
one common objection to the individuality thesis, and the reply to it: that species are not
spatially contiguous, whereas paradigm individuals such as organisms are. As critics like Caplan
have noted, strictly speaking, species are not spatially continuous (Caplan 1981). Hull’s reply is
that such a consideration biases a perspective which is appropriate to organisms. “From the
point of view of atomic entities and processes,” the parts of organisms (and, one should add,
many if not most other medium-sized objects) are not spatially contiguous, and are in fact mostly
empty space. On the other hand, “[t]he appropriate frame of reference for species is evolutionary
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time,” and from that perspective, the parts of species “are usually contiguous in space and time”
(Hull 1981, 150). If evolutionary time is the proper perspective for thinking about species, then
were a species to be extinct for a few decades, or even a century or more, and then resurrected, it
would have ceased to exist for no time, or next to no time, at all. From the point of view of
evolutionary time, it might exhibit no temporal discontinuity at all.
Perhaps it might be thought that this line of thought is inadequate, and that when it comes
to individuals, no temporal break is permitted (but then what of the watch or the chapter house
reassembled after decades?); or that in certain cases, as with the mammoth, de-extinction would
be effected thousands of years after the species went extinct, and this length of time begins to
become significant on an evolutionary scale. Indeed, as shown by studies of the peppered moth,
or Endler’s classic work on changes due to predation pressures in the number, size, color, and
pattern of spots on the Trinidadian guppy Poecilia reticulata (Endler 1980), evolution can occur
on human time scales. Likewise, one might also think that there will be a decisive objection
from evolutionary theory itself, in that, if Hull is correct, evolution seems to require that species
be temporally continuous.
Yet recall, from the chapter on essentialism, Kitcher’s example of the allegedly reevolving hybrid species, and Ereshefsky’s response to the possibility of historically
discontinuous taxa: in order for species to evolve, the organisms in them must be “connected by
heredity relations,” and this requires that populations in a species be “historically connected;” if
they are not, then “information will not be transmitted” (Ereshefsky 1992, 688). What I
highlighted there, and reiterate here, is Ereshefsky’s emphasis upon historical connection or
continuity.

Hull highlights this himself in his argument that species must be “defined

genealogically,” in his citing of “Darwin’s ‘strong principle of inheritance’” (that organisms
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“tend to produce offspring similarly characterised” as them [Darwin 1859, 127]) – evolution by
natural selection is impossible unless there is inheritance from one generation to the next (Hull
1987, 180). But Darwin’s strong principle of inheritance is upheld in de-extinction by cloning; if
I am correct that information has been transmitted from progenitor to clone, then the necessary
heredity relations are established. Clearly, spatial contiguity between organisms is not required
under the individuality thesis, only spatial proximity, for, as Hull points out, “at the very least
propagules must come into contact” (Hull 1987, 180). So it would seem that temporal contiguity
also is not required, so long as historical continuity is maintained. And it is my contention that it
is. The state of affairs in which we find ourselves, as we stand on the verge of what may end up
being numerous de-extinction projects, is one in which historical continuity and temporal
continuity, which in nature are inseparable, can be pried apart by the technologies which would
or could be used in de-extinction. But this is no different in kind from human technologies
disrupting other natural continuities or regularities.
Another possible way of viewing de-extinction and temporal discontinuities is inspired
by something like a combination of the considerations above (about historical continuity) with
some from Lewis’ classic discussion of the paradoxes of time travel.

Lewis suggests we

distinguish between “external time,” or “time itself,” and the “personal time” of a time traveler,
by which Lewis means time “measured by his [the time traveler’s] wristwatch” or “that which
occupies a certain role in the pattern of events that comprise the time traveler’s life” (Lewis
1976, 146)(notice that “personal time” is not the phenomenology of time – it is not the traveler’s
felt passage of time). From the perspective of “external time,” the time traveler is a temporally
discontinuous individual. With respect to external time, different temporal stages of him exist at
discontinuous times, and not necessarily in what we would think of as a normal sequence; that is,
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he could be born at one point with respect to external time (this year, perhaps) but die at a much
earlier point with respect to external time (say, in ancient Egypt). But with respect to his
personal time, the stages are continuous. And what unites them is “the same sort of mental, or
mostly mental, continuity and connectedness that unites anyone else” (Lewis 1976, 148), where
each successive stage depends causally upon the stage before it.
Looking at species, the segment of the species-individual which is formed by deextinction is historically continuous with the segment which existed at extinction, and, of course,
with earlier segments as well. And that, I’ve argued, is the appropriate sort of continuity to
consider in this case, just as the sort of continuity to consider in the case of the time traveler is
his “mental, or mostly mental, continuity.” With respect to “external time,” the species goes
extinct and fails to exist for a length of time, and then, almost as it were (and somewhat like the
time traveler) “appears out of thin air,” becoming a temporally discontinuous individual. But
with respect to the species “personal time” – the relations which occupy a certain role in the
pattern of events that comprise the species’ life – there is no discontinuity at all (and since
“personal time” is not the felt passage of time, we need not worry about whether there is
“something it is like” to be a particular species and experience the passage of time). Indeed, with
respect to species “personal time,” the species might not have been extinct at all. There is one
generation, and then there is another, just as usually happens with species persistence.
Now, one difference between Lewis’ case and ours is that the later stage (post-extinction)
of the species does not depend causally upon just the earlier stage (at or prior to extinction)
alone, but also upon the activities of human beings. That is, it relies on causation in some sense
external to the species, as well as internal to it, whereas with Lewis’ time traveler, the continuitysustaining causation seems to be entirely internal. But this, I have argued, is no different in kind
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than a species which requires the intervention of organisms in other species for its organisms to
reproduce, and so to persist. In such species, each successive generation or stage depends
causally upon the existing generation, and upon the activities of organisms in other species. That
the species at one point in its existence did not require such assistance in order to persist, and
then did, and then again did not (assuming it can be re-introduced into the wild and there persist
without human intervention) would be immaterial. It could not threaten the species’ identity,
because species have no essential intrinsic properties, including mode of reproduction.
I shall consider two possible objections to these thoughts about historical continuity and
temporally discontinuous individuals before moving on. The first returns us to Gunn’s example
of Bentham’s clone. The objection is this: if what I’m saying about historical continuity
preserving the identity of a species across a temporal gap is correct, then why isn’t a clone of
Bentham a continuation of Bentham, and numerically identical to him, since the clone seems to
be historically continuous with the progenitor? And the response is this: if I’m right, then the
clone is descended from Bentham; and since nothing can be descended from itself, the clone
cannot be Bentham. Recall from Chapter 2 that descent is a transitive relation (if C is descended
from B, and B from A, then C is descended from A). But note now that it is neither a symmetric
relation (if B is descended from A, A is not descended from B; you are descended from your
father, but not vice-versa) nor, case in point, reflexive: A cannot be descended from A; you are
not descended from yourself.
Now, descent may certainly be involved in the survival of an individual. The cells which
currently compose me are descended from earlier cells which composed me. This is consistent
with Lewis’ argument above: the cells (or whatever the components are) which compose the
individual which the one demon creates are not descended from the components which
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composed the individual which the other demon destroyed. So the two individuals cannot be
numerically the same individual (or temporally disconnected segments of the same individual),
no matter how qualitatively indistinguishable they are. But I am not descended from me.
Descent is a relation which holds only between distinct individuals or entities. A population at
one stage of a species’ existence is descended from a population at an earlier stage, but they are
nonetheless numerically distinct populations (that the temporal boundaries of populations may be
vague does not change this fact). This is also true in the evolution of conceptual or economic
systems: a stage of feudalism, or of global capitalism, or of Christianity, will be descended from
an earlier stage, but they will be numerically distinct stages.98
However, it now may seem that I face a new problem: that I am committing something
like the same composition fallacy which I claim Gunn committed above. The cells which
compose me now are descended from the cells which composed me 30 years ago, and probably
none of those cells is the same (with the exception perhaps of neurons). Yet they compose
numerically the same organism. So why don’t the cells which compose Bentham’s clone
actually compose Bentham himself? None of those cells is numerically identical to the cells
from which they are descended, but I can’t claim on those grounds that they can’t compose
numerically the same individual without committing Gunn’s composition fallacy. But this new
objection fails to see that the cells which compose Bentham’s clone are not descended from the
cells which compose Bentham. With somatic cells, cells are descended from other cells through
mitosis, and that’s not how we got all the cells which compose Bentham’s clone. We got them
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And if this is correct, it suggests that conceptual systems, no less than organisms and species, are individuals, or
some sort of individual-like historical entity. See Hull 1985, 1988, 1990; but cf. Boyd 1999a, who, as we saw,
claims that forests and tropical storms are developing “natural individuals” with stages, but that economic and
conceptual systems are HPC kinds.)
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through artificial creation of a zygote, and subsequent cell division and differentiation. So those
cells, descended from that zygote, do not compose Bentham.
The second objection has to do with the analogy with the glee club. Why should we
think that the glee club does not exist, rather than thinking that it exists but is merely inactive, or
dormant, or that the “reconstituted” glee club is actually a new, distinct club? And if it is
inactive or dormant, then why not consider that a species in which the last organism has died, but
from which a small amount of material has been preserved, still in fact exists, but is merely
dormant, or inactive?99 My thinking here is that the details matter. The persistence conditions
for species are fairly clear: the lineage cannot be permanently split, in a sexually reproducing
species there must be reproductive isolation from other populations, and the minimal number of
organisms necessary to produce offspring must be alive and capable of doing so, in order to
maintain the species’ internal organization and ability to behave as a whole with respect to a
particular cohesion-inducing process. Glee clubs are not such a well-defined kind, at least in
terms of their persistence conditions, that we can say in general what their persistence conditions
are. It might be that a school would consider that the club exists but is inactive if it nominally
has members but they have engaged in no activities, or if it hasn’t registered for a certain number
of consecutive semesters, or if it hasn’t paid its dues for a particular period of time, or under
some other conditions. Or a school might consider it extinct under any one or more of those
conditions, or others. It will depend upon the conditions they have set forth to govern such
matters.
Some claims that the club exists but is merely dormant or inactive would seem strange: it
has no officers, no members, it’s not registered with the school, it hasn’t engaged in any
activities, and this state of affairs has obtained for a decade; nevertheless, the club exists, the
99

I thank Lionel Shapiro and Donald Baxter for raising these questions.
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school has a glee club, it’s just inactive. It seems that under such conditions, the best thing to say
is not that the club exists but is inactive, but rather that it no longer exists. However, should
another group of students a decade later select officers, re-register, and take up activities under
the original charter, I contend that (it’s at least plausible that) this is the same club reconstituted.
Or, if it had no officers, and so forth, the charter had been lost, no one remembers what was in it,
none of its last members are still at the school, and a group of students took an interest a decade
later in forming a glee club, then it seems the best thing to say is that there is no historical
connection with the old club, and what the new students do is form a new club that resembles the
old and perhaps has the same name. And what is true about the persistence conditions for this or
that particular club may not translate into persistence conditions for other types of organizations,
such as corporations, where for various practical or economic reasons the law may say
something different.

Despite these permutations, there still could be a case in which an

organization ceases to exist and then is reconstituted as numerically the same organization,
composed of different people.
On the other hand, it seems entirely strange to say that a species exists but is inactive.
Particularly if a species is a unit with respect to some process, which implies some sort of causal
activity, it is not even clear what an inactive species would be, or how an inactive species would
be different from one which is extinct.

To think that a species exists when there are no

organisms and no internal organization would be more or less to treat species as Delord does, as
atemporal classes, or, to borrow again from Sober (Sober 1980, 2000), as akin to slots in the
periodic table, which would not cease to exist even if they were currently uninstantiated. Again,
on all extant species concepts, species are composed of organisms, or populations of organisms,
so it would be incorrect to think that a species exists when all that remains of it are preserved
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cells. Yet suppose we thought that the individual which is the species does exist during the time
that all that remains are preserved cells, in virtue of their existence, and their status as parts of the
“proper” parts of this object. Since species are composed of organisms, and not of the detached
parts of organisms, during that period of time that individual (or that segment of the individual in
question) must fail to be or compose a species. So the species does not exist during that time.
Perhaps we could think of annual plant species as existing yet being dormant (but not
inactive) during the winter, when all of the plants die, and all that remains are seeds which will
germinate in the spring.

Gunn argues that we ought to consider annual plant species as

continuing to exist even during such a phase, rather than as going extinct, and a new species
evolving every spring. This is so, he contends, even though all that survives the winter “are
genes, not plants” (Gunn 1991). So it might be open to us to say that a species is not extinct
even if all that remains is genetic material. If true, this would lend support to the idea that a
species exists – and so is not extinct – when all that is left are preserved cells, due to the
existence of genetic material in cell nuclei (although I believe the notion of “genes” which Gunn
has here is genetic material in fused gametes). The problem is that Gunn misconstrues what is
happening in such a case. True, nothing is around which looks like a plant, but the seeds are not
genes. They are plants, but at the very earliest stage of their development. More precisely: they
are organisms, parts of that species, at the earliest stage of their development.100 So we still do
not have a case in which a species exists absent organisms.
7. Lesser Alternatives, and the Least Revision of Our Beliefs
At the beginning of this chapter, I said I would consider some alternate ways of viewing
de-extinction, on the individuality thesis (and anti-essentialism), which I think are weighed
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against.

I take it that the motivation for alternatives would be avoidance of temporally

discontinuous individuals, that accepting temporally discontinuous individuals is not the least
revision we can make to our “web of belief” in light of serious proposals to resurrect extinct
species. Surely, the thought might be, individuals being necessarily spatiotemporally continuous
in the way in which we previously thought is deeper into the interior of the web than are the
individuality thesis or de-extinction (Quine 1951). And, if the prospect of de-extinction means
we are facing some sort of conceptual shift, then there might be wide latitude to adjust our
concepts in various ways.101 We have already seen one such attempt to avoid spatiotemporally
discontinuous individuals – positing that a species continues to exist when all that remains is
frozen cells – and seen why this attempt does not succeed. In further response to this line of
argument, I shall first consider another possible example of such an alternate move, then move
on to some more general thoughts along this line. What will emerge is that, when it comes to deextinction and temporally discontinuous individuals, what I have proposed already is the least
revision of our beliefs consistent with evolutionary biology.
While I agree that we face a situation in which we must re-evaluate the concept of
extinction – namely that it is not forever – and thus that we face a conceptual shift in this regard,
I think any claim that we face the sort of conceptual shift which would allow wide latitude in the
101

This is a possibility posed to me by Ruth Millikan. A different, but related, concern might be a theme from
Millikan: that I am taking terms or concepts developed for the actual world, and defining or projecting them for or
into some possible world in which circumstances have so changed that the features of the world which ground those
terms and concepts are gone, and thus that those terms and concepts have lost their meanings – or that what genetic
engineers are contemplating with de-extinction would amount to just such a change, such that the terms or concepts
which they use now have lost their meanings (Millikan 2000, 2010). I deal with the latter possibility below. In the
former possibility, the conclusion might be the same: since the terms and concepts have lost their meanings, we are
at complete liberty to redefine them however we wish. My response is the same here as below: I think this
overstates the situation. The present chapter is not an attempt to project actual-world concepts into all possible
worlds (the philosophical method to which Millikan objects); we are not considering a bizarre counterfactual world.
If we are contemplating a possible world – one in which de-extinction happens as I have been discussing it – then it
is one which may be the actual world. I am sympathetic to Millikan’s view that language and thought “evaporate”
when we try to “relocate them in worlds that are too far away” (Millikan 2010, 75). This is also a theme in Hull
(Hull 2001). But there is no being closer to something than being identical to it, and the world we are contemplating
may be identical to the world we live in.
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adjustments of our beliefs to be one which views the present situation as more revolutionary than
it truly is. This would be a claim that we face something like a Kuhnian paradigm shift or
scientific revolution. While Kuhn was notoriously inconsistent with regard to what constituted a
scientific paradigm, and thus what constituted a scientific revolution (Kuhn 1970 [1962]), I think
it is fairly clear that we do not face a situation like that of the shift from, say, the pre-Darwinian
to the Darwinian system, where the wholesale reworking of scientific concepts might come into
play.
Except for the permanence of extinction, I believe all of evolutionary theory remains
intact. The cloning technology which could be used for de-extinction already mostly exists, so
we do not face a technological revolution. We face a shift in what this technology might be used
for – more accurately, in addition to purposes for which cloning has been used, we now are
looking at an additional purpose. If the technology’s use for this purpose signifies a revolution
in evolutionary theory, I believe it does so only for our understanding of extinction. It does not
seem to revolutionize our understanding per se of species, perhaps the only other thing in
evolutionary biology which would be a candidate for being revolutionized here. It remains true
that species are lineages of organisms which originate at particular points in time and space,
persist, evolve, and then ultimately cease to exist. The latter, of course, is just the fact that
species ultimately go extinct. But what we are learning is that extinction need not be permanent.
So it is our understanding of extinction which is being revolutionized, and not so much our
understanding of species.

One might try to claim that our concept of species is being

revolutionized, on the grounds that de-extinction entails that species need not ever go extinct.
We thought that forever ceasing to exist was their eventual fate, and now we see we were
mistaken. If this means that species can be saved from extinction, then this is something we
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already knew. A number of species have been rescued from extinction (e.g., the California
condor), and conservation cloning has been proposed as an aid in such efforts (Piña-Aguilar et al.
2009). But if this means that de-extinction promises that we can prevent some species from
permanently ceasing to exist – that they can always be brought back – then that remains to be
seen. Restoring species long-term might prove so difficult that permanent extinction remains
inevitable for all species.

De-extinction might promise only a temporary reprieve, not

immortality.
As I noted at the outset of the chapter, I have attempted to keep my positions here as
consistent with the current body of evolutionary theory as possible. Revisions which we might
make to that body of theory, given the prospect of de-extinction, would need to be wellmotivated with respect to that theory. That is, they should preferably not be ad hoc adjustments
that happen to be consistent with the theory (in just the sense that they don’t, strictly speaking,
contradict it), but rather adjustments which in some sense proceed from, or cohere with, or would
be well-integrated with, or are motivated by the accepted body of theory. As an example, what I
consider myself to have done in §3 and §5, where I argued that clones are parts of the same
species as their progenitors – that the same relation of descent obtains there as it does in ordinary
cases of organism reproduction – is not to have proposed anything new, but rather to have
exposed or explicated something to which we were already theoretically committed.
So, consider one possible alternative line of thinking with regard to de-extinction,
motivated by the desire to avoid temporally discontinuous individuals:

instead of the

resurrection of species and, by that, the creation of temporally discontinuous segments of
individuals, with “de-extinction” we actually have a new form of speciation. Genetic engineers
actually create, from parts of an extinct species, a new species. If we were, as we have been,
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considering a case of a vertebrate species, there would be a serious disanalogy. Speciation with
vertebrate species is a process which takes many generations, whereas here we would have a
case of speciation in a single generation. Speciation in a single generation is really known only
in plants, from polyploidy (the doubling of chromosomes in some offspring). Even the relatively
rapid speciation events involving animals posited by Eldredge and Gould in punctuated
equilibria occur over geological time scales. Presumably, the clones would compose a distinct
species upon their creation, since, to avoid temporally discontinuous individuals, they could not
be parts of the extinct species.
But, of course, it is in nature that speciation of vertebrates does not happen in a single
generation, and we are not contemplating a natural case, or at least not a fully natural case. So a
skeptic of my account who wishes to press the “conceptual revolution” argument might reply
that, because we are outside a normal context, normal contextual parameters (like the
impossibility of speciation in vertebrates in one generation) do not apply. Now, I am denying
that we face a wholesale shift in our evolutionary concepts; my position is that most of these
concepts have not come unmoored, and that we therefore are both entitled and bound to keep as
many of them fixed as we can. If we do not keep at least some, even most, of our evolutionary
concepts moored to their current meanings and extensions, then we can have no confidence that
what we revise will end up having anything to do with terrestrial biology, rather than being an ad
hoc hodge podge. Still, I will grant the skeptic’s claim on this particular point for the sake of
argument, since I believe the proposal will founder on other grounds.
It will founder because, on the individuality thesis, this cannot count as speciation,
instantaneous or otherwise. Speciation is the process, or processes, by which new species
originate from existing species. If de-extinction were really speciation, we would have a case of
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one individual (the extinct species) either becoming (i.e., turning into) a new, distinct individual,
or otherwise giving rise to a new, distinct individual. But as Hull notes (Hull 1978), the criteria
by which one individual becomes another are the same in both species and organisms: criteria of
fission and fusion. Hull points out, “In ontogenetic development, a single lineage is never
divided successively in time into separate organisms” (Hull 1978, 345). With de-extinction, we
have neither an individual splitting more or less equally into two, new, distinct individuals, as in
mitosis; nor do we have two distinct individuals fusing into a new, distinct individual. Given the
individuality thesis, if de-extinction is speciation, then it cannot be transformation of one
individual into another.
Nor can it be the giving rise to a distinct individual through alternate modes of fission or
fusion. In one such alternate mode of fission, an individual buds off part of itself, which
develops into a new individual, as in hydra. With species, this is peripatric speciation, which
involves the geographical separation from the parent species of a peripheral isolate, a small
group of organisms, rather than a roughly equal splitting of the species into two subpopulations
by a geographical barrier (called “vicariant speciation;” both are modes of allopatric
speciation)(Coyne and Orr 2004). But a peripheral isolate remains part of the species from
which it buds off until or unless it achieves reproductive isolation from its parent. There is a
somewhat trivial sense in which the clones produced in de-extinction are reproductively isolated
from their predecessors: they are isolated by time, by the fact that those predecessors do not
exist. But, as I argued in Chapter 2, if it were sound to use such a fact as a criterion of
reproductive isolation, then new species would come into existence within evolving lineages
every few generations, as soon as the last reproductive link to a previous generation was lost.
Humans alive today would constitute a distinct species from their ancestors of about 125 or 150
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years ago.102

So it would seem best to not consider the clones to be isolated from their

predecessors until there is some other, more theoretically grounded development, such as the
evolution of Dobzhansky-Muller incompatibilities (if it were possible to determine that genetic
changes which evolved in the clones’ descendents amounted to such incompatibilities).103 But
then the clones qua peripheral isolate remain part of the extinct species, and we again have a
temporally discontinuous individual.
A tempting way to try to get around this problem would be to say that, were this
peripheral isolate, or its descendents, to become reproductively isolated from the extinct species,
then the entire lineage, starting from and including the isolate, would constitute a new and
distinct species. So, it is indeterminate whether the isolate is part of the extinct species. But I
think such a move misconstrues what it is that is indeterminate in this case. It is indeterminate
whether that peripheral isolate is a founder population, for it is a founder population only if later
generations become reproductively isolated from the parent species.

If the clones are a

peripheral isolate, then at the time of their creation they are determinately part of the extinct
species, as any peripheral isolate would initially be. If the isolate or its descendents became
reproductively isolated from the extinct species in an interesting theoretical way, then the isolate
would become, retroactively, part of the new species of which it was now the founder (Sober
1984b).104
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There is a further problem with such an application of reproductive isolation diachronically within a lineage, as
Sterelny and Griffiths point out (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 188). Which generations get combined into the same
species becomes an arbitrary matter, because which generations are isolated from which depends upon the baseline
one chooses.
103
Dobzhansky-Muller incompatibilities are two or more genetic changes within bifurcated populations which do
not, within the genetic background of each population, produce inviable offspring but which, when crossed with the
allele at the same loci in a genome in the opposite population, cause offspring to be inviable. This precludes
hybridization between the two populations (Johnson 2008).
104
Based upon this fact, Lionel Shapiro has suggested to me that we might employ John MacFarlane’s theory of
future contingents and relative truth (MacFarlane 2003), and question whether a species is extinct when material
from it has been preserved which might be used in the future to clone organisms, as a means of avoiding temporally

260

The alternate mode of fusion by which one individual can give rise to another is when the
parts of two distinct individuals come together to form a third, new, distinct, individual, as
happens in sexual reproduction. I take it as uncontroversial that in the case of de-extinction, we
are not dealing with the parts of two distinct individuals. Nevertheless, our skeptic might
contend that the de-extinction case is more like a somewhat similar and uncontroversial type of
case, one wherein we have remnants of an individual which has ceased to exist, and we use those
remnants in the creation of a new, distinct individual, by combining those remnants – those parts
– with parts which have an independent origin, or perhaps even multiple independent origins.
One might have a very few parts left of some make and model of car, and integrate those parts
with other car parts for that make and model, acquired elsewhere, and create a new car.
But it seems the origin of those additional parts makes a difference to whether we have
numerically the same individual, or a distinct individual. With our hypothetical example of the
car, the additional parts we need to build the car have no historical connection to the remnants
we start with, in the sense that they are not generated from the remnants we have, as clones are
generated from the remnants of an extinct species in de-extinction. Consider, in contrast, annelid
(segmented) worms, which are well-known for their ability to regenerate themselves. In some
species, regeneration is limited to anterior segments, and in others to posterior segments; some
discontinuous individuals. We treat such a species’ extinction as a future contingent. Take a statement such as “S is
extinct at t,” uttered at some time t post-death-of-the-last-organism-in-S, but prior to a de-extinction attempt. We
evaluate the truth of the statement relative to histories which pass through the moments of utterance and assessment
(assessment being made when there either is or definitely never will be a successful de-extinction attempt). Thus,
relative to a history in which S is resurrected, “S is extinct” is false; whereas relative to a history in which it is not,
the statement is true. While this is intriguing, I think the actual situation is that we already have a good notion or
criteria of extinction, which is not affected by the possibility of de-extinction. Again: Lazarus was no less dead just
because it was possible for Jesus to resurrect him. For our purposes, a species is extinct when the last organism has
died, or the species’ internal organization is disrupted. So we have every reason to declare S extinct at t; this matter
is not indeterminate at the time of utterance. What the prospect of de-extinction affects is whether extinction is
permanent. Thus the statement “S is permanently extinct” would lend itself to a future contingents analysis along
MacFarlane’s lines, since whether S is permanently extinct depends upon what happens in the future (assuming cells
have been preserved). One can see that the statement, “P is a founder population,” where P denotes some peripheral
isolate, would lend itself to such an analysis. But, like “S is extinct,” “P is a peripheral isolate” would not. It is
determinate in the present whether P is a peripheral isolate.
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can regenerate both. But in at least two genera of marine annelid worms (class Polychaeta),
Ctenodrilus and Dodecacerin, worms can regenerate from nothing more than a single segment.
Biologists regard this not as the production of a numerically distinct worm, but the regeneration
of numerically the same worm (Reish 1993; Zoran and Martinez 2009). So the criterion here
seems to be that if the parts which compose the “new” individual are generated from the
remnants of the “old” individual, the “two” individuals are in fact numerically the same
individual, whereas if the “new” individual is generated by combining remnants of the “old”
with extraneous, non-affiliated parts, then the “new” and “old” individuals are distinct
individuals. By this criterion, de-extinction is not the production of a numerically distinct
individual. Our allegedly new species is in fact identical with the extinct species. Again, deextinction is not a case of speciation.
Given these thoughts, I think we have good reasons to believe that my position is the
least revision of our beliefs. I hope I have shown that regarding de-extinction as speciation
requires revising our concepts of (at least) speciation, reproductive isolation, and peripheral
isolates, with problematic implications for contemporary biology.105 But if a species was extinct,
and we do not have a case of speciation, and the descent relation establishes the clones as
belonging to the same species as their progenitors, then we have the resurrection of numerically
the same species, and a temporally discontinuous individual. A skeptic might respond that the
conjunction of the individuality thesis, the possibility of de-extinction, and the existence of
temporally discontinuous individuals demands instead that we give up the individuality thesis;
de-extinction proves to be a reductio against the individuality thesis. But then we seem to be

As does regarding the “extinct” species as not truly extinct due to the existence of preserved cells. Organisms
may be targets of selection, but preserved cells are not, nor are the genes contained within them, even if, when
integrated into organisms, both cells and genes may be targets of selection. This is because preserved cells and
genes are not “interactors” (Hull 1989b) – they do not interact with any environment, including one another.
105
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back to species as natural kinds, and, as I hope I have shown in Chapter 1, the preponderance of
considerations is still in favor of viewing species as individuals (and, as I argued in Chapter 2,
that they have no essential intrinsic properties).
A skeptic might, I imagine, respond at this point that certain beliefs are simply much too
deep in the interior of our web relative to others – that temporally discontinuous individuals are
simply too counterintuitive, or a violation of common sense. But, as Hull has pointed out, the
advancement of science often comes at the expense of common sense (Hull 2001), and the
intuitions one has or finds reliable often depend upon the theories or conceptual systems which
one antecedently accepts.

What one finds intuitively plausible or permissible (at least

pretheoretically) often depends upon one’s existing theoretical commitments.

Elder, for

example, regards as “plausible” Woodward’s contention that a theory of causation should not be
in the “primary” business of codifying our intuitions. This is because Elder thinks our intuitions
“are simply too plastic,” seeing as how they can be “pushed one way or another by the influence
of one or another ‘intuition pump’” (Elder 2011, 134). I am not certain that all our intuitions – at
least our pretheoretic intuitions – are always too plastic to be relied upon or accommodated by
scientific or philosophical theories.

Scientists themselves sometimes settle issues, at least

pragmatically, by what seems intuitively more plausible; to wit: as I mentioned, many would be
willing to say that, if a species buds off a peripheral isolate which becomes reproductively
isolated, the parent species continues to exist, against hard-line cladists who would insist that any
permanent split means the extinction of the parent. Why? It just seems right to say that if the
great bulk of the original object remains, it survives the budding-off process, which is what we
would say in the case of plants, or hydras (Sober 2000). But on this issue of intuitions, I tend to
agree with Elder.
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On the other hand, the arguments which Ghiselin, Hull, and others have brought forward
for the individuality thesis, combined with the science upon which they based them, convince me
that species are individuals, not natural kinds (although I can also appreciate some of the points
made by those who think the opposite). Shorn of what knowledge I have of evolutionary theory,
and my acceptance of the individuality thesis, would I find it more (pretheoretically) intuitively
plausible that species are individuals rather than natural kinds?

I don’t think such a

consideration carries any weight in deciding the matter. What I would think about a question in
biology before learning about the biology doesn’t seem relevant to me to whether I should regard
a resolution to that question as plausible. But where considerations from the science are pointing
in one direction, I think pretheoretic intuitions should give way. It is counterintuitive, or was
once, to think that the earth is a sphere, that space is actually a four-dimensional curved fabric of
spacetime, and that species can transmute. The scientific and philosophical considerations
convince me that species are individuals. The logic of the descent relation tells me that the
clones produced in de-extinction must be parts of the same species as the one to which their
progenitors belong. If this means that there can be temporally discontinuous individuals, then we
need to accept the latter, counterintuitive as this may be.
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